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Abstract of M.A. thesis, "The Place of 
Constantinople and the Straits in 
British Foreign Policy; 1890-1902", 
by Margaret M. Jefferson .
V/hen Salisbury and Rosebery directed Britain's foreign 
policy in the early l890s they were convinced of the import­
ance of defending the Straits against Russia and of 
maintaining a strong diplomatic' position at Constantinople.
As British power alone was no longer sufficient to counter 
Russian influence, Britain went into partnership with 
Germany and her Triple Alliance allies. Their collabora­
tion was successful until the confidence of the three 
Continental Powers was undermined by the policy which 
Britain pursued in other parts of the world and then in the 
Near East itself - regarding the Armenian question.
In spite of suspicions to the contrary, Salisbury 
in 1895 upheld his former views on the importance of main­
taining the status quo at Constantinople. It was not until 
November, v/hen the Cabinet refused permission to send the 
fleet through the Straits, that Salisbury had serious 
doubts about Britain's ability to defend them; but, even 
then, he continued publicly to adhere to his former policy, 
believing it essential to retain Austria-Hungary's friend­
ship. Although the real turning point came in October 1897 
when Salisbury privately acknowledged that Britain must 
gradually withdraw from her responsibilities at Constantinople
and strengthen her position in Egypt - a decision made 
easier by the Austro-Russian agreement to maintain the 
status quo in the Near East, in 1901 Lansdowne attempted 
to recreate the old grouping of Powers in order to check 
Russian activities in the Straits; but it proved impossible 
to restore the confidence wh±h had been the basis of the old 
relationship; Austria-Hungary now relied upon her agree­
ment with Russia to maintain the status quo. The way was 
open for the Anglo-French agreement over Egypt.
LIST of ABBREVIATIONS
A.A. : Austrian Foreign Office Archives.
A & P . ; Accounts & Papers (Blue Books).
B.D.F. : Ministère des Affaires ^trang&res: Documents
diplomatiques Français, lB7~l-l914.
P.O. : Public Record Office: Foreign Office Papers.
Foundations : Temperley, H.W.V. and L.M.Penson:
^foundations of British Foreign Policy, from 
dit t to Salisburyl (Cambridge, 1938).
B.D. : G.P.Gooch and H.W.V.Temperley: British
Documents on the Origins of the War,'1898-
igir:— (i6nd'on-r$?CT^rr ----- -
G;.P. : Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette
'ÏÜ71-19Ï4'. (40 VOÏS.’"Berlin Ï922-Ï926).
D.H.B. : The Dictionary of National Biography.
1 .
CHAPTER I
"The Duel of the Whale and the Elephant^
Napoleon, when he said that the Power which possessed 
Constantinople could rule the world, was paying tribute to 
the supreme strategical importance of the former capital of 
the Ottoman Empire# It was the focus of a great ellipse of 
land, bound on the one side by the Black Sea and on the other 
by the Aegean and cut in two by the Straits of the Bosphorus 
and the Dardanelles. The Bosphorus, although only seven­
teen miles long and between half a mile and two miles wide 
(less than the Thames at Gravesend) derived immense importance 
from its position as sole outlet from the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean; while the Dardanelles, guarded by two for­
tresses known as the first and second castles of Europe and 
Asia, given by the Turks the names Set-el-Bahr -Barrier of the
Sea and Mourn Maiessi - Land Castle -’was equally important
(3)
as the gateway from the Mediterranean.
(1) . R .W . Se t on-Wat son, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans
(London, 1917), p.l.
(2) For a good account of the strategical importance of 
Constantinople c.f. L.A.F. Beaujour, "Voyage militaire dans 
1'Empire Othoman”(Paris, 1829), vol.II, pp.BoH^ÎST
(3) E. Hertslet, Memorandum on the Right of the Sultan of 
Turkey to Exclude Foreign Rïïips of War~Trom anH^bo xtestrict 
the Passage of Foreign Merchant Vessels througE the 
LardanerXes and Bospnorus, 12 Novi T8773 F.0. Vol.17 
T T S H f ïd T N ô T ^ r : ---------
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Since both shores of the Straits were within the terri­
tories of Turkey, it was recognized by universal agreement that 
Turkey exercised full sovereignty over the waterway and other 
countries had no rights except such privileges as the Porte 
chose by treaty to accord to them. Thus there arose the 
practice of attempting to influence the Porte by negotiation,
force or bribery.as to the manner in which it should exercise
(1)
its rights of sovereignty, u >
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the sovereign­
ty of the Sultan extended over territories which stretched 
far beyond Constantinople: to.the west, it embraced the
countries of the Balkan peninsula (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia and Bulgaria, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia) and 
- to the south - the territories of North Africa (Egypt, 
Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco); to the east, the Sultan's 
rule extended from the shores of the Persian Gulf, along 
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to the borders of the Russian 
Empire.
Russia, as the Power which, since the time when Peter 
the Great captured Azov, possessed territories bordering on 
those of Turkey, was, of all the great European Powers, the 
most vitally interested in Constantinople and the Straits.
(1) J. Headlam-Morley. Studies in Diplomatic History, 
(Methuen, 1930), p.HIST
3.
For her, arose the questions of the defence of her southern 
frontier and the access of her ships to the Mediterranean. The 
most certain way to gain her ends seemed to Russia either to 
place herself strategically in such a position that it would 
he easy to dominate Constantinople or to force the Sultan to 
grant her exclusive privileges respecting the Straits. Such 
actions invariably aroused the hostility of other European 
Powers, for no great Power could allow another to possess 
such influence, Britain repeatedly took the lead in opposing 
any forward movement on the part of.Russia. She was motiva­
ted by the necessity to keep the Sultan's authority over the
least extensive area which would keep open the over-land route
(1)
to India. In the 1830s interest was centred on the route
across Northern Syria to the Euphrates. In the 1850s the 
Syrian route again found favour when discussions began as to 
the possibility of building a railway through the Euphrates 
valley. There was also the question of maintaining British
sea power in the Levant and the question of prestige; that
/ -
of the British Government at home and in India traditionally 
depended upon the maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople. 
Lord Palmerston was only continuing the policy of Pitt
(1) V/.R. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After
(Methuen, 1938), p.6.
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and Canning when he insisted that the fate of the Ottoman
Empire was of vital importance to all Europe and that any
change in it should he worked out around the conference table
( 1 )
and not produced by the unilateral action of one Power.^ '
His great achievement was to force Russia to give up the 
position which she had gained by the Treaty of Unliiar- 
Skelessi as sole protector of Turkey with the privilege of 
sending her war ships through the Straits and to acknowledge 
with the other signitaries of the Convention of I84I:
"It has at all times been prohibited to the 
ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits 
of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; and that, so long 
as the Porte is at peace, his Highness will admit no 
foreign ships of war into the Straits." (2)
In 1853 the British Cabinet decided upon war because of the
necessity of having a "Power at the Bosphorus to hold the
keys of the Mediterranean from the east "which should not be
Russia"and because they could not "allow Russia to encroach
upon or undermine the Power" which was there necessary to 
(
them. The Treaty of Paris, which ended the war, was in a
sense the high water mark of achievement on the part of
(1) C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. I83O-I84I. 
(London, 1951 j," vol.E) p.790.
(2) E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 1875), 
Vol.II, pp.1024-1026.
(3) Account of the Cabinet meeting of 8 Oct. 1853 by Sydney 
Herbert; quoted by H. Temperley, England and The Near 
East: The Crimea, (London, 1936), p.358.
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Britain, Austria-Hungary?- and France. The neutralisation of 
the Black Sea seemed to ensure that theirs would in future 
he the upper hand. But it was a false security and when 
Russia, in 1871, revoked the Black Sea clauses, the allies 
of the Crimean War had to be content with simply maintaining 
the closure of the Straits, with the important exception 
that the Suit an should have the power "to open the Straits in 
time of peace to vessels of war of friendly and allied 
Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary 
in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1856".
A new element in the old problem appeared in the 1870s 
with the flaring up of nationalism as a vital factor, dominat­
ing the policies not only of Russia and Turkey but of the 
Balkan peoples, who were finding a new consciousness of 
their identity. In Russia, Panslavist doctrine as expounded 
by Fadle;ev, Nicholas Banilevski and General Ignatiev
(2)
revived again the idea of the ancient mission to Constantinople. 
It is difficult to be certain how far those in control of 
Russian policy were influenced by the prevalent doctrines.
When the rising of the Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovinia
(1) E. Hertslet, op.cit. Vol.Ill, p. 1921.
1
(2) W.L. Langer, European Alliances and Allignments, (New 
York, 1950), pp.66-55. 1
6.
first began the conflagration, the Tsar and Gorchakov were
afraid of-thé enormity of the complications that woald ensue
(I)
if the situation in the East got out of hand. They
therefore,' played for safety by ranging themselves with
Austria-Hungary and Germany, a policy made easier by the
continued existence of the Three Emperors' League of 1873.
Russia's attempts to beat down'the flames of insurrection in
the Balkans, as demonstrated by her participation in the
Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum, were probably
genuine. She was determined not to repeat the mistake of the
1850s, but to have other Powers on her side. It was the
relentless sequence of events rather than any deep laid
scheme which led to the Russian declaration of war on 24th
April 1877. "La Turquie", wrote Gorchakov, "a ferra/ toutes
(2)
les voies de conciliation". Even now the Tsar declared 
that his object was solely to secure the execution of the 
decisions of all Europe.
Opinions, even in highest Russian Councils, differed as 
to what should be the precise military object of the campaign. 
Before the ultimatum to Turkey was sent, at a war council 
in Livadia, the Grand Duke Nicholas, designated. Commander
(1) Ibid, p.72.
(2) S. Gorianow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles (Paris: 
1910), p.342.
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in Chief, was told that the goal of the campaign would he 
(1)
Constantinople. Faced by the determined opposition of
England, Russia gave promises that she would not occupy the
city. But it is doubtful how far she regarded herself as
really bound by them. Dascovici draws attention to a despatch
of the Tsar authorising the occupation of Constantinople and
concludes that Russia was prevented from doing this simply by 
• .... (2) 
an "insuffisance de munitions".
There was a similar uncertainty as to Russia's real
intentions regarding the Straits. In reply to a British
enquiry of May, Gorchakov simply said "cette question fut
reglee d'un commun accord sur des bases aquitables et
efficacement garanties". But in a private memorandum for the
information of his ambassador in London he.stated clearly
that the Straits'Agreement should be revised in such a way
to guarantee Russia against attack in the Black Sea in time 
 ^ (3) ' :
of war.
It can be argued that the deeper motivations of the
(1) W.L. Langer, op.cit., p.104.
(2) K. Dascovici, La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles 
(Geneve, 1915), p.*-50.
(3) S. Gorianow, op.cit., p.347.
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policies of the Tsar and Gorchakov were finally revealed in
the Treaty préliminaire of San Stefano, actually negotiated
by General Ignatiev and called by Andrassy an "Orthodox
(1)
Slavic sermon". Montenegro and Serbia were to be inde­
pendent and considerably enlarged. But by far the greatest 
increase of territory was to go to Bulgaria, which would be 
made a state far larger than any other in the Balkans.
Up to this time the creative element in the policies 
of the Great Powers had come from the members of the 
Dreikaiserbund.' British policy was very largely a reaction 
against this. Disraeli, i/spite of his high sounding words 
at the Guild Hall on 9 November 1875:
"The interests of the Imperial Powers in the Eastern 
Question were more direct but they were not more con­
siderable than those of Great Britain". (2)
was unable at this time to do more than clear the ground for
future action. His policy was influenced by two interacting
motives: on the one hand the desire to break down the
alliance of the three Continental Powers; for unless Britain
went out of her way to act with them, they could act without
(1) W.L. Langer, op.cit., p.138 ff.
(2) G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli (London, 192C) 
vol. VI, p.16.
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her, which was not agreeable for a state like England; and, 
on the other hand, the conviction that the Sultan should be 
maintained in a Constantinople which should not be dominated 
by Russia.
It might be expected that, even now, Egypt might play
a large part in Disraeli’s policy.' When he bought for Britain
the Khedive's holdings of Suez Canal stock, in 1873, he
declared : ^
"It is impossible to separate in our thoughts the 
purchase of the Suez Canal shares from the question 
of,England's future relations with Egypt or the 
destinies of Egypt from the shadows that darken 
the Turkish Empire. .Should insurrection or aggres­
sion from without ... bring a political as well as 
financial collapse of the Turkish Empire, it.might 
be necessary to take measures for the security of 
 ^that part of the Sultan's dominions with which we 
are most nearly connected". (1)
Yet, when the eventuality here forseen did take place,
Disraeli was adamant "Constantinople is the key of India and
not Egypt and the Suez Canal": it was no use talking about
Egypt, for Russia could advance by way of Constantinople and
Asia Minor and attack the Suez Canal from Syria. It was
mere moonshine to talk (as Bismarck did) of England having
Egypt or Crete as compensation for "if Constantinople [was]
(1) Quoted by T. Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin (London, 1902) , 
p.8; also quoted by W.L'. Langer, op.cit. , p.256.
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Russian, they would only be an expensive, enoumbranoe".. -
Again, he wrote: "I am surprised that Bismarck should go on
harping about Egypt ... I don't see it would,at all benefit
us, if Russia possessed Constantinople. I would sooner have
(1 )
Asia Minor than Egypt."  ^. .
Even the timid Derby used bold language to.Shuvalov ' -
about Constantinople;
"The British Government would not witness with indiffe- 
' ■ renoe the passing into hands other than those of its
present possessors of a capital holding so peculiar 
-■ and commanding a position". (2)
They also had serious objections to any material alteration 
of the existing arrangements regarding the Straits.
' To the vital question, "would Britain fight ?" no 
conclusive answer can be given. It was true that Disraeli 
was able to write to the Queen, on 21 July 1877, that the 
Cabinet had agreed unanimously that, if Russia occupied 
Constantinople and did not arrange for her immediate retire­
ment from it, the Queen should be advised to declare war
(3)
against Russia. But when it came to the point in 1878, the 
Cabinet showed deplorable indecision. Orders and counter-
(1) G.E. Buckle, op.cit., Vol.VI, pp.100, 104.:
(2) Derby to Shuvalov, 6 May 1877; F.O. 65/986; Foundations 
p.358. _ . . -
(3). G.E. Buckle, op.cit., Vol.VI, p.154.
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orders, regarding advance through the Straits, were sent to
the fleet and it was not until February that it finally passed
through the Straits. It was becoming an object of ridicule
(1)
rather than a weapon of war. On the British Embassy at
Constantinople was placed the notice; "Lost - between Beslka 
Bay and Constantinople - one fleet. Reward to anyone furnish­
ing information". Continental statesmen were not convinced 
that Britain would fight. Bismarck said that, if he had 
made such brave speeches as Disraeli, he would have drawn 
the sword long before.
Disraeli was, however, active in promoting measures for 
the preservation of British interests in the Mediterranean.
In the light of future events the most interesting was an 
attempt to enter into an understanding with the Governments 
of Italy, Austria-Hungary, France and Greece providing that 
they should agree "to consider the maintenance of their 
commercial and political interests in the Mediterranean and 
the Straits and any act tending to the violation of those 
interests, as questions of general concern and they will 
from time to time ... come to an understanding as to the 
measures which may be necessary for the maintenance of those
(1) Quoted by W.L. Langer, op.cit., p.136.
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interests". A change of Cabinet in Italy was immediately
responsible for the failure of what was at best only a half­
hearted attempt at co-operation.
It was not until the Treaty of San Stefano had been
signed and Derby had resigned from the British Cabinet that 
the Government was able, in any real sense, to take the 
initiative in bringing about a combination of Powers hostile 
to Russia. The new foreign Minister, Salisbury, at once made 
the British position clear in a Circular to the Powers of 
1 April. He was chiefly concerned with the combined effect 
of the stipulations of the Russian Treaty; they would 
depress, almost to the point of entire subjection, the 
political independence of the Government of Constantinople, 
"even its independent action and existence I would be! almost
(2) L -J
impossible". He, therefore, insisted that every
article of the Treaty should be submitted to the Congress. 
Salisbury's clarification of the issue earned the respect 
of Continental statesmen, who came to look to him as a 
champion against Russia. The Circular was, in a sense, 
symbolical of the stand that Salisbury was henceforth to take:
(1) Dwight E. Lee, "The Proposed Mediterranean League of 
1878". Journal of Modern History, III, March 1931; pp.33- 
45.
(2) Salisbury's Circular to the Powers, 1 April, 1878; 
printed in Foundations, p.372 ff.
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often suspicious of too close reliance on anything but
British power, he yet recognised that identity of interests
made for sure co-operation among Powers.
The key-note of his future policy was sounded in a
letter to Bayard of 2 May:
"The Porte must recognise that it needs protection; 
that protection must be given by some Power that has 
an interest in avoiding the anarchy which would follow 
on its fall and must be facilitated by a willingness 
on the part of the Porte to make the necessary arrange­
ments." ( 1)
Salisbury considered that Austria-Hungary was as vitally 
interested as Britain in maintaining the Sultan with suffi­
cient power at Constantinople. . From this time, right until 
his retirement, he had only limited faith in the Dual Monarchy,
frequently deploring her weakness and want of trust in her
(2)
own power. But he was forced to depend on her to
guard the dyke that must be built in the Balkans to maintain 
for a little longer the Sultan's power. He was not sanguine
of its ultimate efficacy; "sooner.or later the greatep part
r -7 (3)
of ]_the Turks'! European Empire must go".  ^He only hoped
for a breathing space. Austria-Hungary, now as later,
was reluctant to undertake the onerous duty. It was only
(1) Salisbury to Layard, 2 May 1878; quoted in Lady C.
Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, Vol.II,p.266
(2) Ibid, pp.247-257.
(3) Ibid, p.267.
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after Salisbury had come to a separate agreement with Russia
that Austria-Hungary took her place in forcing Russia to
reduce the Big Bulgaria.
It was clear that she would give no help in forcing
Russia to give up her conquests in Asiatic Turkey; Ardahan,
(1),
Kars and Batoum - strategic keys. Salisbury was convinced
that it was in this region that the strength of the Sultan
must in future lie. Yet, if he had his own strength alone
to trust to, no one would believe in his ability to defend
himself. The presence of Britain would be necessary to stem
the encroaching power of Russia. His efforts were, therefore,
directed towards neutralising the benefits which Russia
might derive from her Asiatic Conquests and providing for the
presence of Britain. Two methods were used. First, by an
Anglo-Turkish Convention England was granted permission to
(2)
occupy Cyprus. She engaged to defend by force of arms
the Asiatic provinces if Russia attempted to take possession 
of any other territories than Kars, Batoum and Ardahan and 
in return the Sultan engaged to introduce the necessary 
reforms into the Government of the Christian and other 
subjects of the Porte in those territories. The latter 
stipulation reflected the problem which had for decades
(1) Ibid, p.261.
(2) For text of Convention of 4 June 1878 cf. E. Hertslet,
The Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 1891),Vol.IV, p.2722.
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troubled British statesmen: if the Sultan were to receive
support, he must appear "respectable" to the electorate and
the criterion of that respectability was the way in which he
treated his Christian subjects.
The second method was to bring about new arrangements
regarding the Straits. The Sultan could be defended by
Britain only if he could be reached. During the Eusso-Turk-
ish war there had been a time when the Sultan was so
intimidated by Russia that he considered opposing by force
the proposed passage of the British fleet. When Admiral
Hornby eventually took the risk he "passed the Straits
without encountering any other obstacle than the presentation
by the Commandant of the Dardanelles of the Porte's protest
(i)
against his proceedings". But the incident had left a
deep imprint upon Salisbury's mind. Writing to Beaconsfield
on 21 March 1878, he suggested that Britain should strive
for "effective securities for the ■free passage of the Straits
(2)
at all times, as if they were the open sea".
In June, influenced by the premature disclosure of his 
agreement with Russia (which contained the British acquiescence 
in her possession of Batoum), he considered the possibility
(1) Layard to Derby, 14 Feb. 1878; F.O.78/4271, No.228; 
printed in Foundations, p.362.
(2) Quoted in Foundations, p.366.
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of concluding an agreement with Turkey, according to which the
Sultan "will not offer forcible opposition to the passage at
any time of the English fleet through the Straits" if England
should consider the presence of her naval force expedient for
(1)
the protection of his interests. . The effect would be
that England could provide for the security of the Porte
without putting upon them^the burden of summoning her under
the Treaty of 1871. Salisbury considered that the advantage
of entry into the Black Sea would be sufficient to outweigh
the disadvantage of the inevitable throwing open of the
Straits, for Britain had the stronger naval power. But his
proposal alarmed his colleagues. ■ It meant a complete change
of front on the part of Britain, who had made the maintenance
of the 1871 Treaty one of her conditions of neutrality in
May, 1877. Philip Currie, a member of the British delegation
to the Berlin Congress owned that it rather made his hair
(2)
stand on end. The Cabinet felt that the opening of the 
Straits would be dangerous and unpalatable to Turkey and 
considered that, with the Anglo-Turkish Convention, Britain 
"should possess a leverage which would at any time force Turkey
(1) Salisbury to Layard, 16 June, 187 9; printed in 
Foundations, p.388.
(2) Currie to Tenterden, 17 June 1878; quoted in Foundations, 
p.382.
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to open the Straits to England, even were the rule of 1871
(1)
to be continued".
Salisbury, therefore, stated on 6 July at the fourteenth
session of the Congress that, considering Batum was declared
a free and commercial port, England would agree to the
(2)
maintenance of the status quo regarding the Straits. A 
protocol was drawn up which eventually appeared in the treaty 
as Article LKIII: The treaties of Paris and London "are
maintained in all such of their provisions as are not
(3)
abrogated or modified by the preceding stipulations".
After this session, further forebodings as to the 
possible adverse effects on British prestige in the East of 
unopposed Russian influence in the Black Sea and dissatisfac­
tion with the Asiatic clauses of the Treaty, were responsible
for turning Salisbury's thoughts back to his earlier ideas
(4)
on the Straits. The most the British Cabinet would
authorise was the very vague statement which Salisbury made 
on 11 July:
(1) Cross to Salisbury, 25 June 1878; F.O.363/4, tel, 
(Tenterden papers); quoted by WIN. Medlicott, The 
Congress of Berlin and After (London, 1938) , p.l05.
(2) Ibid. p.110.
(3) E. Hertslet, op.cit., vol.IV, p.2798.
(4) W.N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp.Ill, 116, 121.
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"Considering that the Treaty of Berlin will modify 
an important part of the arrangements sanctioned by 
the Treaty of 1856 and that the interpretation of Art­
icle Z of the Treaty of London, which is dependent on 
the Treaty of Paris, may thus become a matter of dispute, 
I declare on behalf of England that the obligations of 
H.M. Government relating to the closure of the Straits 
do not go further than an engagement with the Sultan 
to respect in this matter H.M.'s independent determina­
tions in conformity with the spirit of existing 
treaties". (1)
There appeared to be an inconsistency between Salisbury's 
action of the 6 July, when he seemed ready to stand by the 
collective enga^ment regarding the Straits and his action of 
the 11th when he seemed to imply that Britain acknowledged 
an engagement towards the Sultan only. The protocols of the 
Conference offer no explanation of this. It was not until 
1885, when questions were asked in the British Parliament as 
to the meaning of the declaration, that an explanation was 
given. It was admitted that the object had been to establish 
the principle that British engagements in respect to the 
Dardanelles were not engagements of a general European or 
international character, but were engagements towards the 
Sultan only. The practical bearing of the declaration, how­
ever, was considered to be:
"that if, in any circumstances^the Sultan should not 
be acting independently, but under pressure from some
(1) E. Hertslet, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.2727.
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other Power, there would he no international obligation 
on j^ritain'^ part to abstain from passing through 
the Dardanelles". (1)
This corresponds with what has already been shown to be the
direction of Salisbury's thoughts before the sessions of
July. His declaration could be justified legally by the
argument that the Treaty of 1871 would bemlid only if the
Sultan were free to make an independent judgement as to
admitting foreign vessels. But international lawyers are
agreed that there could be no legal justification for
"Une declaration unilatérale insérée au protocole 
apr’és coup, sans qu'il se soit produit aucune 
circonstance qui pourrait justifier le retrait 
d'un consentement donné, ne saurait altérer 
l'unanimité du congres, constatée par le président, 
sur ce point". (2) 'L •
The most far-reaching implications of Salisbury's declaration
were not to be found in law, but in politics. It will be
seen that Britain derived little practical benefit from it.
Indeed, the air of vagueness and doubt which resulted from
the statement but non-clarification of the opposing views of
Britain and Russia at the Congress was responsible for many
of the difficulties of future diplomatic activity concerning
the Straits. But most important of all were the effects on
(1) Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol.279; Colls.1818-27.
(2) E. Nys, Droit International {Bruxelles, 1912), vol.I, p. 
509. For a discussion of the legal aspect of the 
declaration of. C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, The Question 
of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (London, 1917), p.156 ff.
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Russian policy of the fear she now felt that a British
squadron would appear in the Black Sea when - as Sahurov put
(1)
it - it seemed good to her to send it. In the 1880s this
fear was, more than anything else, responsible for the
movement of Russia towards Germany - the only Power who could
prevent Britain gaining Continental allies to help her to
further her ends. Throughout the negotiations leading up to
the formation of the Dreikaiserbund of 1881, the one subject
on which Saburov was immoveable was the question of the
Straits. He eventually secured from Germany and Austria-
Hungary the acknowledgement of
"The European and mutually obligatory character of the 
principle of the closing of the Straits".
The three Courts would take care that Turkey would make no
exception to this rule and should an infringement occur, they
would inform Turkey:
"that they would regard her, in that event, as putting 
herself in a state of war towards the injured party 
and as having deprived herself thenceforth of the 
benefits assured to her territorial status quo by the 
Treaty of Berlin". (2)
This development lay in the future and the immediate 
importance of the Berlin Congress for British policy was to be
(1) Saburov to Bismarck, 5 Feb. 1880; G.P.III. No.512.
(2) A.F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 
(Cambridge, U.S.A. 1920-21) Vol.I, pp.36-50.
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seen in the inauguration of a working partnership between
Britain and Austria-Hungary. It was first demonstrated to the
world in a dramatic way at the second sitting when Austria-
Hungary openly supported Britain in her demands for the reduc-
(1)
tion of the Big Bulgaria. It was continued after the
Congress when difficulties were felt in putting into operation
the stipulations of the Treaty. In February 1879 the issue was
the reluctance of Russia to evacuate the Balkan peninsula:
Salisbury declared his willingness to exchange notes with
Andrassy, "expressing .... readiness to assist the Sultan in
case the Russians should refuse to abide by the Treaty in the
(2)
matter of evacuation". In May, the fear that Britain was
wavering in her support led Andrassy to attempt to bind her
more closely. He was so far successful that Salisbury
undertook "that no diplomatic step touching the Balkan .
peninsula in its widest sense" would be taken vis-a-vis
Russia without its having been previously communicated to the
(3)
Austro-Hungarian government. Andrassy responded by expres­
sing his satisfaction "À l^idee de nous concerter sur toute
(1) W.H. Medlicott, op.cit., p.53.
(2) Salisbury to Elliot, 6 Feb. 1879; Austrian Foreign Office 
Archives, copy. 'Q,uoted by W.H. Medlicott, British Fèreign 
Policy in the Near East from the Congress of Berlin Fo 
The Accession of Ferdinand of Ooïïurg; M.A. thesis Tor the 
University of London, 1926, p.^6.
(3) Salisbury to Karolyi, 8 May 1879; Austrian Foreign Office 
Archives; quoted by W.H. Medlicott, The Congress of 
Berlin and After, p.376.
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demarche diplomatique concernant la péninsule des Balkans".
This was a much greater undertaking than the former - yet
Salisbury did not demur when the words were read to him by the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. The explanation of his attitude
is to be found in the conviction that it would be difficult
for Britain not to goto Austria's assistance, if she were
seriously attacked by Russia. He developed his ideas fully
in a speech at Manchester on 18 October:
"The danger was that Russia would threaten the independenci 
of Constantinople or the shores of the Black Sea to the 
Adriatic. The remedy we have applied depends, in the 
first instance, on the Turk ... If the Turk falls, remem­
ber that Austria is now at Novi Bazar and has advanced 
to the latitude of the Balkans and that no advance of 
Russia in the Balkans ... can now be made unless the 
resistance of Austria is conquered ,.. . I believe that 
in the strength and independence of Austria lie the 
best hopes of European stability and peace". (2)
He therefore welcomed the news of the strengthening of
Austria-Hungary by her alliance with Germany as "good tidings
of great joy".
This speech was in sharp contrast to the one made by
Gladstone early in the following year. Aroused by the fever
of his electioneering campaign, he said:
(1) Andrassy to Karolyi, 20 may 1879; Austrian Foreign 
Office Archives. The correspondence is quoted in
extenso in the appendix of W.N. Medlicott's M.A. thesis 
for the University of London, 1926.
(2) The Times, 19 Oct. 1879; p.10.
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"There is not a spot on the whole map where you can lay
your finger and say: There Austria did good."
It might be expected that when he came into power at the head
of a Liberal Government there would be a great change in
British policy. But as far as the central features of
Britain's Eastern policy - Constantinople and the Straits -
were concerned, it is probable that the change was not so
far-reaching as has been generally considered. Even Gladstone
accepted the maintenance of Turkey as a means of protecting
the route to India. In a Memorandum of May he expressed his
views in a characteristic manner:
"We desire the maintenance of the Turkish Empire com­
patibly with the welfare of the people and think that, 
where autonomy has or may be granted, the Suzerainty of 
the Sultan might still be useful and conducive to the 
peace of Europe". (1)
He never demanded the extinction of the Sultan's rule over
his Moslem subjects or even over the Christians of Macedonia.
As to Constantinople itself, his views were described by his
Foreign Secretary in a letter to the British ambassador
at Berlin: ♦
"I doubt whether there be any statesman at home or 
abroad who is more opposed to £fîussial having any 
paramount power at Constantinople". Cs)
Lord Granville might be relied upon to know the views of his
(1) Memorandum on "The proposed language of Mr. Gladstone to 
Musurus Pasha, 23 May 1880; printed in Foundations, p. 
398.
(2) Granville to Odo Russell, 13 Oct. 1880; quoted by S. 
Fitzmaurice, The Life of the Second Earl Granville (Long-
n n o  «A 1 0 / ^ K \   I T T -  ^  '
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chief and he could have little reason for misrepresenting 
them to Lord Odo Russell. A second testimony to the same 
effect was given in 1887 hy Philip Currie, then Permanent 
Under Secretary when he told Bismarck that he thought that 
even Gladstone would he prepared to join with Austria- 
Hungary, in opposing a.Russian occupation of Constantinople*
The Liberals would say that the difference between 
their policy and* that of Salisbury and Disraeli simply lay
in their refusal to exploit "abuse and nagging at Russia"
as a means of popularity. There was, of course, a basic 
difference in the European situation which confronted the 
Liberals in i860. By that time the Great Powe'rs were ready 
to find a modus vivendi for themselves and to concentrate 
common attention on the one Power who had failed to carry 
out her obligations under the Berlin Treaty. They, there­
fore, responded willingly to Gladstone's invitation to 
unite in concert to require Turkey to fulfil her obliga­
tions to Greece, Montenegro and Armenia.
By 1885 it had become evident that British statesmanship 
was greatly inferior to that of Bismarck, who had succeeded in
(1) Lady G. Cecil, op.cit., Vol.Ill, p.259.
(2) Foundations, p. 394.'
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disrupting Gladstone's Concert by winning over Austria-Hungary 
and Italy to his side in new European groupings. This was all 
the more serious since Britain had incurred onerous obliga­
tions through her entry into Egypt in 1882. The dangers of 
her position were strikingly demonstrated in the Spring of 
1885 by the Pendjeh crisis. At first sight it might seem 
to be only a matter affecting Central Asia: Russia had
defeated Afghan troops on the borders of Afghanistan, a 
country which Britain had promised to defend from unprovoked 
attack. Britain had watched with alarm the Russian advance 
through Central Asia, fearing for the safety of her rule in 
India. . The threat was to her prestige rather than to her 
strategic position. Public opinion forced the Government 
to arm and make the incident a trial of strength between 
Britain and Russia. It then became clear that, for each 
country, the issue would be decided not in central Asia, but in 
the Near East : British forces must pass through the Straits,
if Russia was to be attacked in the Caucasus - the only 
satisfactory ground for operations. The diplomatic struggle 
became centred on Constantinople. Britain attempted to 
maintain her interpretation of the rule of the Straits as 
expressed in 1878. Russia now called upon the members of the 
Breikaiserbund for fulfil their obligations under that Treaty. 
Bismarck was true to his word and took the initiative in
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making the views of the three monarchies known at Constanti­
nople: the Saltan could maintain his neutrality only if he
kept the Straits closed. The German Chancellor was consciously 
opposing Britain in what he called "le duel de la haleine et
U )
de 1 'elephant". He was making use of the occasion to
demonstrate to the world the solidarity of the Three Emperors'
alliance, recently renewed at Ski^hevlce. In the face of
this combination Britain was helpless and unable to impress
(2)
her views upon the Sultan, who kept the Straits closed.
Although the crisis quickly passed, when Russia and 
Britain submitted their claims in Central Asia to arbitration, 
its effects were far reaching. The Sultan was confirmed 
in his admiration of Germany. He sent von der Goltz and 
Ristow, German officers in the service of the Porte, with a 
commission to examine the defences of the Dardanelles. A 
report was drawn up to the effect that "neither the batteries 
nor the torpedo defences could deter a British fleet from 
passing through". Salisbury always saw in this the origins 
of the Sultan's decision to make the fortresses of the
(1) C. de Freycinet, Souvenirs 1878-93 (Paris, 1913) , p.3C3.
(2) C.L. Smith The Embassy of Sir William White at., 
Constantinople T886-189T. "TOxTorH, 19 67) pp.8-13.
W.L. Danger, op.cit., pp.309-315.
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(I)
Dardanelles really effective.
Salisbury himself, when he came into power in June, was
confirmed in his belief that Britain must draw closer to the
Central Powers, if her policies were to be successful. On
2 July he wrote a private letter to Bismarck, stressing the
"supreme importance" he attached to a good understanding
(2)
Between Britain and Germany. He also revived the plan of
exchanging information with Austria-Hungary concerning Russian
activities in the Balkans, when he sent to ICalnoky reports,
(3)
received from Dascelles, of revolutionary activities.
When, in September, peace in the East was threatened by 
a revolt in Eastern Roumelia and the union of the two parts 
of Bulgaria which had been separated at Berlin, his first 
instructions to William White (British Minister Plenipoten­
tiary to the Porte) were:"as a general rule, you may associate' 
yourself with any advice in which your Austrian and German 
colleagues join". He considered that Britain's interests 
were not sufficient to justify her acting alone, but she
was prepared" to act with the other Powers in upholding the
(4)
Treaty of Berlin".
(1) Marschall to Hatzfeldt, 19 May 1890; G.P.IX. No.2090.
(2) Salisbury to Bismarck, 2 July 1885, G.P.17, No.782.
(3) Memorandum forwarded: from British Embassy, dated Vienna, 
27 June 1885; Austrian Foreign Office Archives, quoted 
by W.N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp.252-253.
(4) Salisbury to White, 22 Sept. 1885; FtD*78/3757, No.58 A;
Foundations, p.429.
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Yet in fact Britain did again stand alone among the Great
Powers and Salisbury had to change his formula to preserving
(1)
the sanctity of the treaty by an "act of veneration". When 
he wrote to White he did not know of Austria-Hungary's commit­
ments under the terms of the Three Emperors* Alliance or of 
her Treaty with Serbia. Bismarck^ true to his words to 
Malet’- minor questions in the East were left to Austria-
Hungary, but when the peace of Europe was seriously threatened,
/ ^
"he took the reigns into his own hands and was able to hold 
(2)
them" -.became the dominating figure. His chief object 
was to divert Russia's hostility away from Austria-Hungary 
to Britain.
His task was not difficult, since Britain's attitude 
to the Bulgarian problem was still diametrically opposed to 
Russia's; although changed circumstances,had led each country 
to change her ground. At Berlin, Salisbury objected to the 
Big Bulgaria because he thought it would be a strong-hold 
through which Russia would menace Constantinople. In 1885, 
he recognized that a united Bulgaria would be anti-Russian 
and would be a more effective barrier against a Russian advance
(1) Salisbury to Pauncefote, 4 Dec. 1885; F.0.64/IC75: 
Ibid., p.433.
(2) Malet to Salisbury, 22 Sept. 1885; F_._Q. 64/IC79, No.436
Seer.; quoted by C.L. Smith, op.cit., p.19.
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through the Balkans than the mountain range which the Sultan
had failed to fortify in 1878. . Therefore, he advocated a
personal union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, under Prince
(1)
Alexander. Russia, although sympathising with the union,
objected to the method of its achievement and the rule of
Prince Alexander and demanded a return to the status quo 
(2)
ante. It was with reluctance that Salisbury agreed to the
Russian suggestion that a conference of ambassadors at
Constantinople should attempt to find a solution to the problem
In reality, Britain was now as isolated as she had been earlier
in the year. But she marked time until the victory of Prince
Alexander over the Serbs at 3livnitza.:i enabled her to press
her views strongly. She was so far successful that, in a
Turco-Bulgarian agreement of April 1886, Prince Alexander
was named Governor General of Eastern Roumelia for a period
(3)
of 5 years. Her prestige at Constantinople and in
Europe was immensely increased: she had been raised "from
( 4 )
contemned singularity to applauded leadership".
(1) G. Cecil, op.cit., Vol.Ill, pp.239-42; C.L. Smith, op. 
cit., PP.2U-H5T”
(2) W.L. Langer, op.cit., pp.345 ff.
(3) C.L. Smith, op.cit., pp.30-37.
(4) Lady G. Cecil, op.cit., III, pp.256-7.
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But the realisation that this success was due to the 
Battle of Slivnitza and to clever diplomacy rather than to any 
real increase of strength was impressed on the world in July 
1886 when Russia notified Britain.that the privileges of free 
port status would he removed from Batum. . Although Britain ha$, 
at Berlin, made an issue out of the status of Batum, the For­
eign Secretary, Lord Rosebery, was unable to do anything more 
effective than to write a blistering Blue Book dispatch. The
severity of his language only served to emphasize, Britain's 
( 1)
isolation.
When Salisbury returned to office in August--.to be 
confronted by a second Bulgarian crisis v  resulting from the 
enforced abdication of Prince Alexander^ he.was more deter­
mined than ever to win the support of Austria. His Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Iddesleigh, put the issue clearly to her in a 
Memorandum of 30 September:
"It is to be feared that Russia may so influence the 
Balkan people ... that they may practically give 
themselves up to her. In that case the influence 
would be exerted not only over the Balkan states but 
over Constantinople itself. The Sultan, in the hands 
of Russia, would be a very formidable power and it could 
not be long before England would find herself in a 
position from which she would hardly be able to extricate 
herself without a serious war ... For a clearly defined 
object, such as the defence of Constantinople, England
(1) Foundations, pp.436-441.
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no doubt would fight. Whether she would do so to ob­
viate the danger of an attack is very questionable 
unless she had the full support of some other Powers ...
We must prepare for a long diplomatic struggle. We (1) 
cannot work at once at Constantinople and Bulgaria ..."
The implication was obvious: Salisbury and Iddesleigh wanted
to return to the partnership of the Berlin Congress period: 
Austria-Hungary was to be responsible for the Balkans,
Britain for Constantinople. But Austria-Hungary was even 
less willing now than formerly to do this. In 1886 she had 
serious doubts as to whether Britain would in fact cariy out 
the policy she professed. It was well known abroad that the 
British Cabinet was divided. Lord Randolph Churchill, suppor­
ted by V/.H. Smith and Lord George Hamilton, favoured the 
idea of an understanding with Russia, by which, in return 
for support in Egypt and an abandonment of her pressure upon 
Afghanistan, Britain would allow Russia to settle Balkan 
affairs as she wished. Churchill thought that "any anti- 
Russian policy which involved Britain taking the lead
ostensibly on the side of Turkey about Constantifaople would
(2)
place the Unionist party in great peril."
(1) Ibid, p.442.
(2) W.S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (London, 1951) 
new edition, pp.615^16.
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His views called forth from Salisbury a clear statement of 
ideas :
"The possession by Russia of Constantinople will be 
an awkward piece of news for the minister who receives 
it. The prestige effect on the Asiatic populations ■ 
will be enormous and I pity the English party which 
has this item on their record. They will share the 
fate of Lord North's party.”
In October he repeated the same sentiments;
"I consider the loss of Constantinople would be the ruin 
of our party and a heavy blow to the country and I am 
anxious to delay by all means Russia's advance to 
that goal". ( 1)
The fundamental disagreement between Salisbury and Churchill
on foreign affairs was probably as much responsible for the
submission and acceptance of his resignation from the Cabinet
as the ostensible reason given - the rejection of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer's proposed economies at the
Admiralty and War Office.
But his resignation in December came too late to reassure
Austria-Hungary; who continued her "attitude of observation".
Disappointment as to Austria-Hungary's attitude and Germany's
attitude (whose interest at this time was centred on France -
so much so that she would not promise to rescue Austria-
Hungary from Russian aggression in the East) and growing
(1) Ibid.
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concern about the Egyptian question Led the British Govern­
ment to turn to Italy, who, as a naval power, might be 
expected to be useful to Britain in the Near East. Bismarck, 
faced by a deadlock in the negotiations for the renewal of 
the Triple alliance, envisaged a new arrangement by which 
Germany would support Italy as before, but Italy would secure 
further support by an arrangement with Britain, so that
Austria-Hungary need incur obligations towards Italy only in
(1)
the matter of her Balkan policy. Bismarck and Salisbury
alike looked to an Anglo-Italian understanding as a means
(2)
of giving Austria-Hungary increased support in the East. 
Salisbury wrote that he was confident of his ability to pre­
vent Russia acquiring "any foothold on the Aegean and the 
Straits" but a conflict would menace Austria-Hungary too and 
England alone can do nothing effective to save Austria.
Yet it is of great importance to her that Austria should
(3)
not succumb".
The basic principle involved in the notes exchanged 
between England and Italy on the 12 February 1887, was the
(1) W.N. Medlicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887", 
The Slavonic Review,Vol.V, 1926,.p.67.
(2) Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, 6 Feb. 1887; G.P. IV. No.885. 
Bismarck to Henrich VIII; ibid, No.893.
(3) Salisbury to the Queen, 30 Jan. 1887; Letters of Queen 
Victoria, 3rd series (London, 1930), p.HBU.
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preservation of the status quo in the Mediterranean, Adriatic
and Black Seas - with the additional promise of Italy to
support British policy in Egypt in return for the British
(I)
promise to support Italian policy in North Africa.
Salisbury expressly stated to the Italian ambassador that
"England never promised material assistance in view of an
uncertain war of which the object and cause were unknown".
He thought that the agreement was "as close an alliance as
the Parliamentary character of British institutions would
(2)
permit". ' . .'
From the beginning, Salisbury mepnt the agreement with 
Italy to be a starting point to a closer understanding with 
Austria-Hungary. Even before the exchange of notes,Paget, 
the British Ambassador in Vienna, had again asked Kalnoky how 
England could help Austria-Hungary, in the event of a war 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Kalnoky had again replied 
that Britain must defend the Straits and Black Sea, but 
expressed doubts as to whether any Parliamentary Government 
could be permanently bound, Salisbury admitted that no 
British Government could pledge itself to military co-operation
(1) Text in B^. Vol.VIII, pp. 1, 2.
(2) Salisbury to the Queen, 2 Feb. 1887; . Letters of Queen 
Vietoria, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.268-70.
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But in reporting this to Kalnoky, Karolyi expressed his pri­
vate belief that the "political agreement” would be an
(1)
important step to an eventual military alliance. When, 
on 24 March, there were exchanged between the two Governments 
notes which contained an expression of their mutual desire 
to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean and neigh­
bouring seas, it was clear that the Austro-Hungarian Govern­
ment regarded them not as important in themselves, but as a
(2)
promise of better things.
Salisbury emphasized again that the question of 
material assistance had been carefully put aside. He said 
openly that the agreements had been adopted to a great ex­
tent by the advice of Germany, who appeared to attach great 
importance to them. Salisbury hoped that the Agreements, 
which gave Britain a link with the Central Powers, would 
draw to Britain's side the support of German diplomacy.
The testing ground for the new friendship was found not 
in the Bulgarian but in the Egyptian problem. As early as
• : r O
1885, when Sir Henry Drummon Wolff was sent on a special 
mission to Constantinople "with special reference to the 
affairs of Egypt", Salisbury had defined his policy: to work
(1) W.N. Medlicott, The Slavonic Review, Vol.V, op.cit., 
pp.72-73.
(2) Text in B.D., Vol.VIII, pp. 2, 3.
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"for evacuation, but with certain privileges reserved for 
England". In that year negotiations failed. But in May 
1887 Wolff succeeded in signing with the Porte a Convention, 
which provided for evacuation under certain conditions. Then 
the storm broke. France, supported by Russia, objected to 
the conditions and pressed the Sultan to refuse to ratify 
the Convention. It was now vitally important that Britain 
should have the support of the Central Powers if she were 
to win the diplomatic battle, which had been transformed 
from an Anglo-Turkish struggle over Egypt to a more compre­
hensive struggle, involving the balance of power in the 
Mediterranean. But Bismarck was at this time involved in 
the last stages of negotiating with Russia the Reinsurance 
Treaty, in which he promised to Russia "moral and diplomatic 
support", should the Tsar "find himself under the necessity 
of assuming the task of defending the entrance of the Black 
Sea, in order to safeguard the interests of Russia". The 
German Chancellor was unwilling to jeopardise these negotia­
tions by coming out openly on the side of England. The 
Sultan refused to ratify the Convention and Britain, 
lacking the necessary diplomatic support, was unable to make 
her wishes prevail. Her new friends had failed her.
But Salisbury, from the beginning of the year, had been 
careful to find further safeguards for Britain's position by
37.
attempting to conciliate Russia over Bulgaria. In January
he had laid down three points as the basis of his policy
there: the recognition of British obligations under the
Treaty of Berlin, the necessity to consider the wishes of the
(1)
Bulgarian people and the legitimate desires of Russia.
The air of vagueness had increased the air of conciliation.
When, in July, an agreement was also reached with Russia
over the Afghan boundary dispute, the Russian Foreign
Minister, Giers, became convinced that there was no longer
any major cause of antagonism between the two countries. He
was concerned with the dangers of a Franco-German war - .
since Germany's attention was still focused on France,
where the Boulangist movement was at its height. . He went
so far as to suggest an understanding between Britain and
Russia, which he thought would be a starting point for a
(2)
general understanding between all the Powers. This sugges­
tion came in the summer of 1887, just after the diplomatic 
defeat of Britain at Constantinople: that Salisbury consid­
ered it is proved by the conversation he had with Hatzfeldt
(1) Foundations, p.445.
(2) Morier to Salisbury, 17 Aug. 1887; £ .0.65/1298, No. 
287 Seer. Quoted by C.L. Smith, op.cit., p.86.
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on 3 August, in which he attempted to sound the German
(1)
attitude to the idea. But it was almost a foregone
conclusion that Salisbury would ultimately reject it. He
gave his principal reason in a despatch to his ambassador
at St. Petersburg:
"As long as Russia moves, however slowly, towards 
Constantinople, her actions will be watched jealously 
here ... The real cause of friction, which may be 
durable, is the Stamboul sentiment in Russia. I 
doubt if the Englishman will for a long time recon­
cile himself to seeing the Black Sea a Russian lake,and 
I therefore look upon any cordial friendship with 
Russia as problematical." (2)
The lesson learnt from the failure to ratify the Wolff 
Convention was not that Britain should look for support to 
another Power, but that she should seek to strengthen the 
ties which she already had with the Powers v/ho had exchanged 
Notes with her in the Spring. This was made easier by the 
existence of a wish on the part of Italy and Austria-Hungary 
to change that vague understanding into a more definite 
agreement.
In July the Italian ambassador at Constantinople, Baron 
Blanc, had drawn his own conclusions from Britain's diploma­
tic defeat and presented them to the British Government in
(1) Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, 3 Aug. 1887; G.P. IV, No.907; 
cf. C.L. Smith, op.cit., p.87 and W.L. danger, European 
Alliances and Alignments pp.430-1.
(2) Salisbury to Morier, 2 Aug.1887; Morier Papers; Quoted 
by C.L. Smith, op.cit., p.87.
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the form of a Memorandum. He suggested that Britain should
make her Convention the foundation of an immediate agreement
between Italy and Austria-Hungary: a general scheme for the
administration of Egypt should be prepared. It would inspire
the confidence of Germany, who would co-operate with the
Powers long after the completion of the arrangements for 
(1)
Egypt.
The suggestion was not immediately accepted by Britain, 
who had a horror of.international interference in Egypt.
But the idea was borne in mind. A further contribution to 
it was made by Austria-Hungary, who was becoming alarmed at 
Bismarck's support of the Russian attempts to establish
General Erenroth as Regent in Bulgaria. Irlspite of the
/
formal acceptance of the Bulgarian throne given by Prince 
Ferdinand, the Porte continued to concede the substance 
of the Russian demands. In August the Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador at Constantinople, Calice, wrote that he had 
consulted with his British and Italian colleagues concerning 
the basis of ideas which should preserve the interests of the 
Powers in the East.
Salisbury still held back, wishing this time to secure
(1) Wolff to Salisbury, 12 July 1887; F .0.78/4C59, No.113 
Most Seer, and Gonfid. Quoted by C.L. Smith, op.cit., 
p.79.
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from Bismarck a definite assurance of support. His waiting
game was ultimately successful, for Bismarck, becoming aware
of his failure to conciliate Russia, once again decided
that the possibility of war in the East would be lessened if
he came out more openly on the side of the Mediterranean
Powers. On 22 November Salisbury received from him a letter
which gave the desired assurance as to the future lines of
(1)
German policy.
The British Prime Minister then set about revising the
draft of an Agreement which had already been drawn up by
Austi;o-Hungary and Italy to make it conform more closely to
the direction of British policy. The changes which he made
are significant as indications of Salisbury's ideas at this
time. Article 5 was revised so that it stipulated that;
"Turkey, constituted by the Treaties guardian of the 
Straits, can neither cede any portion of her sovereign 
rights nor delegate her authority to any other Power 
in Asia Minor."
In Britain it was considered that a threat to the Straits
could come from Asia Minor as well as the Balkans. Articles
7 and 8 were revised so that they recognized specifically
that the maintenance of "the independence of the Ottoman
(1) Bismarck to Salisbury, 22 Nov. 1887; G.P. IV, No.930.
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Empire and the integrity of its territory" should he the 
purpose of the Agreement. In the event of a threat to that 
independence the Powers "will immediately come to an agree-
(I)
ment as to the measure to he taken". It is important to
notice that, once again, Salisbury had refused to commit
Britain to action: the only commitment was to concert with
the signatory powers as to the measures to be taken.
When agreement was finally reached, on 16 December,
Salisbury sent a separate answer to the two identic notes
of Italy and Austria-Hungary, instead of signing three
(2)
identic notes. His object was to make it clear that Italy 
and Austria-Hungary were to be in the front line, with 
Britain behind them. Although he fully admitted Britain's 
interest in the maintenance of Turkey's domination over her 
present Empire and over the Straits, it was not so 
"imperative and vital" as theirs.
In the same vein, he attempted to belittle the impor­
tance of the Agreement, saying that it guaranteed nothing 
which had not been secured by more formal treaties. But 
this depreciation of the value of written agreements was
(1) W.N. Medlicott, The Slavonic Review, Vol.V, op.cit., 
p. 85.
(E) Text i n ^ D .  , Vol.VIII, pp.12-13.
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habitual with Salisbury. In reality, Britain's position at 
Constantinople was immensely strengthened. Even before the 
notes were exchanged, her ambassador there had written
(1)
jubilantly; "Now, we are four sentries at their posts". 
Behind these sentries was the shadow of Bismarck, whose 
promise to support the Mediterranean Powers gave the coup de 
gr^ce to the Three Emperors' Alliance.
The plan, vaguely formulated by Disraeli in 1887 for 
preserving Britain's interests in the Mediterranean was now 
realised. The idea of protection for the Sultan, envisaged 
by Salisbury at Berlin, was developed to its logical 
conclusion. How closely and for how long the Powers, thus 
united, could continue to work together to maintain what in 
1887 were common interests were questions to which only 
future events could reveal the answers.
Although Salisbury regarded it as of vital importance 
for Britain to maintain a strong diplomatic position at 
Constantinople, such a position was becoming increasingly 
difficult to achieve in the last years of the nineteenth
(I) White to Salisbury, 18 Oct. 1887; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 75, No.56.
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century; for,^as Salisbury himself observed, the Sultan 
hated Britain. The British occupation of Egypt and Cyp­
rus was in itself sufficient to account for this feeling, 
because, in each case, Britain had made herself mistress of 
a Moslem community. She had shown that she could govern 
Moslems and make them prosperous. To the Sultan, to whom
his position as the first Moslem of the world was every-
(2)
thing, this rivalry was exasperating and alarming. Abdul
Hamid was also alarmed by the desire which the Liberal
Government of 1880 had shown to introduce some form of
constitutional control over his arbitrary power. Sir Austen
Layard (British ambassador at Constantinople) had written
on 27 April 1880:
"The Powers have a right to demand that the National 
Assembly should be called together. If H.M.'s Govern­
ment were disposed ... they would, I believe, be 
supported by the most intelligent and enlightened 
liberal public opinion in the Empire. An adequate 
control might, in this case, be placed on the arbitrary 
power of the Sultan". (3)
To Abdul Hamid, to whom absolute authority in his dominions
was of subsidiary importance only to his position as Caliph,
the idea was anathema. Personal pique and a general
(1) Salisbury to White, 14 Sept. 1891; Ibid, Vol.76, No.122
(2) Ibid.
(3) Quoted in Currie to Salisbury, 21 Cot. 1894; Salisbury 
Papers, Currie file.
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conviction that Britain's "friendship" was almost as costly 
to Turkey as Russia's hostility, combined to concentrate 
the Sultan's hostility upon Britain.
Russia, who had been forced by the Treaty of Berlin^^ 
to give up her gains in the Balkan peninsula, turned her 
attention to Constantinople itself and attempte<^-by means 
of vigorous diplomacy to dominate the scene. The proximity 
of Russian frontiers, the Russian army and the Russian, 
navy (the Black Sea fleet was greatly strengthened in the 
I880s) all combined to give Russia great influence at Con­
stantinople. Sir William White (British ambassador from 
1 8 8 7 /1 8 9 1 ) very soon became convinced that British influence 
was not in itself sufficiently strong to counteract the
effects of.Russian influence: "British influence must either
f 11perish or go into partnership". ' ^
The partners chosen were Austria-Hungary, Italy and 
Germany. The latter Power was the most important; for, at 
the very time when the Sultan was becoming increasingly ill- 
disposed towards Britain, so he was becoming more disposed 
to favour Germany. . Tur0 0 -German intimacy increased after 
the Congress of Berlin, which abrogated many of the heavy
(1) C.L. Smith, op.cit., p.40.
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conditions which had been imposed upon the Sultan by the
Treaty of San Stefano: it was Bismarck who had presided over
the Congress and the Turks received the impression that
(I)
Bismarck was favourable to Turkey. Moreover, the Turks 
were impressed by the newly-acquired power of Germany in 
Europe, which was based on military prowess. The isolation 
which Turkey felt after her defeat in the Russo-Turkish 
war made her all the more anxious to seek the assistance of 
Germany - the great military power - in the reorganisation of 
the Turkish army. In 1881 a group of German army officers, 
headed by General Koehler, took up service in the Turkish 
Army. Two years later General von der Goltz became the 
leader of what v?as in fact a German military mission - a 
mission which eventually succeeded in reorganising the 
Turkish army and making it into the fine fighting force 
which defeated the Greeks with such ease in 1897. Germany 
gave the Turks material assistance and, unlike the other 
European Powers, Germany was willing to give such assistance 
without demanding concessions in the form of territory 
or better treatment for the Christian subjects of the Sultan. 
Of all the European Powers, Germany was the only one in 
whose disinterestedness as regards Turkey, the Sultan still
(1) Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, La Turquie, ItAlIemagne et 
I'Europe (Paris, 1924), p7U4.
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believed. Consequently, the Sultan was more ready to listen 
to the advice of Germany than to the advice of any other 
Power. There were rational grounds for the belief of 
Salisbury and White that, if Britain went into partnership 
with Germany and her allies of the Triple Alliance, British
t. ■ ■ ■
influence on the Golden Horn would not be négligeable.
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CHAPTER II
•^our Sentries at their Postst 
T8^H92~"----—
«Vhen Sir William White first went to Constantinople 
in 1885 he found himself alone in his struggle to prevent 
the Sultan from falling into the hands of Russia. The Rus­
sian ambassador, Helidovaided by his French colleague, 
Montebello, was tireless in his efforts to achieve dominance 
over the mind of the Sultan. The non-ratification of the 
Drummond-Wolff Convention demonstrated the success of the 
partnership. But the exchange of Notes between Britain, 
Austra-Hungary and Italy, which took place in December
1887, with the approval of Germany, marked the formation of
(1)
a new "alliance". At Constantinople, the ambassadors of
Britain and the Powers of the Triple Alliance drew together 
for the purpose of combatting and checking Russian influence 
at the Palace. The issue was clearly joined. Even questions 
of minor importance formed a battle ground over which the 
two groups fought. A victory for one or other of the groups 
on even a minor point had importance in the East where
(1) This term was used by the British ambassador at Constan­
tinople. White to Salisbury, 29 Nov. 1887 ; Salisbury 
Papers, Toi.76, No.65.
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prestige was synonymous with power.
In 1890, Salisbury was well aware that British prestige
was not high at Constantinople. But the Turks had great
respect for Germany. As long as Britain could associate
Germany with her in the execution of her policy at
Constantinople, Salisbury thought that Britain would be able
to maintain her position. In the latter years of his second
Ministry, as in the earlier years, the basic assumption
behind Salisbury's policy was the paramount importance of
keeping Constantinople and the Straits out of Russian hands.
(I)
To him the Dardanelles still represented a "great prize".
He thought that the Russians would make an open attempt to 
seize the Straits only if they were confident of acting 
"on the weak nerves of the Sultan", confident that they 
had made Bulgaria "tolerably safe" and confident that
(2)
Britain's chances of passing the Dardanelles were poor. 
Salisbury worked with the object of demonstrating that 
Russia could not afford to be confident on any of these 
points.
Salisbury believed that Russia would not expose herself 
to the risk of sending an expedition to the Bosphorus as
(1) Salisbury to Sir John Linton Simmons, Confid. 30 Sept. 
1891, F.0.353/6.
(2) Salisbury to Simmons, Private 21 Sept. 1891 and 25 
Sept. 1891; F.0.358/6.
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long as she thought-there was a real chance that British
ships might pass the Dardanelles before Russia had time to
man the forts of the Dardanelles. The problem, he thought,
would present itself to Russia in this way:
"Unless we (The Russians) are able to be first at the 
Dardanelles ... or are able to make the Turks keep the 
English out ... unless, in view of these two ways, we 
can cork up the Dardanelles, our expeditionary force 
to the Bosphorus will be prisoners of war". (1)
Time was the important factor. A Russian expeditionary
force in the Black Sea, steering for the Bosphorus, would
require certain preparations. Britain had organised her
"watchmen" in the Black Sea so that she would receive early
notice of any important movement there. She observed closely
the movements of the Russian Volunteer Fleet and other
steamer ships up and down the Straits, so that any undue
(2)
agglomeration of ships would at once be known. If there
were indications that Russia was preparing for hostile
action a telegraphic message could quickly be sent to the
Eastern squadron of the British Mediterranean Fleet, which
had orders always to remain to the East of Cape Matapan and
(3)
within fourty-eight hours steaming of the Dardanelles.
(1) Salisbury to Simmons, Confid. 30 Sept.1891. F.O.358/6.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Secret Memorandum from 1st Lord of Admiralty to Comman­
der in Chief in Mediterranean 10 June 1890, Adm.I
R 7122. cf. A.J. Harder, British Naval Policy 1880- 
1905 (London, 1940) , p.154.
5 0.
The chances in favour of the British ships arriving before
the Russians were good. Articles in Russian newspapers
showed that Russia was aware of this fact. The chances of
British ships being able to pass the Dardanelles depended
upon the Sultan's temper, on the fidelity of the Dardanelles'
commander and on the skill and courage of the English
Admiral. Salisbury thought that these chances also were
sufficiently good to give Russia pause. He had complete
confidence in his country's ability to defend her vital
interest in the Straits; he gave to the German Foreign
Mnister the assurance:
"Vous pouvez compter sur nous, tant que le
Gouvernement actuel est au pouvoir, nous y
serons à temps". (1)
He did not, however, fail to point out that the greatest
difficulty in the way of Britain would be the fortifications
of the Dardanelles, which had been undertaken by the Sultan
on the advice of Germany. If Germany really desired to
serve their common interests in the Near East, she should
take back her advice and ensure by every possible means that
(2)
Britain would not find the door shut when the time came.
( 1) M e m o r a n d u m M a r  schall, Windsor Castle, 6 July 1891. 
G.P. IX. No.2111.
(2) Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 8 May 1890; G.P. IX, No.2086.
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Unknown to Salisbury, Germany had already gone so far as 
indirectly to advise the Turks to strengthen the fortifica­
tions of the Bosphorus, so as to encourage Britain in her
(1)
support of Turkey against Russia.
When the men who had taken over from Bismarck the task
of conducting the foreign affairs of Germany decided not to
renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, because the spirit
of the provisions of the Treaty could not be harmonised with
the Triple Alliance or with the influence which Germany
exercised upon England, they had considered especially
(2)
those provisions referring to the Straits. In the event of 
an Anglo-Russian war, Germany would have been forced by the 
provisions of the Reinsurance Treaty to press for the closure 
of the Straits, that is - she would have been forced to act 
against the interests of England. But, in order to keep 
Italy within the Triple Alliance, Germany needed the support 
of England; in order to keep England with her, Germany 
must regulate her Eastern policy so that it would be in 
harmony with the interests of England. Such was the reasoning
(1) Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 2 May 1890; G.P. IX, No.2083,
(2) Memorandum by the Chancellor, Caprivi, 28 March 1890, 
G.P. VII, No. 1369. Memorandum by Holstein, 20 May 
1890; G.P. VII, No.1374.
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of the Kaiser, Caprivi, MarschalL and Holstein. Once Germany
had broken the wire to St. Petersburg, she was forced to
come down on the side of England in the Near East. Her change
of attitude was very soon made apparent. On 29 March 1890
the German under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Count Burchem, had with Malet a conversation in which he
seemed to wish to impress upon the British ambassador that
Germany would be more ready to enter into action with Austria-
Hungary, Italy and Britain than had been the case when
Bismarck was Chancellor.
"His whole conversation", reported Malet, "was a bid , 
for a closer alliance with us than heretofore and 
indicated a less unbending attitude in regard to 
the pretended disinterestedness of Germany in 
Eastern Affairs". (1)
Thus it happened that Germany.was anxious to support 
Britain in the Near East at the very time when Britain needed 
German support in order to carry out her policy. The value 
to Britain of German support was demonstrated when a new 
phase of the ever-recurring Bulgarian question presented 
itself to the Powers. Early in 1890, the Bulgarian Govern­
ment began to press strongly for Prince Ferdinand's 
recognition by his suzerain, the Sultan, and this matter
(1) Malet to Salisbury, 29 March 1890; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.63, No.29.
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became Linked with the equally difficult one of the rights 
of the Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia. Bulgarian opinion 
was very strong on the question of recognition and on the 
ecclesiastical question. Unless the Stambulov Government 
achieved some satisfaction, it was likely that it would be 
defeated in the approaching elections. The Government was 
friendly to Britain and the Powers of the Triple Alliance. 
They thought it essential for their interests that it 
should remain in office and that friendly relations should 
be re-established between Bulgaria and Turkey. By this 
means only could a safe bulwark be maintained against a 
Russian advance. Naturally, the interests of Russia were 
directly opposed; they dictated that no satisfaction should 
be given to a Bulgarian Government which was hostile to 
Russia; every effort should be made to rid Bulgaria of that 
Government and to establish friendly relations between 
Bulgaria and Russia. At Constantinople, Nelidov, supported 
by Montebello , worked towards this end; while White, suppor­
ted by Radowitz, Calice and Blanc (the ambassadors of 
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) worked to press his 
views on the Sultan. In this way,' the Bulgarian question 
became a test question of influence on the Bosphorus.
Which group of Powers would prevail?
The struggle began in March when Dr. Vulcovitch, the
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Bulgarian Agent at Constantinople, held strong language to 
the Sultan, based on a memorandum from Stambulov. He re­
counted the considerations which ought to induce the Porte
(1)
to recognize Prince Ferdinand. At first it seemed that
the Grand Vizier would take some action. White thought that
it was intended that a special Commission should be sent to
Sophia to report on what was going on there and to employ
moderate and persuasive language to Stambulov and Prince
Ferdinand. But Nelidov devoted himself to seeing that even
so small a gesture as the sending of a special Commission
should not be made. He was successful. When White sent
Sir Alfred Sandison to question the Grand Vizier, the latter
denied ever having "had such an appointment in view". White
concluded that he must have met with insurmountable diffi-
(2)
culties in carrying out his intentions. Nelidov had 
won the first round.
The second round began in June, when Dr. Vulcovitch 
presented to the Porte a very determined Note from the 
Bulgarian Government. It declared that, unless the Porte 
satisfied its claims, it would be forced to consider that
(1) White to Salisbury, 3 March 1890; F. 0.78/4374, Ko.104 
Seer.
(2) White to Salisbury, 15 March, 1890; F.0.78/4274, No. 
120 Confid.
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the suzerain Court had withdrawn its protection from its 
vassal principality and that Bulgaria must henceforth depend 
upon her own strength for the means of escaping from her
(I)
uncertain and perilous position. Britain and the Powers 
of the Triple Alliance believed that it would be fatal for 
Turkey (and also for Bulgaria) if Stambulov carried out 
his threat of the principality breaking away from its 
suzerain. It was essential that Bulgaria should be given 
satisfaction at least on the ecclesiastical question.
The rights of the Bulgarian Church had been a matter 
of dispute since 187 0, when the Bulgarians had obtained 
from the Sultan a firman, granting them an independent 
Exarch. The Greek Patriarch thereupon excommunicated the 
Bulgarian branch of the Greek Church. The Bulgarians 
refused to recognize the decree and continued to regard them­
selves as part of the Metropolitan Church, although, at the 
same time, they claimed to manage their own Church affairs. 
In 1890, they asked the Porte to grant Berats to Bulgarian 
bishops visiting their flocks in Macedonia. The Greek 
Patriarch opposed the request and he was supported by the 
Greek and Servian Ministers; intermixed with the religious 
Question was the question of nationality - of Greek and
(1) White to Salisbury, 20 June 1890; F.0. 78/4280, Tel 
No. 40.
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Servian propagandism against Bulgarian propagandism in
Macedonia. In the background was the immense weight of
the Russian embassy. • . ’
The opposition to Bulgaria was strong at Constantinople.
Nevertheless, the British charge^d'affaires, Fane, received
instructions to advise the Porte to be as favourable as it
properly could to Bulgaria on the ecclesiastical question
(2)
and to communicate with Calice on the subject. The 
Italian ambassador told Fane that he had instructions "pour 
defèrer au de sir exprimé" par le Comte Kalnoky" to join with 
the British and Austro-Hungarian representations. But Fane 
thought that the representations of the three Embassies 
would fail without the strong support of Germany. He was, 
therefore, overjoyed to learn that Radowitz had officially 
Informed the Grand Vizier that his Government, while desirous 
of maintaining its reserve on the Bulgarian question, could 
not but express its approval in the general interests of 
European peace of the advice which the representatives of 
Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy had given to the Porte. 
Radowitz had added as his personal opinion that the Porte 
would commit a very grave effor if it neglected to adopt the
(1) Fane to Salisbury, 7 July 1890; F.0.78/4276, No.305 
Confid.
(2) Salisbury to Fane, 7 July 1890; F.O.78/4280, Tel.No.47
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wise counsel given to it by the three Governments.
For the first time Germany had come forward openly on
the side of Bulgaria. This prominent fact attracted much
attention and "produced a deep impression at the Palace of
(I)
Yildiz". It proved decisive. On 16 July, Kiazim Bey,
one of the Sultan's secretaries, announced to the German
ambassador^-that the Sultan had decided to sanction the grant
of the Berats, but that he was desirous of receiving some
assurance that the Bulgarian Government would be content
with this concession and would not put forward further
demands. Radowitz gave general assurances. The Sultan
placed so great a confidence in Germany that he was reassured^
and^on the next day sent the Grand Vizier an irade^ authori- 
^  (2) 
zing him to issue the Berats.
The intensive diplomatic activity of the friendly
ambassadors took place within eight days. During that time
the Russian ambassador had been away on Princes Islands.
When he returned and learnt of what had taken place in his
absence, he went straight to the Porte and used menacing
language as to the effect of Russian resentment should the
Berats be granted. The Turkish Council met to consider
(1) White to Salisbury, 2 Aug. 1890, F.O.78/4277, No.352 
Seer.
(2) Fane to Salisbury, 18 June 1890; F.O.78/4276, No.319 
Confid.
58.
NeLidov's formal protest and decided that it was inadmiss-
ahle. Thereupon Nelidov sent his First Dragoman to the Grand
Vizier with a "communication verbale", in which appeared
violent language ; ‘ ' '
"Nous considérons la remise des Berats ... comme le 
, résultat immédiat de la Note de Stambouloff et de la 
4^r pression,ses Puissances qui ont pour but de consolider 
/ le Gouvernement chancelant de Coburg. Ce Gouverne- 
f. ment étant illégale et ouvertement hostile a la Russie 
le Sublime Porte, en prenant une mesure humiliante 
pour sa propre dignité" commet un acte hostile %.
1'égard de la Russie". (1)
It is probable that Nelidov made the communication on his
own responsibility, in a fit of desperation. He was trying
the same tactics, which he had employed with Montebello,
three years before, on the Egyptian Convention. On this
occasion no effect was produced on the Sultan. Nelidov had
lost the second round. He had bungled the affair. He
received from his Government a telegram en clair telling
him that he was at liberty at once to ami himself of the
permission, /he had had for some time, to go away on leave of 
(2)R '
absence.
Although the struggle at Constantinople had been short, 
it was noteworthy in several respects. The Bulgarian
(1) The communication was dated 22 July 1890. A copy is 
enclosed in Fane to Salisbury, 24 July 1890; F.O. 78/ 
4276, No,326, Seer, and Most Confid.
(2) Fane to Salisbury, 26 July 1890; F ^ . 78/4276, No.333 
Confid.
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Governmentby the success which it had gained in the
ecclesiastical quest ion,ihad proved that Sophia was the real.
centre for the protection of Bulgarian interests and not
St.Petersburg. It had "broken the monoooly". The hands
(1)
of M. Stambulov were greatly strengthened. At the same 
time the Government was aware,that it owed much to the support 
given by Britain and her friends. No progress was made in 
the;matter,of: Prince Ferdinand's recognition because these 
Powers, knowing how sensitive the Tsar.was on the subject, 
refused to press it, in case their.action might.produce 
war. • . ■ -, ■; ; ' ■ '■ . , ■ „ , • -
; : Britain, could not fail to realise that the decisive 
factor in the struggle at Constantinople had been the action 
of Germany. . Without the strong support of Germany, the . 
representations of Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy would 
not have prevailed against the Russian efforts to intimidate 
the Sultan. The success in the ecclesiastical question 
represented a triumph for the working partnership of Britain 
and Germany in the Near East,
But the testing time was not yet over. Nelidov left 
Constantinople for two months only. When he returned his
(1) Gaillard to Salisbury, 21 July 1890; Salisbury Papers, 
Gaillard file; the report of a conversation Gaillard 
had with Dr. Vulcovitch.
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thoughts were of revenge. He was,more than ever convinced 
that he must break down the united Front presented by Britain 
and the Powers of the Triple Alliance, and that he must 
secure the dismissal of the Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, 
who had been instrumental in frustrating his efforts to 
intimidate the Sultan in July.
' In order to gain the former"object, Nelidov sought to
utilise the situation created by a crisis in Crete. For
some time there had been ferment between the Mahommedan
and Christian populations of Crete, dissatisfaction with the
Government and a movement for liberation from Turkey and
(1)
union with Greece. In the summer of 1891 the situation
became dangerous when Ivl. Tricoupis, a Greek ex-Minister,
openly avowed-his intention, if he came into office again,
of taking advantage of the movement in Crete to attack 
(2)
Macedonia. The Greek Ministers in office asked that
the Cretan question should be taken up by the guaranteeing 
Powers, les anciennes Grandes Puissances: Britain, France
and Russia. The last two Powers accepted the invitation with 
enthusiasm and urged that Britain should join them in 
advising the Porte to make changes in the Government of _ .
(1) W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York 1956) 
Vol.I, p.316.
(2) Salisbury to Fane, 23 July 1891; F.O.78/4349, Tel.No.45.
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Crete. Their motive was quickly perceived by White. He 
realised that it suited Nelidov and Montebello to see the 
three Powers acting at Constantinople without any reference to 
the Triple Alliance proper;
(1)
"It was a clever move, calculated to impress the Sultan." 
Salisbury discerned another motive: France seemed to be try­
ing to induce Britain to join with Russia in advising the 
Porte as to Crete, not so much for the sake of the Cretans, 
but to pacify French opinion by exhibiting Britain as acting
with those two Powers to the exclusion of the Triple Alliance.
. ' ' (2)
"Britain had no desire to assist in this design". On the
other hand, Britain did not wish to show apathy in regard to
the welfare of all classes in Crete. Salisbury decided
that Britain must make her own representations to the Sultan
and inform the friendly Powers of her action. He instructed
Fane to call the Grand Vizier’s attention to the dangerous
increase of crimes of violence in Crete and the possibility
of the troubles being made an excuse by M. Tricoupis, should
,(3]
he return to power, for attacking Macedonia. Kiamil Pasha 
explained the perils of the situation to the Sultan. The
(1) White to Salisbury, 31 Aug. 1891; Salisbury Papers,
Vol.76, No.71.
(2) Salisbury to White, 20 Aug. 1891; F^O.78/4349, No.57 Seer.
(3) Salisbury to Fane, 23 July 1891; F^^7S/4349, Tel.No.45.
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whole question was discussed at a Council of Ministers. 
l\o time was lost in despatching to the island sufficient re­
inforcements to re-establish order between the Mahoramedan'’
(1) ^
and Christian populations.
Britain achieved her end without appearing to act with
France and Russia. For a time there was quiet in Crete and
Nelidov could do no more. But, already, the climate of
opinion at Constantinople was turning in favour of France
and Russia. News of the review of the French and Russian
fleets at Cronstadt on 24 July soon reached the Turkish
(2) . -
capital. The Sultan was always impressed by a show of
force. Nelidov made full use of the event as he worked to
achieve his second object: the dismissal of the Grand Vizier.
It was generally considered that Kiamil Pasha pursued a ‘
policy of benevolent neutrality towards Britain and her
(2)
friends. His fall would represent a check to their
influence. Moreover, Kiamil Pasha was a man of firm character
(1) White to Salisbury, 28 July 1891; F.O.78/4566, No.311.
(2) W.L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, oplcit., p.184.
(3) White to Salisbury, 7 Sept. 1891; F.O.78/4347, No.379.
White to Salisbury, 9 Sept. 1891; F.0.7 8/4347, No.390;
enclosing a Memorandum drawn up by M. Alvarez.
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and Large views. As long as he was Grand Vizier the Porte
played an important part in the direction of the foreign
affairs of Turkey. If he lost his position, it was likely
that his successor would he more subservient to the Palace
where Russian influence was still strong.
When the Sultan dismissed Kiamil pasha and appointed a
new Cabinet on 3 September, Nelidov and Montebello were
noisy in their triumph. The French military attache, an
active and unscrupulous agent, went about calling the new 
' (1)
Ottomon Cabinet "Notre Ministre". In actual fact there
was no evidence that the new Grand Vizier, Djevad Pasha, was
(2)
particularly friendly to France and Russia. Fane thought
(3)
he was "an honest man anxious to do his duty". But the
Turks were more impressed by appearances than facts and the
appearances were in favour of those two Powers. Certainly,
under the new regime. Palace influence as opposed to that of
the Porte, would be far more supreme than it had been
(4)
latterly.
The British ambassador was very much discouraged by the
(1) White to Salisbury, 13 Sept. 1891; F.0.78/4347, No.399.
(2) Under Secretary at German Foreign Office to Hatzfeldt, 
19 Sept. 1891; G^. IX, No.2113.
(3) Fane to Salisbury, 17 Jan. 1892; F ^ . 78/4412, Ho.25.
(4) White to Salisbury, 9 Sept. 1891; F.C.78/4547, Ho.390.
64.
situation. He thought that matters were going from had to
worse in the Ottoman Empire. The Palace clique was getting
all the judicial and administrative appointments in the
Provinces into their hands exclusively:
"Since I came here as Ambassador in October 1886, we 
have never been in such bad odour with the Khalife or 
blackguarded so much by his entourage as we have been 
these last two months. I am afraid I do not feel at 
all humiliated at the Padishah’s personal displeasure 
with us and with me". (1)
The concluding note of defiance reflected the new mood of the
ambassador. When White first came to Constantinople^he was
in good health and anxious to show himself worthy of his
promotion from the consular to the diplomatic service. He
had vigorously asserted British interests. By 1891, as a
result of his masterly handling of the major Balkan crises,
(2)
White’s position was assured. His health was less good
and his understanding of the current problems (the Straits 
and the Egyptian questions) less deep. He no longer showed 
the same energy in pressing the interests of Britain and her 
friends. The Italian ambassador complained that he found in 
White
(1) White to Salisbury, 31 Aug. 1891; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.76, No.71.
(2) C.L. Smith, op.cit.. Chapter III.
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"a smaller degree of oo-operation and a smaller 
desire for an intimate exchange of views concerning 
questions touching their common interests in the 
Mediterranean". (1)
Kalnoky thought that White's new attitude looked like a return
(2)
to Gladstone's "Crientpolitik". . Radowitz reported that 
White had -,
"expressed himself in such a manner concerning the 
validity of the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 
that he had no further desire to discuss the matter 
with the English ambassador". (3)
The German Government became concerned when it heard that
the character of the British representative on the Golden
Horn seemed less adapted for an increased activity in British
( 4) .
policy than had been the case a few years ago. Influence 
at Constantinople could be maintained only by constant 
activity. As a result of the failing energies of her 
ambassador, British influence was diminishing and it was not 
long before anxiety grew in Germany, lest her influence 
should suffer a corresponding decline.
So great was the concern of the German Government that
(1) Radowitz to Caprivi, 6 Sept. 1891; Foreign Ministry 
Archives, Berlin, quoted by von Ludwig Israel, England 
und die orientalische Drelbund {Stuttgart, 1 9 3 7 ) pT39".
(2) Kalnoky-Schiessl, 22 Oct. 1891, H.H. u.St. A. Wien. Pol. 
A. Hot. 465, Geheim, XXVlA.
(3) Radowitz to Caprivi, 6 Sept. 1891; Foreign Ministry 
Archives Berlin; quoted by von Ludwig Israel, op.cit., 
p.39.
(4) Marschall to Hatzfeldt, 13 June 1891; G.P.VIII, No.1794.
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it decided upon the momentous step of taking the Lead in 
Near Eastern policy. In October, the Foreign Office summoned 
Hatzfeldt (their ambassador in London) to Berlin to confer 
on the measures to be taken to retrieve the situation at 
Constantinople. Caprivi and Marschall - the new men of 
the post-Bismarckian regime - had little experience in foreign 
affairs. At this critical time they looked for guidance to 
Hatzfeldt who, during a former residence at Constantinople, 
had been on terms of intimacy with the Sultan and who, since 
his appointment to the London embassy in 1885, had also been 
on intimate terms with Salisbury. Hatzfeldt was well quali-
U ]
fied to assume an authoritative role. He was glad to 
take the initiative. He suggested two lines of action.
First, he thought an exchange of ideas should take place 
between the Governments of Britain and the Powers of the 
Triple Alliance which should have as its object the eventual 
communication to the Sultan of the accords of 1887. He 
thought that, if the Sultan knew that these Powers had in 
their possession not only force, but also a common decision 
for action in the event of a crisis in the near East, the
(1) Both Salisbury and Kalnoky thought that Hatzfeldt "very 
often" took the initiative in proposing the course 
Germany should adopt in the Near East.
Paget to Salisbury, 13 Deo. 1891; Salisbury Papers,
V o l . N o .  127. In October 1891 Hatzfeldt "showed 
great activity and appeared to be taking an independent 
line, so much so that Lord Salisbury thought he was 
making a push for the Chancellorship". Memorandum by Sir 
Philip Currie. 14 Nov. 1892. F.0.78/4463.
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Sultan would not only be restrained from going over to 
France and Russia, but he might be persuaded to undertake
certain obligations to the opposing group of Powers. In the
;
meantime action could be taken/to remove from France and
Russia the means which they continually used to incite the
Sultan against England,by the achievement of an Anglo-Turkish
understanding over Egypt. It could be brought about on the
basis of English recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty over
Egypt and Turkish renunciation of the demand for a date of
English evacuation. Hatzfeldt considered that through his
confidential relations with Salisbury and the Sultan he might
be able to bring about an agreement which would be to the
(1)
advantage of both.
Neither Salisbury nor Kalnoky received with enthusiasm 
the first part of Hatzfeldt's dual programme. Salisbury's 
attitude was that of an elder statesman humouring the less 
experienced. He was convinced that any system of diplomatic 
defence which was based on the influence they might now 
establish on the Sultan's mind^ by whatever mean§. was fatally 
untrustworthy. It would be built on a character and
(1) Notes of Hatzfeldt, 28 Oct. 1891; G^. IX, No.2117.
Deym to Kalnoky, 16 Deo. 1891; H.H. v St. A. Wien,
Pol.A. Rot. 465, Geheim XXV/A, No.49B, Geheim.
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disposition whioh had no element of stability in its
composition. He believed that the German Government and
those who were guided by it, were relying too much on precau-
(1)
tions of this evanescent character. Kalnoky doubted the
expediency of pressing the frightened Sultan to take a
decisive attitude towards either of the groups of Powers.
It would mean setting in motion a whole series of actions
which would involve many complications. It had to be borne
in mind that Germany did not occupy the same position or have
the same vital interests in the East as Austria-Hungary
or Britain. The latter Powers had to keep in mind all kinds
of considerations, with which Germany, because of her less
(2)
prominent position, had no need to concern herself.
This expression of ideas by Salisbury and Kalnoky 
revealed in an interesting way their views on the respective 
positions of the friendly Powers vis-a-vis Eastern affairs. 
Although at that time Germany did in fact have more influence 
at Constantinople than any of the Powers adhering to the
(1) Salisbury to Malet, 29 Oct. 1891; F.C.64/1252, No.250 
Most seer.
(2) Kalnoky to Schiessl, 2 2 Oct. 1891; H.H. v St.A. Wien,
Pol.A.Hot, 465, Geheim, XXV/A.
Kalnoky to Galice, 24 Oct. 1891; Ibid.
Kalnoky to Deym, 23 Deo. 1891; Ibid.
Paget to Salisbury, 11 Oct. 1891; FTO.7/1171, No.205, Most 
Confid•
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Agreements of 1887, Britain and Austria-Hungary still expected
to take the lead on decisions of policy. The universal
regard in which their two Foreign Ministers were held,
allowed them to carry their wishes. Their cautious attitude
did not mean that they were less concerned than Germany about
the position at Constantinople. It was the reflection of
greater experience and the knowledge that, in the past, those
Powers who had played a waiting game had often achieved the
greatest success.
Salisbury's attitude towards the Egyptian question was
influenced by similar considerations. There is no real
evidence to support the theory, sometimes put forward, that,
at this early date, Egypt was already assuming more
importance than Constantinople in Salisbury's view of the
(L)
Near Eastern question. In 1891, Salisbury still regarded
Constantinople and the Straits as the central factors in the
problem: the prestige of the British Government, at home
(2)
and abroad, was irretrievably tied up in their defence. 
Britain had gone into Egypt to save the country from internal 
anarchy and foreign aggression. Sir Evelyn Baring was, every
(1) 'C.L. Smith, op.cit., p.139.
(2) of. p. .
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year, achieving greater success in his efforts to put the 
finances of the country on a stable basis but time was 
needed to ensure that his work would be lasting. There could 
be no question of Britain's evacuating Egypt as long as 
their was a possibility that France might step in and take 
her place. On the other hand, at this date, Salisbury had 
not yet conceived the policy of strengthening and consolidating 
Britain's position in Egypt so as to make that country a new 
centre for British power in the Near East. In 1891, Salis­
bury's attitude towards the Egyptian question was simply one 
of caution: nothing should be done to compromise Britain -
the way must be left open for any action which Britain might 
decide to take in the future; but, at the same time^ every­
thing possible should be done to conciliate the Sultan. 
Salisbury was ready to defer to the wishes of Germany in 
this matter. He was willing to conduct negotiations with the 
Sultan as long as the question of evacuation was not raised.
He wrote to White:
"If we should find any formula in respect to the 
Egyptian question which does not involve evacuation, 
but which he (the Sultan) thinks will add security 
to the permanence of the rights which legitimately
(1) The Marquess of Zetland, Lord Cromer (London, 1932), pp. 
168-78.
The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt (London, 1908), Vol.II, 
pp.443—55.
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iDelong to him under the firmans and treaties, I 
think we ought to consider such propositions with 
verj great care". (I)
White was very reluctant to take part in any kind of 
negotiations with the Sultan on the subject of Egypt. He 
remembered that, in 1887, the failure to achieve the ratifica­
tion of the Drummond Wolff Convention had been regarded at 
Constantinople as a diplomatic defeat for Britain and a 
triumph for France and Russia. He tliought that, even in 
1891, the Sultan, in the way in which he wished to treat with 
Britain in the question, would be likely, knowingly or 
unconsciously, to play into their hands. There was some 
justification for his view. On 26 June, the Grand Vizier 
told white that he thought he could persuade the Sultan to 
come to a direct understanding with England on the basis that 
the question of evacuation should be dropped, provided that 
England recognized the Sultan’s sovereignty over Egypt by 
a solemn compact. Kiamil Pasha hoped to keep this secret from 
everyone except M. Radowitz. White knew that, even at that 
time, the Sultan had, without the knowledge of his Grand 
Vizier, appealed again to the French Government. France had
(1) Salisbury to White, 9 Nov. 1891; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.76, No.123.
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agreed to eease to oppose Britain’s right of re-entry into 
Egypt if Britain would agree to a date for evacuation. The 
Sultan^was encouraged to press for an understanding on these 
lines.
In October, the new Grand Vizier, Djevad Pasha, took
up the subject with White. The latter gave it as his personal
opinion that an essential condition for the success of the
negotiations was that no date of evacuation for British troops
should be proposed by the Sultan. The Grand Vizier demurred
and, when he saw that his arguments had no effect, had recourse
to strong language:
"Alors vous nous jetez dans les bras de la Russie".
White promptly replied:
"Allez, allez. %  country will find means of adapting 
itself to this new situation, but your sovereign and 
master is too wise to adopt such a course and could 
never have employed such language, which can only be 
due to Y.E.’s inexperience". (2)
It was unlikely that negotiations conducted in such a 
manner would lead to any satisfactory result. There was 
more to hope for from the mediation of Germany. The Sultan 
readily accepted the suggestion that Hatzfeldt, as "amicus
(1) White to Salisbury, 26 June 1891; F.C.78/435C. Tel.
No.36, Very Seer. Radowitz to German Foreign Office,
26 June 1891, Cipher Tel. N 0 .8 C. Confid. G.P.VIII,
No.1797.
(2) White to Salisbury, 31 Oct., 1891; F.0.78/4348, No.462, 
Seer.
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amice", should ascertain from Salisbury what terms would be
(I)
acceptable to Britain. Hatzfeldt presented to Rustem
Pasha (the Turkish ambassador in London) a memorandum of
fifty-three pages, written in French and sent "from’ himself,
personally". He advised the Sultan:
"de remettre k une époque future la question de 
1 ’evacuation ainsi que celle d'en fixer le terme".
He considered that Britain would, in return, agree to a
declaration of the Sultan’s suzerainty. He strongly advised
that an agreement should be reached as soon as possible,
at any rate before the next elections in England; the
Liberal Government would be no more compliant over the
(2)
Egyptian question than the Conservative one. During an
audience with White, the Sultan admitted that he had been led,
as a result of interviews with Sir Charles Dilke and other
persons in close relations with Gladstone, to believe that
the Egyptian question could be settled in a more favourable
manner with the Liberal Government. But Abdul Hamid now
declared that he hoped that, through the good offices of
Hatzfeldt, a solution could be found with the Conservative
(3)
Government.
(1) White to Salisbury, 12 Oct. 1891; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.76, No.72.
(2) E.T.3. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914,
II, p.88.
(3) White to Salisbury, 6 Nov. 1891; F.0.78/4348, No.463; 
Incl. No.2.
74.
It is difficult to determine whether or not the
Sultan was sincere. Certainly, no further progress was made
towards solving the Egyptian question. By February 1892,
the German Government had lost patience. It sent to Radowitz
a terse message, recounting the history of the negotiations
and concluding:
"We wish to make it clear that the responsibility is 
not ours if his [the Sultan’s] hesitation introduces 
a new situation, entailing disadvantages for Turkey". (1)
Salisbury had never been sanguine about the negotiations.
He appreciated the German anxiety as to the position at
Constantinople and sympathised with the effort to promote
an understanding on the principal subject of difference
between England and Turkey ; but he himself believed that:
"no combination is at present possible, which would 
at once satisfy the Sultan and the English people". (2)
A new situation was created in January 1892 by the death
of the ruling Khedive and the succession of Abbas Hitmi
(3)
Pasha, who was only eighteen years old. For many years 
he would be strictly under the guidance of his Ministers.
(1) Marschall to Radowitz, 4 Feb. 1892; G.P.VIII, No.1809.
(2) Salisbury to White, 9 Nov. 1891; Salisbury Papers, Vol. 
76, No.123.
(3) Fane to Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1892; F.0.78/4412, No.10.
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Salisbury thought that the governing body among Mahomraedans
in Egypt valued their independence more than their connection
with the Sultan. If once the connecting and mediating
influence of the English occupation was withdrawn, this
feeling of independence would show itself. Some occasion
would arise which would place the Egyptian Government at
issue with the Sultan. Any resistance or claim of supremacy
on his part would lead them to seek some other protector.
They would look to France, whose traditional policy since
1839 had been to accentuate the independence of Egypt and
(1)
minimise the connection with Constantinople. Salisbury 
was convinced that this was a real danger. If the Sultan 
could be made to recognize the reality of the danger, a very 
different feeling might be created in his mind towards 
Britain. Salisbury instructed Sir Clare Ford, who replaced 
White as British ambassador at Constantinople in January
(2)
1892, to set to work to influence the Sultan in this way. 
Salisbury never under-estimated the mental capabilities of 
the Sultan. The Foreign Minister recognized that Abdul
(1) Salisbury to Fane, 16 Feb. 1892; F.0.78/4411, No. 
42. .
(2) Salisbury to Ford, 1 March 1892, Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.46, No.1241.
G. Cecil, op.cit., IV, p.391.
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Hamid’s policy was dictated purely by self-interest. The 
Sultan gave his favour to one or other of the groups of 
Powers according to the advantages he could gain in return. 
Imbued with the notorious cunning of the Turk, he realised 
that his safety lay in playing off one group of Powers against 
the other. All that Britain could hope to do was to show 
the Sultan that he would derive certain positive advantages 
from an attitude of consideration towards Britain.
Nevertheless, Salisbury was as worried as the Germans
by the way in which France and Russia seemed to be gaining
the upper hand at Constantinople in October 1891. The
increased activity of these two Powers was a reflection of
their increased confidence, as a result of the understanding
(1)
reached by the two Governments in July and August. The 
other Powers did not know the contents of the Notes exchanged 
between the French and Russian Governments. They only knew 
that, at Cronstadt, on 24 July, the Tsar had stood bare­
headed while the Marseillaise was played. More than anything 
else, this demonstration signified the determination of
(1) W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit., 
Vol.I, p.22.
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Tsarist Russia and Republican France to present a united
front to the world. The other Powers could only ask the
question: what comes next? No one could say with certainty
and the uncertainty gave rise to rumours and fear. The
British press assumed an alarmist tone and magnified out
of all proportion the importance of small incidents in its
endeavour to demonstrate the perils of the European situation.
It seized upon the negotiations which were being
conducted between Russia âfid Turkey with reference to the
passage through the Straits of ships of the Russian Volunteer
(1)
Fleet. It confused the special question under discussion,
as regards the passage of particular vessels, flying the
merchant flag, belonging to the Volunteer Fleet and carrying
soldiers on board, with the general question of the rights
of ships under the Straits Treaties. The Standard announced;
"Russian diplomacy has achieved a complete victory 
on this question and henceforth the Straits will 
be open to her vessels, whilst closed to those of 
other nations". [2]
Although Salisbury thought that, in the matter of the 
passage of the ships of the Russian Volunteer Fleet through
(1) Cf.
(2) The Standard, 31 Aug. 1891.
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the Straits, the Sultan had conceded nothing essential
(I)
and was only playing with Russia, he did not shut his eyes 
to the dangers inherent in the situation. The condition of 
Europe was unsettled. France and Russia were over-confident.
Russia was concentrating her attention upon the Straits. 
Salisbury believed that "circumstances have tended and still 
tend, to increase the probability of Russia being involved 
in war":
"The unabated thirst of the French for their revenge: 
the fact that a war between them and Germany would 
remove the principal military check on Russian 
ambition: the growing weakness of Turkey: the
approach of Russian armaments to their full develop­
ment: all these things seem to point to an early
effort on the part of Russia to make herself mistress 
of the Straits". (E)
Salisbury was determined to frustrate that effort and was
confident of his ability to do so. In October 1891, he was
less concerned with possible defects in British preparations
for the defence of the Straits than with the possibility of
a defect or gap in the defences of the North West frontier
of India. H^ e wrote to Lansdowne, warning him that Russia,
in order to paralyse Britain’s resistance on the Bosphorus,
might try an expedition against India. Salisbury thought the
(1) Salisbury to White, 14 Sept. 1891; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.76, No.122.
(2) Salisbury to Lansdowne, 21 Oct. 1891; Salisbury Papers, 
Lansdowne box.
79.
Government of India had neglected to give aid to Persia in
(1)
order to encourage that country to resist Russian aggression.
Salisbury’s confidence as to Britain’s ability to defend 
the Straits against Russia was not shared by the Directors 
of Naval and Military Intelligence. It was true that they 
believed that a Russian attempt on the Straits could be frus­
trated by the British Fleet, if warned in time and if the
(2)
Dardanelles were occupied by at least 10,COO British troops.
But a study of more general questions of naval strategy
led them to express serious misgivings as to the advisability
of employing the British Fleet at a remote corner of the
Mediterranean. Since France had reorganised her Fleet in
1888, so as to concentrate her main forces at Toulon, Britain
had ceased to be the undisputed mistress of the Western
(3)
Mediterranean. The ships, detached from the British 
Mediterranean squadron to steam to the defence of the Straits, 
would be at the extreme end of "somewhat precarious communica­
tions" :
(1) Ibid.
(2) A.J. Marder, op.cit., p.159.
(3) Ibid, p.146.
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"Detaching them would hand over, certainly for 
a time, the maritime preponderance in the Western 
basin to the French and, if the detached ships were 
long delayed in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, 
not only the Western basin, but also the neighbouring 
Atlantic and even the English Channel might be open 
to a naval combination, which would be a grave menace 
to this country".
The conclusion was reached that unless Britain had the con­
currence of the French, which, at that time, was impossible, 
or, unless Britain first destroyed the French Fleet at 
Toulon, which was a remote contingency, it was not legitimate
for Britain to employ her Fleet at the Eastern end of the 
(I)
Mediterranean.
It was not until 18 March 1892 that these ideas, embodied
in a joint report of the Director of Military Intelligence and
the Director of Naval Intelligence were communicated to Lord
Salisbury. He was completely taken aback. In a Memorandum
for the Cabinet, he described the report as a "tragic declara-
(2)
tion". The Defence Department on the one hand and the 
Foreign Office on the other had been proceeding on lines 
as far divergent as it was possible for lines of policy to 
diverge :
"The protection of Constantinople from Russian conquest 
has been the turning point of the policy of this
(1) Ibid,#159-60. Joint Report of D.M.I. and D.N.I. 18 March 
1892.^
(2) Memorandum of Salisbury, 4 June 1892. Printed for Cabinet 
8 June 1892, Salisbury Papers. Cf - zr.
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country for at least forty years and, to a certain 
extent, for forty years before that. It has been 
constantly assumed, both at home and abroad, that 
this protection of Constantinople was the special 
interest of Great Britain".
Salisbury gave the reasons for this assumption: if Russia
possessed Constantinople and the influence which went with 
it, the route to India through the Suez Canal would be endan­
gered; the effect of a Russian possession of Constantinople 
upon the Oriental mind and upon the British position in 
India, which was so largely dependent upon prestige, would 
be extremely harmful. It was at present assumed that the 
fall of Constantinople would represent a great defeat for 
England. According to the opinion of the Defence Department, 
that defeat was not a matter of speculation, but of absolute 
certainty. If this opinion were correct, Salisbury wrote:
"Our policy is a policy of false pretences. If 
persisted in, it will involve discomfiture to all 
who trust in us and infinite discredit to ourselves".
The whole question of British policy in the East would have 
to be reconsidered: all that England or India could furnish
of naval or military strategic knowledge would have to be 
examined and the real facts ascertained.  ^Unless new facts 
emerged to modify the opinion of the Defence Department, 
British Foreign Policy would have to be speedily and avowedly 
revised.
Salisbury evidently wrote the Memorandum of 4 June when
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he was still suffering from the effects of shock. It proves, 
beyond a shadow of doubt, that, up to this date, at least, 
Salisbury considered the protection of Constantinople and the 
Straits from Russian aggression as crucial factors in British 
policy; British prestige had become bound up in their 
defence; upon their protection depended Britain’s ability 
to use the Suez Canal, freely, at all times. There was no 
thought of the British occupation of Egypt being sufficient 
in itself to guarantee the use of the Canal.
The Memorandum does not by itself prove that there would 
necessarily be a change in British policy. Even before 
Salisbury left office in August, the effects on his mind of 
the communication from the Defence Department had diminished. 
Salisbury had only a layman’s knowledge of naval affairs.
He had always placed great faith in what could be accomplished 
if British Admirals showed courage and skill and the Direc­
tors of Naval and Military Intelligence’s report did not 
destroy that faith.
The report had taken no account of political considera­
tions. A Russian attack on Constantinople and the Straits 
would create serious international complications. In those 
circumstances, it was probable that Britain would have the 
support of the Powers of the Triple Alliance, whose assistance
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Could be utilised to hold the French in check. When once
the dreaded crisis occurred, all kinds of factors and
considerations, now unforseen, might influence the situation.
The Defence Department’s report, far from leading Salisbury
to revise British foreign policy, in the long run confirmed
his belief in the wisdom of the policy hitherto pursued.
The key to the problem lay in Britain’s "position towards
(1)
Italy and, through Italy, to the Triple Alliance". As 
long as Britain associated herself with those Powers, she 
could expect diplomatic and, if necessary, armed support, 
to forestall or to meet a situation which would be dangerous 
to them all.
The policy of close association with the Powers of the 
Triple Alliance ât Constantinople had been vindicated over 
and over again. The friendly Powers finally succeeded in 
preserving the balance there and preventing France and Russia 
from gaining too much power. The Sultan grew alarmed at 
the pressure of the latter Powers and issued an "official 
communique" to the "Agence de Constantinople", which, towards 
the end of December, 1891, was furnished to the principal 
newspapers in Europe. It stated:
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 18 Aug. 1892. Cecil, op.cit., Vol. 
IV, p.404.
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T1 a des journaux qui affirment qu'un rapprochement 
a deja eu lieu entre la Turkie et ces deux puissances 
(France et Russie) .
Toutes ces feuilles prennent leurs dé"sirs pour 
des realité's. Stricte impartialité ... neutralité" 
loyale a toujours été la régie de conduite 
Gouvernement Ottoman". (1) '
In reality, the Sultan had merely returned to his old policy 
of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. But 
the semblance of neutrality was restored. The four sentr/es 
(the ambassadors of the friendly Powers) had kept in check 
the opposing Powers. The action of Germany, who, for the 
first time, had put herself prominently forward at Constanti­
nople was largely responsible for the achievement. Indeed, 
the most hopeful sign for the future lay in the increased 
interest Germany was taking in the policy of Britain and her 
friends in the Near East.
As Salisbury prepared to hand over the Foreign Office 
to his Liberal successor, his greatest fear was tl'iat the 
Liberals might attempt a too hurried rapprochement with 
France, which would result in the abandonment of the Triple 
Alliance by Italy and a reconstruction of the Dreikaiserbund. 
The inevitable result of the latter occurrence would be -
(1) Fane to Salisbury, 16 Jan. 1892; F .C.78/4412, No.18 
Conf. j
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"Russia on the Bosphorus". Salisbury was convinced that
this disaster could be prevented as long as Britain maintained
her "position towards Italy and, through Italy, to the
Triple Alliance". Such was "the key of the present situation
(1)
in Europe".
(I) Salisbury to Currie, 18 Aug. 1892, Cecil, op.cit., Vol. 
IV, p.404.
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CHAPTER III
Uneasy Friendship
The news that Gladstone had returned to power for the
fourth time as head of a Liberal Government was a source of
alarm to Turkey and the Powers of the Triple Alliance:
(1)
Gladstone had spoken sharply against them. They could
only hope that the new Foreign Minister, Rosebery, who had
often spoken of the necessity of conducting foreign policy on
(2)
a non-party basis, would prevent too great a departure from
the lines of policy which Salisbury had laid down. In thi^
their hopes were justified: Rosebery’s aim was to continue
Salisbury’s policy. The Liberal Minister also believed that
"the central keystone of the situation in Europe was England,
(3)
through Italy, to the Triple Alliance". England should
(1) Horley, Life of Gladstone, II (1922) p.654; Contemporary 
Review, Cet. 1889.
(2) of. Rosebery’s speech at Leeds on 11 Oct. 1888: "I have
always held and I hope I have proved by action and also 
by want of action that my belief is that the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs should speak as often as 
possible, with the united voice of the English nation, 
without distinction of party". ' ,
(3) Salisbury to Currie, 18 Aug. 1892; Cecil op.cit., vol.IV, 
p.404. Rosebery to Malet, 6 Jan. 1895; FTg ."343/3.
Malet Private Papers, Seer.
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maintain her entente with the Triple Alliance in European 
questions, more especially in the Rear East where the support 
of the central Powers was essential to Britain if she were to 
maintain her position. Unfortunately, Rosebery was hampered 
by his chief and other members of the Cabinet who leaned 
towards France and Russia: he could pursue his aim only by
working unobtrusively.
It was debateable how long the Powers of the Triple 
Alliance would be content with such conduct. In October 
1891 Kalnoky had been satisfied with the Mediterranean Agree­
ment of December 1887. He thought that the "harmless agree­
ment", which contained only "certain fundamental and general 
theoretical promises", had fulfilled its purpose in that 
it had assured "the principle of collaboration of the 
participating Powers in those questions regarding Eastern 
Eturope" and would also assure them for the future. At that 
time he believed it inadvisable to put to the test the bind­
ing powers of the "theoretical accord" because he was con­
vinced that, if it came to a discussion of the value of the 
agreement, which did not have the character of a contract,
Lord Salisbury himself would reduce it in Parliament to a
(1)
minimum. Kalnoky’s views were conditioned by the confidence
(1) Kalnoky to Ritter von Schiessl, 22 Oct. 1891; II.H. v St. 
A. %ien. Pol.A. Rot. 465, Geheira XXY/A.
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he placed in Salisbury. The Austrian Minister did not place
the same confidence in his successor; throughout the Liberal
administration, he sought to bind Britain more closely. At
first the response seemed satisfactory. Although Rosebery
sought to safeguard his position by refusing to read the
notes which Britain had exchanged with Austria and Italy in
1887, within a month of taking office he gave to the German
ambassador a memorandum which acknowledged Britain’s promise
to come to Italy’s support, should the latter be the object
(1)
of unprovoked attack by France. Rosebery told the Austrian
ambassador that the intimate reciprocal relations of Britain
(2)
and Austria "must rest exclusively on reciprocal confidence".
It was unfortunate that, at the very time when the return 
of Gladstone to office tended to diminish the confidence of 
the Powers of the Triple Alliance in British policy, there 
should be at Constantinople a new British ambassador,, who 
also did not inspire confidence. When the Liberals came to 
power. Sir Clare Ford had been at Constantinople for eight 
months. Formerly a Minister at Madrid, he had not the 
experience of Oriental affairs which had been of such value
(1) Rosebery’s Memorandum of 5 Sept. 1892; printed in B«D. 
VIII, p.4.
(2) Deym to Kalnoky, 14 June 1893; W.S.A. Geheim XXVb. 
printed in Foundations, Dec. 1886, p.473.
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to White. Ford was not of the same calibre as Nelidov who 
had represented Russia at Constantinople since 1883 or Gambon, 
the new French ambassador. Unused to Oriental intrigue, he 
allowed himself to be deceived by the manoeuvres of the 
Turks and the more capable diplomats.
He showed himself particularly gullible when the question 
of appointing a Governor for the Lebanon came up for discus­
sion. At first he advocated the candidature of Melharme^, 
a Maronite. Even the permanent officials of the British
Foreign Office knew that the appointment of a native had
(1)
always been considered objectionable. A second candidate,
Wasri, had formerly been opposed by Britain on the grounds
that he was a French nominee. When Ford discussed Kasri with
the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter admitted
he intended to propose Kasri, saying that it was a "grave
error to suppose he was biased in favour of France". Ford
seemed ready to accept the Minister’s word. Again it was
left to an official of the British Foreign Office to raise
an objection: the Turkish Minister had obviously been
(2)
"squared" by Cambon. The Foreign Office eventually sent
(1) Gadogan’s Minute on Ford to Salisbury, 16 July 1892; 
Fj^.78/4419, Tel. No.85.
(2) Gadogan’s Minute on Ford to Salisbury, 23 July 1892;
0.78/4419, Tel. No.89.
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Ford explicit instructions to seek the co-operation of his 
German colleague in order to secure the appointment of a 
certain Maom.
The importance of "the principle of collaboration" 
between Britain and the Powers of the Triple Alliance in the 
Rear East, which Kalnoky had thought assured, was not suffi­
ciently appreciated by Ford. Ror was it appreciated by the 
new German ambassador, Radolin. His prime objects were to
maintain an intimate footing with the Palace and to promote
(2)
the commercial interests of German subjects. Under these 
circumstances, the united front, so well preserved by the 
"four sentries" of former years, was easily shaken. The 
extent to which it could be shaken was demonstrated when the 
question of railway concessions came, like "a storm in a clear 
sky", to trouble the Powers.
The major role in the fight for concessions was occupied 
by Herr Haulla, a representative of the Deutsche Bank. The 
Sultan summoned Kaulla to Constantinople and asked him to 
construct a railway line from Angora to Bagdad. The Germans
(1) Salisbury to Ford, 20 July 1392; F.0.78/4418; Tel.Ro.44
(2) Currie to Kimberley, 27 March 1895; F.0.78/4609,
Ro.207 Confid.
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thought that it,would he.impossible to count upon the Bagdad
line proving a financial ^ success and they therefore asked,
as compensation for their prospective losses, that'they should
be allowed to construct a branch line from Kutaya to Konia/^^
British interests were represented by the Smyrna-Aidan and
Smyrna-Cassaba railways which ran almost parallel to each
other and would be at right angles to the projected Kutaya-
Konia line. The latter would cut^off the former from further
extension East and would also take over the transporting of
the produce from the Kutaya-Konia districts. The resulting
loss of trade would cut the revenues of the Smyrna Companies
(2 )
by about one third.
The British ambassador at Constantinople took the steps 
he thought necessary for the protection of British interests.
He brought to the serious consideration of the Porte and the 
Palace :
"The great prejudice which would be inflicted on 
British interests were new railway concessions in 
certain parts of Asia îàlnor to be given to a German ..
(1) Ford to Rosebery, 11 Jan.1893; F .0.78/4477, No.13 Confid.
(2) Ford to Rosebery, 26 Dec. 1892; F ^ . 78/4417, No.386 Confid
Ford to Rosebery, 6 Jan. 1893; F.0.78/4477, No.6;
forwarding a copy of a memorandum from Mr, Purser, ■
representative of Smyrna-Aidin railway.
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Company ... The interests of certain railways which 
were actually being worked by British Companies would 
be seriously affected". (1)
Ford reported home that Kaulla appeared to be backed by the
(2)
Germah Government, and that the Kaiser was said to have 
expressed, through his ambassador, his personal desire to see 
railway lines in Asiatic Turkey constructed by German Compan­
ies. Indeed, the German embassy in Constantinople was
(3)
credited with great activity in pushing on the enterprise.
But it never occurred to Ford that he ought to discuss the
Kaulla project with Radolin. Ror did Rosebery quickly think
of suggesting such action. On 29 December 1892 he simply
instructed Ford to continue to do what was in his power to
(4)
prevent the concession for the branch line being granted.
It was Sanderson of the Foreign Office who first suggested
the correct course of action:
"Our two ambassadors (the British and German) should 
endeavour to come to some agreement about lines of 
railway in Asia Minor". (5)
(1) Ford to Rosebery, 26 Dec. 1892; F.0.78/4419, Tel.No.116.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ford to Rosebery, 26 Dec. 1892; F.0.78/4417 No.387 Confid.
(4) Rosebery to Ford, 29 Dec. 1892; F.C.78/4411, No.271.
(5) Minute by Sanderson, 7 Jan. 1893 on Ford to Rosebery, 26
Dec. 1893; F ^ . 78/4417, No.387 Confid.
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But the advice came too late to prevent a serious mis­
understanding between Britain and Germany. Radolin, not being 
properly informed of the objective of Ford’s representations, 
reported that the British ambassador had protested in the name 
of his Government against a concession being given to a German
house for the construction of a railway from Angora to
- (1) ' . : : : ^ .
Bagdad. Now it happened that there were two other
rival schemes in the field for the construction of a railway
to Bagdad: an English one, which lacked solidarity and had
little hope of success^and an Anglo-French one. The German
minister, and perhaps also the Kaiser, immediately concluded
that Ford was working with Gambon against Radolin. Without
waiting for explanations, they took reprisals by requesting
their agent at Cairo to inform Lord Cromer that, in consequence
of the British ambassador having worked with France against
Germany at Constantinople, he, Herr von Leyden, had been
instructed to withhold his consent to the proposal for an
12)
increase in the Egyptian army.
This drastic action was taken by the German Government
(1) i;alet to Eosetery, 6 Jan. 1893; g.0.64/1296, No.l Confid
(2) Sosetery to Malet, 12 Janl 1 8 9 3 ; F X . 64/1292. N0.17A
Seer. •.
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because they thought that Ford had made a political question 
out of the question of railway concessions in Asiatic Turkey. 
Marschal told Malet:
"It became a serious matter when the ambassador of 
a friendly Power protested against a concession being 
granted in this manner. It removed the matter to a 
political ground". (1)
It brought the British Government into play against the German
government and would have the unfortunate effect of leading
the Porte and the Sultan to believe that the two Governments
were in contention and not, as hitherto, united:
"It was a blow to the Triple Alliance . .. The French 
were already jubilant over the incident". (2)
When the opinions and actions of the German Government
were brought to the attention of Rosebery he immediately sent
an assurance that nothing could be further from Britain’s
wishes than to take any step inimical to German influence and
(3)
interests at Constantinople. Ford had only been watchful
over his countrymen’s interests, which involved some two 
millions sterling. Rosebery maintained that he had no reason
(1) Malet to Rosebery, 6 Jan. 1893; F.0.64/1296, No.l Confid.
(2) Ibid. of. also Malet to Rosebery, 14 Jan. 1893; FVO.343/13
(3) Rosebery to Malet, 7 Jan. 1893; F^O.64/1296; Tel.No.l#
Rosebery to Ma let, 12 Jan.1893; F .0.64/1292, No.l7A beer.
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to believe that the German Government was interested in the
matter until he learnt of the instructions which had been sent
to the German agent at Cairo. Indeed, Rosebery had thought
of Kaulla merely as an adventurer, acting in concert with a
(I)
German commercial company. The Foreign Secretary expressed
privately to Malet his feelings of disgust at the German
outburst. The Germans^accused Britain of having struck a
blow at the "entente Cordiale". But the Germans had never
sought any "entente" on the subject:
"Surely we may well ask ourselves what is the cordiality 
of an understanding that is carried on in such a 
fashion? I agree that this transaction has dealt a 
blow to our good understanding, but not in the way Baron 
Marschall intended it". (2 ) ,
Rosebery was aware that a considerable section in the Liberal
Party would gladly seek a close understanding with France.
It would greatly facilitate their views if they knew of
this sort of proceeding. The German "blackmail" deeply
impressed Sir Edward Grey who,in later years, listed it as
an instance of "the rough side of German friendship", which
provided an incentive for freeing Britain from dependency on
(3)
Germany.
(1) Rosebery to Malet, 11 Jan. 1893; FX). 143/3. Private.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Sir 3. Grey, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (London 1925), 
Vol.I, p.11.
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In 1892, however, the support of Germany was essential
to Britain if she were to maintain her position in Egypt.
Britain ceased to press the claims of the railway companies.
Kosehery contented himself with giving to the German ambassador
a serious warning:
"If the good understanding between Great Britain and 
Germany were to be translated into this, that when a 
German financial agent applied for a concession in any 
country, Englishmen were to stand aside at whatever ' 
sacrifice to their own interests, and vice versa, it 
would have to stand a very serious strain". (1)
The whole incident served to illustrate the extent to 
which the good understanding between Britain and Germany 
depended upon the careful collaboration of their representa­
tives abroad. If White and Badowitz had still been at Constan­
tinople there might never have been an incident at all. The 
British Foreign Office, which had for some time been afflicted 
with doubts as to Ford's ability to manage affairs, sent out 
Arthur Kicolson as Secretary of the Embassy. It was hoped
that Nicolson might make good the defects in British diplomacy
( 2)
which arose from Ford's lack of perception and energy.
Britain's disquietude as to the state of affairs at.
(1) Eosebery to Kalet, 17 Jan. 1893; FhOy64/1292, No.23 Seer
(2) Harold Nicolson." Sir Arthur Kicolson, Bart. First Lord^  
Garnock (London, I937T’j pTsTT"
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Constantinople increased in the summer and autumn of 1893
as it became clear that the attention of France and Russia
was becoming more and more focused upon the.Mediterranean.
In August Admiral Avellan was appointed commander of a Russian
squadron which was to.be established permanently in the 
( 1 )
Mediterranean. Then, in October, there took place a great
parade of the French and Russian fleets at Toulon. Even if
the French and Russian military agreement, concluded at the
turn of the year, was directed primarily against the Triple
Alliance, the naval demonstration at Toulon was certainly aimed
at the Power which had once exercised a dominant influence . -
in the Mediterranean. The Sultan was confirmed in his belief
that there-had taken place a change in the balance of power
(2)
in favour of France and Russia.
From Britain's point of view the situation was rendered
more critical by the dissensions which were becoming apparent 
in the Triple Alliance. Salisbury and Rosebery had always 
considered that the alliance formed the best guarantee of 
European peace. But at this time Italy, because of her 
insoluble financial problems, was unreliable and Germany,
(1) A.tT. Harder, op.cit. , p.175.
(2) Kicolson to Rosebery, 13 Aug. 1893; F^.78/4481, No.390 
Confid.
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because of the lack of leadership and confusion in the Foreign 
Office, was not to be trusted. Eosebery expressed his mis­
givings to Malet:
"The Triple Alliance is in a somewhat parlous condition, 
wnich I most truly deplore. It is mutually suspicious, 
which is the worst of signs". (1)
What could Britain do? "
"We could of course enter the Triple Alliance or 
enter into a new treaty with Italy, Neither of 
■ these, however, is in the range of practical politics 
for a British minister at this time". (2)
The fact that Eosebery considered these two possibilities at 
all is an indication of his concern about the European situa­
tion. But the conclusion he reached was typical of the more 
usual lines of his thought:
"our hands must be free: we must co-operate, but
not be hand-cuffed to any-one". (3)
The only sure policy for Britain was.to strengthen her fleet.
The attention of the public had been drawn to the weak state
of the British fleet as compared with that of her two rivals
in the Mediterranean and a furious campaign was started for
( '^)
the establishment of a long-term ship-building programme.
(1) Eosebery to Malet, 3 Jan. 1894; F»0.543/5.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ihih.
(4) A.J. Harder, op.cit. Chapter X, pp.174-205.
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Eosebery was so convinced of its necessity that he was
prepared to resign if the Cabinet did not sanction at least
the minimum programme demanded by the sea lords.  ^ In the
event, it was Gladstone who resigned: refusing to acknowledge
the necessity for so much expenditure, he left with the
words, "it is the Admirals who have got their knife into 
( 8 )
me". . Adequate provision was made for the strengthening of 
the fleet. Eosebery became Prime Minister and Kimberley, ■ 
Foreign Secretary, but the former still played an important 
part in the direction of foreign policy.
Rosebery believed that the news that Britain had deter­
mined to maintain a strong naval force would suffice to 
reassure Italy as to her own position in the Mediterranean
and keep her faithful to the old policy of co-operation with
(3)
Britain and alliance with the central Powers. It remained 
to reassure Kalnoky;, whose fears as to the probable adverse 
affects of the Franco-Russian alliance on Austria's position 
in the Near East were aggravated by his knowledge that
(1) • Beym to Kalnoky, 29 Dec. 1893. V/.S.A.'TIIl/l/2 ^ngland
III. Printed in Foundations, Doc. 188, p.478.
(2) Algernon hest. Private Diaries (1922) , p.238; quoted by 
. A.J. Harder, op.cit .7 p:2'G27
(3) Deym to Kalnoky, 29 Dec. 1893. Foundations^, Dec.188, p.478
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Germany nad resolved on a policy of absolute reserve in that 
( 1 )
region. ICalnoky thought that the immediate threat would be
against the Straits. He argued that Russia could now count 
upon the support of France in matters affecting the Mediter­
ranean and that she would not be so foolish as to wait for 
any abatement of France's enthusiasm, but would quickly raise 
the Straits question - either by calling on the Sultan to take 
measures-for its discussion and settlement or by addressing 
herself to the Great Powers. If Russia once obtained free 
passage for her ships through the Rtraits, she would estab­
lish her influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and would 
embark on a policy of intimidation of all countries bordering 
on the Aegean and contiguous seas. The policies of Austria, 
Italy and Spain would depend upon the policy of the British 
Government. Kalnoky repeatedly.pressed these views on that 
Government and refused to be satisfied with general assur­
ances as to Britain's determination to maintain her 
traditional policy. He stated unequivocally that, unless 
Austria could be certain that Britain would protect 
Constantinople and maintain the status quo in the question
(1) Monson to Rosebery, 29 Deo. 1893; PRC.7/1199. No.267 
Seer. and Conf.
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of trie ütraits, Austria would be compelled to leave them to 
their fate and confine herself to safeguarding her interests 
in the Balkans. . '
For some time Rosebery had given his serious attention 
to the straits question. In November, 1893 he read a memoran­
dum by Goltz Pasha on the means at the disposal of Turkey 
for resisting a Russian attack on the Bosphorus. The only  ^
conclusion that could be drawn, was that,, when war broke out, 
Russia would be in possession of the Bosphorus. Rosebery 
commented:
' ; : (2)
"I am afraid the case is very bad".
He was familiar with the Directors of Naval and Military
Intelligence's report of 4 June.1892 as to the powerlessness
 ^ (3)
of the British Mediterranean fleet against France and Russia.
He concluded that the maintenance of the British Levant squad-
(4)
ron had become a policy of "bounce" or bluff. But he was
(1) Monson to Rosebery, 13 Dec. 1893; F.0.7/1199, No,245 
Most Conf.
Monson to Rosebery, 19 Dec. 1893; Ibid, No.255 Conf. 
Monson to Rosebery 24 Jan. 1894; F .0.78/4592 No.17 Seer. 
Deym to Kalnoky,7 Feb. 1894; W.S.a .YIII/172, England 
' III. Printed in Foundations, Doc.189, p.481.
(2) , Draft from Foreign Office to Admiralty transmitting
' Gosselin's despatch No.272 of 17 Nov. 1892 which con­
tained an extract of a report by Gottz Pasha. Minute 
by Rosebery of 26 Nov. 1893; F ^ . 78/4592 Secret (no num­
ber)
(3) cf. pp
(4) A.J. Marder , op.cit., p.219
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not unduly dismayed. He agreed with the first sea lord, Sir
Frederick Richards, that "bounce counts for a good deal, if
the other^party is not sure that it is 'only Bottom the
weaver'." Rosebery argued that nothing prevented Russia
from taking possession of Constantinople (and the Rtraits)
but fear of the consequences - that is, the possibility of
war with one or more of the Great Powers. Russia could not
want to fight Britain. As long as Britain showed^ by the
presence of her squadron in the Levant, that she was awake,
it was unlikely that Russia would attempt to gain her ends
(2|
by violent means. The new naval programme would afford 
Russia additional evidence that Britain did not intend to 
stand aloof. Currie, the Under-Secretary of State, and 
Rosebery did not believe that Russia, even if she were
i ' I.
allied to France, would be able to count on active support 
from that Power for an advance against the Straits and the 
resulting break-through into the Mediterranean. France had 
no interest in making Russia all-powerful in the Near East,
(1) Memorandum for first lord, 15 April 1894 (Spencer MSb.) 
quoted by A.J. Harder, op.cit., p.221.
(2) Rosebery to Spencer, 22 April 1894, (Spencer MSS.) quoted
by Harder, p.223. -
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where she had always jealously guarded her role as protector
of Christians and in sharing with Russia control over the
(1)
Medit erranean.
Rosebery must have felt that it was quite safe to
give to the Austrian ambassador the personal assurance he
did give on 31 January 1894. He chose his words carefully:
"Je suis parfaitement decidë' à maintenir le status 
quo actuel dans la question des détroits et je 
ne reculerais pas devant le danger dJentrafner 
l'Angleterre dans une guerre avec la Russie; mais 
je dois vous dire franchement que si la France se 
, trouvait h coté’ de la Russie, il ne serait pas 
possible à 1'Angeleterre de defendre Constantinople 
contre les deux puissances; en tout cas nous ne 
pourrions laisser notre flotte dans la Méditerranée 
courir le risque d'un catastrophe, se trouvant entre 
la flotte Russe et la flotte française. Dans ce cas 
il nous faudrait l'assistance de la triple alliance 
pour tenir la France en echec". (2)
Rosebery made this statement only after he had convinced
himself that it was unlikely that Russia would attempt hostile
(1) Hatzfeldt to Caprlvi, and Hatzfeldt to Holstein, 30 
Dec. 1893; G.F.IX, Hos.2142-2143. This opinion was 
ultimately proved correct. Hanotaux, who became
■ Foreign Secretary in France shortly after the signing 
of the Franco-Russian alliance later wrote: "II fut
toujours stipul/ que l'alliance laissait en dehors 
de ses engagements les affaires d'Crient, Constantinople 
et les Balkans, qu'elle (France) s'opposait expressément 
à toute enterprise de la Russie dans cette region".
(2) Deym to Kalnoky, 7 Feb. 1894, No.7A-E Secr. ik’.S.A.7111/ 
172, England III. Printed in Foundations, Doc. 189; p.480
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action against the Etraits because of the danger she would
incur of war with Britain. The motives which prompted him
to make the statement were mixed. Undoubtedly, he wished to
reassure Kalnoky as to his determination to maintain the
traditional British policy regarding the Straits; but the
last part of the statement was a calculated bid to obtain
for Britain an assurance that the Triple Alliance {in fact,
Germany) would put pressure upon France to prevent her taking
part in a struggle with Russia against the Straits. Such
an attempt is understandable if one remembers the joint
'   (1)
report of the Directors of Naval and Military Intelligence;
but, if one also remembers the doubts which Rosebery felt
as to France's willingness to assist Russia in her Near
(2)
Eastern designs, one can only conclude that Rosebery was 
using the subject as a means towards another end: , the induce­
ment of Austria to secure, a better disposition of Germany
towards Britain. , , ■
(3)
Since the Siam crisis of July 1893, a noticeable 
coolness had developed between Britain and Germany « tv hen the
(1 )
(2) Of. -gp/OS.-/OJ, - ' -
(3) A good account of the effect of the Siam crisis on Anglo 
German relations is to be found in von Ludwig, Israel,
op.cit., pp.5C-53,
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prospect, of securing Britain's adhesion to the Triple Alliance 
had appeared only to disappear with provoking suddenness, 
the Germans had become more than ever convinced that Britain's 
policy was to seek "lightning conductors rather than 
alliances". All Kalnoky's efforts in spring 1894 failed to 
convince the Germans that Britain's attitude had changed. 
C&privi pointed out that, in case of a conflict with Russia, 
Rosebery was free to decide not only the time but also the
opportunèss of fighting Russia; but Germany was to pledge
. (1)
herself to go to war to hold France in check. Germany
would not give such a pledge: Kalnoky was told to treat
. . : (2) ; , , - 
Rosebery's proposal dilatorily.
It is unlikely that Rosebery seriously expected Germany
to give a definite pledge. His object was rather to promote
co-operation upon the Straits question in order to use that
co-operation as a basis from which a return could be made to
the old policy of co-operation in all matters Involving
mutual interests. The extent to which he failed was demonstrate
(1) Gaprivi to Marschall, 4 Aug. 1893; G » P.VIII, Ko.1757.
(2) Sz&gyeny to Kalnoky, 10 March 1894; summarised by W.L. 
Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, p.383.
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Yi/hen Germany sided with France in protesting against the
(1
Congo Treaty which Britain signed with Belgium in May 1894. 
Then Rosebery revealed to the Austrian ambassador his view as 
to the place which British policy towards Constantinople held 
in relation to the larger issues of British foreign policy. 
The assurances which Rosebery had given Austria-Hungary 
on the subject of Constantinople and the Straits had brought 
about an entente between Britain and the Triple Alliance on 
European questions. Rut Germany was a party to the Triple 
Alliance. If Germany continued to follov; in Africa a policy 
hostile to Britain, it would be impossible for Britain to 
maintain her entente with the Triple Alliance on European 
questions:
"If Germany continues to show herself so hostile to 
• the Cabinet of St. James, I shall feel obliged to 
take back the assurances I have given on the subject 
of Constantinople". (2)
The maintenance of the latter were to be conditional upon 
the assumption by Germany of a more friendly attitude towards 
Britain.
At the same time as Rosebery was attempting to re­
establish between the Governments of Britain and the Powers
(1) W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of imperialism, op.cit,, vol. 
I, pp.132-141.
(2) Deym to Kalnoky. 13 June 1894; N.3.A.VIIl/l72,England 
III, Ho.29 Sec. Printed in Foundations, Doc. 192, p.49^.
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of the Triple Alliance the friendly co-operation which had 
once existed in the treatment of Near Eastern questions, a 
similar attempt was being made by the new British ambassador 
at Constantinople in his efforts to reconstitute the quartet 
of the ambassadors of Britain and the Powers of the Triple 
Alliance as it had existed under White, Blanc, Calice and 
Radowitz. Rosebery sent Sir Philip Currie as ambassador to 
Constantinople, in 1894, in order to demonstrate to Kalnoky 
that he was determined to continue Salisbury's policy in the 
Near East; Currie was a man of the Salisbury school; he 
had been Salisbury's secretary at the Constantinople
(1)
Conference of 1876 and at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.
Currie believed that the confidence of the Powers of the
Triple Alliance in British policy could be restored if
Britain increased her influence at Constantinople. After
surveying the situation there, he concluded that this could
be done if Britain could persuade the Sultan that she wished
him well and that he would receive from Britain fair treatment
(2)
and scrupulous regard for his ancient rights. When, in
(1) D.N.B. 1901-1911, p.455; Foreign Office List 1907, p.397. 
Kalnoky to Calice, 8 Feb. 1894; YIII/172, England
III, Priv. letter; recounting a conversation with Currie 
who passed through Vienna on his way to Constantinople.
On 31 March Monson reported; "Kalnoky is evidently much 
relieved by the knowledge that his Ambassador at the 
Porte no longer stands alone but is supported by the 
courage and firmness of a really strong British colleague, 
holding views and assuming an attitude identical with
his own." Monson to Kimberley, 31 March 1894; 0.7/1213,
No.82 Beer. .
(2) Currie to Kimberley, 22 Aug.1894; Kimberley Papers v/3a.
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.Au^Uot 1894, the oultan re-opened discussions, which- had taken
place in the previous summer, concerning a proposed Anglo-
Turkish understanding about Egypt, Currie thought that, if
such an understanding could be brought about, it would be the
best point of departure for the improvement of Anglo-Turkish
relations. "
The discussions of summer 1893 had as a centre a
proposal which Rosebery had put forward as "absolutely personal
to himself" that the objects of the British and Turkish
Governments could be secured by a Convention of which the
main part would be:
"L'Angleterre qui n'occupe l'Egypte qu'à titre , 
provisoire, s'étant déjà, engagée à retirer complète- - 
ment ses troupes de cette contrée, les deux Parties 
Contractantes s'engagent à^arr^ter et à conclure 
Y / dans l'espace de cinq ans à parte de l'échange des
* / ratifications de présente Acte, 'oa. plus t6t si
I faire se peut une Convention fixant la date et les
conditions de l'évacuation". (1)
The authority of the Sultan in Rgypt would be fully recognized
by the British Government and one more proof would be given
to the Sultan of Britain's readiness to evacuate Egypt when
evacuation was practicable. In the meantime, Britain would
( 1) Rosebery to Nicolson, 13 Sept. 1893; PhO.97/601, 
No.243 Very Conf.
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obtain the expressed or implied sanction of the Sultan to 
her occupation and tne whole question would be placed upon 
a legal and authoritative footing. The words "et conditons" 
would reserve all other articles as well as the right of re­
occupation. In the summer of 1893 Rosebery had believed that 
it would be advantageous to Britain to conclude such a Con­
vention, if it were concluded quickly. He argued that it 
would not really bring Britain nearer to the evacuation of 
Egypt as, after five years, Britain could begin to discuss 
thé conditions upon which she would evacuate and the discus­
sions could -occupy many years. In view of the rumours which 
circulated at that time of impending Franco-Russian naval 
demonstrations in the Mediterranean, Rosebery had been anxious 
to anticipate.the possible course of events by placing 
Britain's relations with the Sultan upon a more satisfactory 
footing. ■The Turk was, however, almost constitutionally 
incapable ,of acting rapidly and, in spite of Rosebery's 
insistence that Rustem Pasha should speedily obtain permission 
to sign the Convention, no answer had been received from 
Constantinople by 20 September 1893. Accordingly, Rosebery
had informed Rustem Pasha that his private proposal was at 
■ (1)
an end: circumstances had changed when a Russian squadron
(1) Rosebery to Nicolson, 15 Sept. 1893; F.0 .97/601, No.247 
Seer. Rosebery to Kicolson, 20 Sept. 1893; Ibid, No.
247 A.
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had entered the Mediterranean with a view to altering the
(1)
balance of power there. -
When the Sultan attempted to reopen the negotiations, in
August 1894, there weis some evidence that he was sincerely
anxious to reach an understanding. For the first time, he
put forward a practical proposal, asking for an additional
article which would provide for Turco-British co-operation
to prevent the occupation of Egypt by any other Power after it
(2)
had been evacuated by Britain. Currie believed that the
Sultan was "likely to be in a more yielding mood than usual"
and the ambassador suggested that, if the British Government
wished to conclude a Convention on the lines of Rosebery's
proposal of 1893, they should inform him "with the least
possible delay", so that he could strike while the iron was
(3)
hot. ' The British Cabinet deliberated upon the draft 
Convention as it then stood. Certain amendments were 
suggested, but, at first, there was a desire to sign some 
such Convention* Kimberley, now Foreign Secretary, thought 
that there were some advantages in the Convention; the
(1) Rosebery to Ford, 13 Cot. 1893; Ibid, No.266 very Seor.
(2) Currie to Kimberley, 11 Aug. 1894; Ibid, No.129 beer.
(3) Currie to Rosebery, 9 Aug. 1894; Ibid. No.128 Seer. 
(Paraphrase).
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principal gain would be the better disposition of the Sultan
(1)
towards Britain. On 14 August he was able to inform
(2)
Currie that the Cabinet was "inclined to accept in principle". 
Currie, who was personally keen to see the Convention conclu­
ded, immediately communicated privately and unofficially to 
Shakir Pasha an amended draft with the date of ratification 
left blank, so that, if the Convention should go through, it
would be in a form for final submission to the British
(3)
Government.
The news that Currie had gone so far caused some alarm
in British. Government circles. Rosebery wrote in a minute
of 17 August: "Currie had no business to commit us so
( 4)
much ..." . The. Queen wrote to Kimberley expressing the
(1) Kimberley to Currie, 28 Aug. 1894; Kimberley Papers, 
C/'3h.
(2) Kimberley to Currie, 14 Aug. 1894; P.O.97/601. Tel. No. 
67. . The words "inclined to" were inserted in the draft 
telegram as an afterthought. Before the insertion, the 
sentence read: "Cabinet accept in principle".
(3) Currie to Kimberley, 17 Aug. 1894; Kimberley Papers 
' G/3a;
(4) Rosebery's Minute 17 Aug. 1894; Kimberley Papers C/3a.
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opinion that Britain should not hind herself to evacuate
(1)
Fgypt within any definite time. . Kimberley consulted Lord
Cromer as to the probable effects in Egypt ,of the Convention
and Cromer replied in such a way as to make it quite clear
(2)
that he did not wish for the Convention. Consequently,
the early enthusiasm of the Cabinet cooled. Britain was 
engaged in critical negotiations with the French about 
African questions and the Cabinet was afraid of offending 
France at that time. Currie was told that, as the Cabinet 
was on the point of dispersal for the Summer, no further pro-
(3)
gress could be made with the negotiations.
Thus was lost one more opportunity for the settlement of 
the Egyptian question. Currie was discouraged and he wrote 
to his old chief, Salisbury, that he could have brought the 
negotiations to a successful conclusion if there had been 
"more fixity of purpose in Downing Street". The action of 
the British Cabinet caused Currie to reflect and to ask.what
(1) The Queen to Kimberley, 11 Aug. 1894; Ibid C/l9.
(2) Kimberley to Currie, 16 Aug and 22 Aug. 1894; Ibid C/St.
(3) Kimberley to Currie, 22 AUg a no 28 Aug. 1894; Ib^ id, u/3A.
(4) Currie to Salisbury, 21 Oct. 1894; Salisbury Papers,
Currie file. -
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was tne real policy of the British Government towards Turkey. 
He hoped that Turkey was not looked upon entirely as a 
quantité négligeable" or as "a mere appendage to the Eastern 
question". Sooner or later the Eastern problem would come 
up for treatment and Britain's position in regard to it 
would greatly depend upon the state of her relations with the
, ' k . ^ (I) ' '
Sultan. Kimberley volunteered only a brief and non­
committal answer;
"The master of such an army as the Turkish army can 
never be a 'quantité négligeable'".: (2)
' When, in the middle of. August, • the-Armenians at Sassoon,
in the Bitlis vilayet, rose in an open revolt .which.was put
(3)
down with great ferocity by the T u r k s i t  seemed that the
Eastern question would very soon demand treatment. Britain
hadr obligations, under the Cyprus Convention and under .the
61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, to watch over the '
welfare of the Christian inhabitants of Asiatic Turkey and it
(4)
was certain that she would have to take some action. The
(1) Currie to Kimberley, 22 Aug. 1894; Kimberley Papers,C/3a.,
(2) Kimberley to Currie, 28 Aug. 1894; Kimberley Papers C/3b.
(3) B.C.'Weeks, The Armenian Question and British Policy in 
Turkev 1894-96. ^n unpüblïsned M.A. tnesis for the 
UnTversîf^of“Lonüon, 1950, p.87. Hr. Weeks deals fully 
with the Armenian question and so, in the following pages,
the question is dealt with only in so far as it is
necessary to treat it in relation to the general theme
of this thesis.
(4) For Cyprus Convention and 61st Article 7 of Treaty of 
Berlin cf. E. Hertslet, Map of Europe, b^ q Treaty. Vol.IV, 
pp.2717-20 and p.2796.
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need to act became pressing when the Porte presented to Currie
a note which charged the British vice consul at Bitlis,
Hr. Hailwood, with urging the Armenians to rise against the 
( t ) /
Government. Currie proposed sending the military attache
of the British Embassy at Constantinople to hold an inquiry
into Hailwood's conduct and into the disturbances in the Bitlis 
(2)
vilayet. - This proposal, as Currie had anticipated, caused
the Porte to ; suggest a counter-measure: the Sultan promised
"a just and impartial inquiry into the events which had taken
place at Sassoun" and, in accordance with this measure, the
(3)
Porte was prepared to cancel their note. .
- Currie, who maintained that.the best attitude for 
Britain to adopt was one of friendly advice to the Sultan, 
persuaded his Government to accept the proposed Commission
(4)
of the Sultan as a means of inquiry.into the disturbances. .
But the aspect of the problem changed when.the Sultan decorated 
two Turkish officials who were implicated in the incidents 
at Sassoun and when it was officially announced in the Turkish
(1) Currie to Kimberley, 9 Nov. 1894; F.0.78/4546, Tel.No.189*
(2) Ibid. :. .
(3) Currie to Kimberley, 16 Nov.1894; F.0.78/4546, Tel.No.194.
(4) Ibid. V ,
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press that the object of the Sultan's Commission was "to
. (1)
inquire into the criminal conduct of the Armenian brigands".
Britain needed some guarantee that a really impartial inquiry 
would be made and these two events made it unlikely that it 
would be obtained unless Britain took further action. Currie 
was still reluctant to appeal to the other signatories of 
the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin for help in inter­
vening between the Turk and his Christian subjects. He thought 
that Germany would refuse to participate and that Austria-
Hungary and Italy would give only half-hearted support to 
(2)
Britain. ' As a milder form of intervention, Currie sugges­
ted that Britain might propose to the Powers who had consuls 
at Erzeroum jointly to call upon the Porte to give facilities 
to their consuls to communicate with the Turkish commission
and to reoort the progress of the inquiry to their respective
(3)
Governments. France and Russia were the only two Powers 
(apart from Britain) who had consuls at Erzeroum. Russia, 
who was compelled by her own geographical position to prevent 
the spread of Armenian disaffection from arousing her own
(1). Currie to Kimberley, 24 Nov. 1894; F.C.78/4544, No.533;
B.C. vveeks, op. cit ., p. 100.
(2) Currie to Kimberley, 26 Bov. 1894; Elmtierley papers, C/3a.
Currie to Kimberley, 26 Hot. 1894; F.0.78/4544, Bo.541.
(5) Currie to Kimberley, 27 Kov. 1894; F ^ . 78/4546, Tel.Bo.
205.
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Armenian population, would probably respond favourably to.
such a proposal and France would be likely to follow suit.
Although Currie, in proposing to seek the aid of France
and Russia, was influenced purely by the practical eonsidera-
tion that it was from those Powers that Britain could expect
most help in solving the Armenian problem, some members of
the British Government (which eventually adopted the proposal)
were influenced by views which took into consideration wider
aspects of policy. Harcourt wrote to Kimberley:
"The key to the enigma is a good understanding with 
Russia, a thing we have never yet tried, but which is 
now/ happily within our reach ... If we stick.firmly 
to it, the Eastern question will be a much less 
dangerous one than it has been heretofore". (1)
when Harcourt wrote to the Prince of Wales in order to con­
gratulate him on his contribution to the "establishment of 
the most friendly and intimate relations with Russia" 
(following the Prince's visit to St. Petersburg to attend 
the funeral of the Tsar) , Harcourt added;
"This is an experiment which has never yet been 
fairly tried in foreign affairs and it is my humble 
opinion that there is none which is more likely to 
minister to the cause of peace and good-will". (2)
(1) Harcourt to Kimberley; quoted in A.G. Gardiner, The 
Life of Sir William Harcourt (London, 1923), Vol.Tl, 
p73S5.
(2) Harcourt to the Prince of Wales, 6 Dec. 1894; Ibid, 
p.326.
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In November Britain finally met all the Russian demands concer­
ning the Pamirs^and a definite agreement regarding the Pamirs 
was concluded. Eosebery, in his speech at the Guildhall,
emphasized that in the Far East Britain and Russia had.pro­
ceeded hand,in hand and that the relations between the two
' '(2) ^'
Governments had never been "more hearty".
... The evidence available indicates,that these gestures of
friendship. towards Russia were meant not as preliminary
moves towards a.reorientation of policy.but as means to put
pressure upon Germany in order to persuade her to readopt a
more friendly attitude towards Britain. ; . Hatzfeldt, however,
was seriously concerned and,he told Kimberley that:
"Closer relations between [Britain^ and Russia appeared 
to him to imply a considerable and important change 
in £*British“] policy and one that might have far- 
reaching consequences. It was not to be supposed 
that Russia would ask for nothing in return ... it 
would not be long before she demanded free passage 
through the , Bosphorus and Dardanelles for her ships 
of war". ( 3)
In November both the British and the Germans thought it likely
that, in the near future, Russia would raise the question of
( 4)
the free passage of her'war ships through the Straits.
(1) W.D." Danger, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit.
Vol.I, p.145.
(2) Annual Register, 1894.
'(3) Memorandum of Kimberley's conversation with Hatzfeldt,
19 Nov. 1894; Kimberley Papers 0/23.
(4) On 27 Nov. Harcourt wrote to Kimberley: "indications come 
from all quarters that the question of the Dardanelles
(cont. next page)
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In a conversation with Colonel bwaine the Kaiser made it clear
that he would not raise objections, but would demand a quid
pro quo in the shape of a reduction of the Russian forces on
the German frontier; although he would make it clear that,
if Russian men of war were allowed to pass freely in and out
(1)
of.the Black Sea, German ships must have a similar privilege.
Early in December, the German ambassador at Constantinople'
had a conversation with Jadowski (the Russian charge d'affaires)
in which the latter expressed an opinion that an agreement
between Russia and Britain regarding the Gtraits was unlikely
because, although it would be in Russia's interest to secure
Britain's assent to the free passage of her war ships through
the Straits, it was unlikely that Britain would give her'
consent without demanding compensations which it would not
(2)
be in Russia's interest to grant.
Jadowski's view of the situation was to prove correct.
The Near Eastern question was still a formidable obstacle to
(4) from previous page:
is about to be raised ... As the Cabinet may not meet 
again for some time, I think it essential, that we should 
discuss the whole matter (the Eastern question) on Wed­
nesday and especially the question of the Dardanelles. I 
have written to Rosebery to ask that we may have a full 
statement on the subject". Harcourt to Kimberley, 27 Nov. 
1894; Kimberley Papers, C/l5a. There is no available 
account of the Cabinet meeting.
(1) Gosselin to Kimberley, 16 Nov. 1894; F.0.78/4592, No.229 
Seer, enclosing a Memorandum by ColonelT'Swaine.
(2) ReWWln to Hohenloke, 7 Dec. 1894; Austrian Foreign Office 
Archives; quoted by von Dudwig Israel op.cit. p.6o.
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doser Anglo-Eussian relations. Although the Russian and 
French Governments did accept Britain's proposal to call 
upon the Porte to give their consuls facilities to communicate 
with the Turkish'commission of inquiry into the disturbances 
at Sassoun, the subsequent history of the Armenian question 
demonstrated that this T;as done more with the object of 
restraining Britain than with the object of helping her to 
find a satisfactory solution to the Armenian problem. Kimber­
ley gave a true answer to Hatzfeldt when he said:
"So far as regarded the Triple Alliance, fhej was 
not aware that there was anything new in the 
situation". (1)
Although Germany declared that her official attitude towards
the Near Eastern question was one of désintéressement, the
need to maintain the status quo at Constantinople was still
a pressing one to Austria-Hungary and Italy. Throughout
the subsequent negotiations for the settlement of the Armenian
question, Currie kept Calice informed of all that passed
and he found the knowledge and experience of the Austro-
Hungarian ambassador very useful. Although Calice took no
part himself in Armenian affairs, he was "friendly and
(1) Memorandum of Kimberley's conversation with Hatzfeldt, 
19 Nov. 1894, Kimberley Papers C/23.
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helpful" and had no sympathy with the German attitude.
The Italian ambassador at Constantinople at first requested 
that the Italian consul at Trebizond, who also had jurisdic­
tion at Erzeroum, should be allowed to join with the British,
(2)
French and Eussian consuls. Kimberley instructed Currie
to give the Italian ambassador his "best support":
"The active co-operation of some member.of the 
Triple Alliance is for many reasons desirable 
and of Italy especially on account of her cordial 
relations with us". (3)
Although for practical reasons, Kimberley was forced to seek
the support of France and Russia, he was under no delusion
as to the real attitude of Russia and he still believed
that a close relationship between Britain and the Powers
of the Triple Alliance formed the best guarantee for peace.
Currie considered that it was almost certain that the
inquiry would show that an impossible state of things
existed in the Bitlis vilayet and, soon after the commission
began its labours, he began to consult with the French and
Russian ambassadors at Constantinople with a view to drawing
up a scheme of reform for the Armenian provinces of Asiatic
(1) Currie to Kimberley, 29 Nov. 1894; Kimberley Papers C/3a.
(2) Currie to Kimberley, 8 Dec, 1894; F .0.78/4546, Tel.No.230
(3) Kimberley to Currie, 14 Dec. 1394; Kimberley Papers C/3b.
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(I)
Turkey. The object of the three ambassadors was to draw
up provisions which would ensure security for the life and
property of-the Armenians. Currie did his utmost to introduce
into the scheme of reforms provisions which would enable the
Powers to exercise an efficient control, but his colleagues
were afraid that, if these were of too stringent a nature,
"it would be impossible to induce the Turkish Government to
agree to them without having to resort to measures which
(2)
they were unwilling to employ". - '
This early difference of opinion as to the stringency
of the provisions for ensuring an effective European control
foreshadowed the differences of opinion which followed after
the scheme of reforms was presented to the Porte early in
(3)
May 1895. When a fortnight had elapsed without the
(1) Currie to Kimberley, 31 Dec. 1894; Kimberley Papers C/3a.
(2) Currie to Kimberley, 18 April 1894; P.C.78/4609, No.245.
(3) Cn 6 May 1895 Kimberley authorised Currie to concert 
with the French and Russian ambassadors for the presen­
tation of the scheme of reforms to the Sultan and the
Porte. Kimberley to Currie, 6 May 1895; F.0.78/4626, Tel
No.40. For text of reform scheme cf. Memorandum  _
enclosed in Currie to Kimberley, 19 Jan. 1895, A g-'PlSl
( 1896) , Turkey No.l. p/>- 1-2.
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ambassadors receiving a satisfactory reply, Kimberley 
instructed Currie to propose to his two colleagues that, if 
an answer was not received by 30 May, they should make a 
joint communication to the Porte, insisting upon a categori­
cal answer by 1 June and stating that an unfavourable reply
; , {1 )
would be the occasion for the exertion of pressure. A
despatch of Helidov to the Russian Government, reporting
Currie as saying that, if the Porte's answer was delayed,
Britain would'have recourse to measures of constraint,
resulted in Lobanov telegraphing to his ambassador that "in
no case would the Russian Government associate itself with
(2)
such measures".. The relations between Britain and Russia
were, therefore,^.unsatisfactory when, on 3 June, the Sultan
presented his answer, in which he rejected most of the
(3)
demands of the ambassadors. % - .
Britain was forced to act alone in order to press the
Sultan to reconsider his reply. Kimberley used strong
language to the Turkish ambassador in London and the British
fleet was ordered to-cruise along the coast of Syria and
(4)
Asia Minor. These measures resulted in the Sultan declaring
(1) Kimberley to Currie, 27 May 1895; F.0.78/4626, Tel.No.52.
(2) Kimberley to Currie, 31 May 1695; Ibid. Tel.No.58.
(3) Currie to Kimberley, 4 June 1895; F.0.78/4615, No.556.
(4) Kimberley to Currie, 11 June 1895; F.0.78/4626, Tel.ho.
71.
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on 14 June, that the British, French and Russian Governments
were mistaken in considering his reply of 3 June as a rejec-
tion of their advice and that a further reply would soon he 
■ - ( 1 ) .
communicated. No satisfactory answer had been received
when the Liberal Government resigned on 24 June. One can
detect in the telegram which Kimberley sent' to Currie on that
day something of the relief which the Minister felt on being
relieved of further responsibility:....
"The Ministry having tendered their resignation, 
which has been accepted by the Queen, I must leave 
the decision of the course to be'followed to my 
successor". (2)
The negotiations regarding the Armenian question 
had been conducted on a day-to-day basis without any specific 
programme and without any specific idea as to the course 
to be followed if the Sultan refused to accept the reform 
proposals. This manner of conducting affairs had the 
advantage of localising the conflict and preventing the 
raising of general issues in Britain's relations with other 
Powers. But there were great disadvantages in such a mode 
of orocedure. Britain could not really depend upon Russia
(1) Currie to Kimberley, 19 June 1395; F^O.78/4613 No.392, 
enclosing a copy of a note verbale received from the 
Porte.
(2) Kimberley to Currie, 24 June 1695, F .0.78/4626, Tel. 
No. 91.
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for support in order to force her demands upon the dultan. 
Abdul Hamid saw that the Powers were not really united and 
quickly took advantage of this circumstance. The fact that 
Britain v/as associating herself with the Powers of the Dual 
Alliance in the negotiations regarding the,Armenians aroused 
the suspicions of the Powers of the Triple Alliance. The 
close relationship between Britain and the latter Powers, 
which had been based upon "reciprocal confidence" was 
damaged without Britain gaining any real advantage from her 
new relationship with France and Russia. It v;as an 
unenviable heritage which Kimberley bequeathed to his 
successor, Salisbury.
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CHAPTER IV 
Eus sia and the Straits: 189C-I894
There was no major spectacular crisis during these 
years, yet they were years in which Turkey and the Powers 
had to meet as great a challenge as they had ever met regard­
ing Russia's pretensions to the passage of her ships through 
the Straits. At this time Russia pursued her old object - the 
opening of the Straits for Russia and for Russia alone - not 
by an open challenge but by an underhand, systematic by­
passing of the stipulations laid down in the treaties respec­
ting the Straits. Just because her methods were underhand, 
the problem presented to the Powers was more complex than 
it had ever been before. Britain, supported with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm by the Powers of the Triple Alliance, 
grappled manfully with the problem; but, inlpite of the
■i
efforts of Salisbury and Eosebeiy and the British ambassadors 
at Constantinople, the Powers were placed in what was essen­
tially a false position.
' The situation will be seen more clearly if a detailed 
examination is made of Russia's actions and the counter-moves 
of the Powers; but, first, it must be pointed out that there 
was some justification for Aussia's action. Trie opening of 
the Suez Canal and the movement of Russia's interests to the
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Far Fast had for Russia completely altered the aspect of 
the Straits question. The quickest and safest route to the 
Far East was not from the Baltic but from'the'Black ' Sea via 
Suez. In these circumstances, Russia considered that it was 
absolutely necessary for her to insist upon'immediate transit 
to her Pacific possessions and back again. This demand was 
recognized by the other Powers to have a certain amount of 
justification; it was the means employed by Russia to which 
the Powers - if they had regard for the treaties and their
own interests - were forced to object.
The first issue over which Britain and Russia came to
grips concerned the passage through the Straits of actual
Russian war ships. The treaties clearly stated that, as long 
as the Porte was at peace, no foreign war ship should pass 
the Straits; the only exceptions being two gun boats for 
the Danube for each Power, light despatch boats for the 
service of the foreign embassies at Constantinople and ships
which carried on board a sovereign or the chief of an ..
' ( 1 ) '  ^ ■ -, '•
independent state. . Russia circumvented these stipulations
when she sent through the Straits, into tne Black Sea, snip&
which, at the time of passing the Straits, were unarmed but
(1) Foundations, p.466; Memoranuum of Bertie, 4 July 189C;
FTcTTs/it^ .. ■ .
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which could easily he turned into war-ships proper, as
facilities for arming ships existed at Russian ports in the
Black Sea. Since the Porte made little difficulty in regard
to the passage through the Straits of merchant ships carrying
arms and munitions, it would be competent to a man of war to
pass the Dardanelles with a vessel unarmed and, when in the
Sea of Marmora, to receive his armaments from a merchant
ship. , ■ \ j g -
Britain recognized the significance of this practice
(1)
and watched closely Russian activities. . In June 1890 three
unarmed torpedo vessels passed through the Straits into the 
( 2 )
Black Sea. Since it was not the first occasion for such
a practice, Britain attempted to make an issue out of the
occurrence. On 16th White was instructed to warn the Porte
of the danger of allowing these vessels to pass and so
(3)
strengthen the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. On 11 July 
Fane was told to point out that the passage of such ships was
(1) In Deo. 1890 the British Vice Consul at the Dardanelles 
wrote that he trusted to make arrangements so that no
i ' Russian vessel should pass down the Straits without his 
knowledge. White to Salisbury, 8 Deo. 1890; F.0.78/4473, 
No.530.
(2) White to Salisbury, 13 June 1890; F.0.78/4280, Tel.No.34.
(3) Salisbury to White, 16 June 1890; No.179.
This despatch is not in the case volume on the Straits 
nor in the volume of despatches to Cons tant inopSe; the 
reference is taken from R.W. Brant's memorandum;
The Passage of Ships of War and of Vessels of the Russian 
VnlIInteer Fleel" through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,
6 Oct. 19Ü2; F.'üTTO/524ë. “
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a breaoh of Treaty stipulations and to intimate that H.M.'s
Government "would expect to be treated with similar favour,
- - ' ( 1 ) ' 
should they have occasion to require it". White carried
  (2)
out these instructions in a Note to the Porte of 13 August.
Salisbury.hoped that he would receive the support of 
Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy for a common representation 
in which stress would be laid on the fact that, if Russia 
continued her practices, the other Powers would do the 
same. But enquiries at their respective capitals revealed 
that the Continental Powers still showed considerable circum­
spection about putting themselves forward in a matter which 
they considered to be primarily the concern of Britain.
Caprivi thought it was "out of the question" for Germany 
to join in a protest at Constantinople to be directed at 
Russia, when Germany's own interests were not vitally 
affected. During the approaching Imperial visit to St. 
Petersburg declarations regarding the Straits, but in the 
opposite sense, were expected from Germany. If she previously
(1) Salisbury to Fane, 28 June 1890; No.286; R.W. 
Brant, op.cit.
(2) a White to Salisbury, 13 Aug. 1890; No.369; ibid.
(3) A draft to this effect was drawn up in Aug. 1890, but was 
subsequently cancelled on Lord Salisbury's directions. 
Minute by a Permanent official of the Foreign Office, 9 
Sept. 1890; F.p.78/4473.
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took up a positive position on that question, a friendly 
arrangement at St. Petersburg would be rendered difficult.
If, on the other hand, Germany remained free she could stop 
all discussion at St. Petersburg with the intimation that she 
stood absolutely on the basis of the treaties, the inter­
pretation of which was not her affair, but that of all the 
signatory powers in common. Holstein, who thought it 
important to reassure Britain, came forward with a proposal 
of his own. He suggested that it would be a very serious 
mattery even for Austri^to join the protest, especially if 
Germany held aloof; she might refuse and, in that case the 
community of views which had recently been made apparent by 
the four Powers at Constantinople would vanish and the recent 
confidence of the Sultan would diminish. But, if Britain 
reversed her method of procedure and first asked the Porte 
for permission for a British ship of war to pass the Straits, 
explaining to the Sultan that this was done for his own 
safety and upon the advice of Austrfa-Hungary, Italy and 
Germany, these Powers would be obliged to say that, as the 
Porte had allowed Russian ships, which were virtually men of 
war, to pass, she could hardly refuse a similar permission to
(1) Caprivi to Hatzfeldt, 8 Aug. 1890; G^P.IZ, No.2100.
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England. The,effect would be that the Sultan would have to
grant the permission; or would have to refuse it in future
to Russian ships; or, if he refused permission to Britain
alone, sufficient ground would then exist for a protest in
(1) ' '
which Austria and Italy could more easily join.
Salisbury was not greatly impressed by the circumlocutions 
of Holstein. He was influenced more by the opinions of Currie 
and Ealnoky. Currie thought it prejudicial to British 
interests to demand a free passage for British ships, because, 
in order to make that permission effective, the British 
Government would be forced to keep a number of ships per­
manently in the Sea of Marmora. If, in the course of time, 
the Sultan was obliged to yield to Russian pressure and the 
Dardanelles were occupied by Russia, if those British ships 
were not fully equal in strength to the combined Russian 
and Turkish forces, they would run a serious risk of being 
cut off and overwhelmed. Britain could not run such a risk 
and, if she chose this course, she must keep a fairly strong 
fleet stationed on the other side of the Dardanelles, which 
would cause the British tax payer an immense and very 
unwelcome increase of expense. It would be taken in Russia
(1) Holstein to Hatzfeldt, 8 Aug. 1890; £iP*IX, No.2099 Priv.
Malet to Salisbury, 8 Aug. 1890; Salisbury Papers, Vo.63, 
No.48 Priv. and Seer.
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(1)
as a provocation and might lead to complications. Kalnoky
thought that if Britain demanded passage for her ships,
France would make a similar demand for her own ships and the
result would be the union of a considerable Franco-Eussian
(2)
naval force in the Black Sea. Salisbury bowed before these
opinions and gave up the idea of a common representation to
(3)
the Porte. He fell back on the old habit of simply placing
(4)
on record each Russian infraction of the rule of the Straits.
In September, Ealnoky made up for his lack of support 
on this specific question, when he was present at the meeting
of the Emperors of Austria-Hungary and Germany at Eohstock,
/
by obtaining for Britain and Austria considerable success 
on the more general question. He gained German assent to a 
verbal understanding to the effect that a solution of 
the Straits question according to Russian desires would be 
impossible and that any change in the existing treaties or 
any concessions to Russia in the Near East would be made by
(1) Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 19 Aug. 1890; G.P.IX, No.2102.
(2) Paget to Salisbury, 9 Oct. 1890; No.439; R.W. Brant, 
op.cit.
(3) Salisbury to Barrington, 8 Aug. 1890; F.0.78/4473.
(4) Ford to Salisbury, 22 April 1892; Ibid, No.133; Minute by 
J.H. Sanderson.
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(1)
Germany only with the consent of Austria. The achievement 
was remarkable in that Germany was led so far away from the 
Bismarckian policy.
 ^ In 1891 Kalnoky gave his full support to Britain when 
she again joined issue with Russia in the matter of her by­
passing the stipulations of the Straits' Treaties. On this 
occasion the offending vessels were ships of the Russian
Volunteer Fleet and Russian transports. The Volunteer
(2)
Fleet was founded in 1877. Its ships carried the merchant
flag, with the Imperial Eagle on the white field, but they were
so constructed as to make it possible for them to be used as
men of war at any moment. Their crews were subject to naval
discipline and training and the principal officers of each
vessel were commissioned by the Government. A transport
was for all practical purposes a vessel employed for carrying
soldiers, war-like stores or provisions from one place to
another and for conveying to their destination convicts,
who required a large military guard; it was clearly not a
merchant vessel in the ordinary sense of the term, though
13)
transports also usually carried the merchant flag. An
(1) GJP.XXX, Nos. 10987, 10989, 10998.
(2) On the status of the Russian Volunteer Fle^t, cf. J.B.
Espi'ret, La Condition Internationale des DetroîTs du 
Bosphore el des I^rdanellês, (Toulouse, 19oY), chap.VlI.
(3) Memorandum by E. Hertslet to The Right of Russia to send
Troops and Unarmed Recruits in Ku3sian or~Other hired'
rôont. next page)
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effort was made by Russia to regularise matters by styling her 
troops "military immigrants" and by entering them at the Port 
office at Port Said as "passengers". But the Porte insisted 
that the essential character of the ships was war-like and 
required for their passage through the Straits permission 
in the form of an Irade or personal expression of the Sultan's 
will, instead of a firman, which was issued as a matter of 
course for merchant ships proper by subordinate officials at 
the Porte. - 
The importance for the Powers and the Porte of keeping 
a check on ships, which, although sailing under the guise of 
merchant vessels, could become effective war ships was obvious. 
If Russia alone were allowed continually to send such ships 
through the Straits, without the observation of the formali­
ties necessary for warships, privileges would be given to 
that Power greater than those possessed by other Powers 
under the international treaties. By devious means Russia 
would be achieving what the Powers had joined together to 
prevent her achieving in 1833 by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi: 
the sole and exclusive right of sending her war ships through
(3) : cont. from previous page;
Trananorts through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, 9 Oct 
1886; F.Ü".78^48, Conf.
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the Strait s.. The danger to the Porte of such a practice was 
equally obvious; Russia could turn the usage against Turkey; 
and ships, ostensibly designed for the Pacific possessions 
of the Russian Empire, might under certain eventualities 
be suddenly landed on the shores of the Bosphorus.
The difficulties involved in the treatment of such ships 
became clear when an open controversy broke out in 1891 bet­
ween Russia and the Porte. Early in April the Porte detained 
in the Bosphorus the Volunteer Vessel "Nijni Novgorod" on the 
ground that it had a railway battalion on board and special
permission for the passage of the ship had not been requested 
" - C1 )
by the Russian Government. On 9th Nelidov sent to the 
Turkish Foreign Minister a note in which he claimed that 
the alleged soldiers were simply workmen and pointed out that 
the ships also carried a number of first class passengers, 
among whom was a courier of the Imperial Cabinet, proceeding 
to the Far East. Such treatment of a ship flying the 
commercial flag constituted a flagrant violation of the liber­
ty of navigation assured to Russia by the treaties in force. 
The note concluded with the threat;
(1) White to Salisbury, 18 April 1891; F.0.78/4473, No.156.
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 ^ "L’ambassadeur Imperial se croit oblige d’aviser
désormais: lui-m8me aux mesures nécessaires pour 
assurer a ses bateaux la liberté^ de passage qui 
leur est acquise par les traites".
The tone of Said Pasha’s reply of 20 April was almost apolo­
getic. He wished to assure the Ambassador that the measures 
prescribed by Turkey were little more than a simple surveil­
lance of police. He concluded with the significant statement;
"Le Ministre Impériale regrette d’autant plus que 
/ l’Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l’Empereur en ait fait
/ l’object d’une plainte qu’elle arrivée à une (1)
conclusion a attirer l’attention des autres Puissances".
Turkey was aiming at keeping the dispute quiet between herself
and Russia. Therein lay the difficulty for Britain. Currie
remarked that it would be difficult for the Powers to take the
(2)
matter up, unless the Porte appealed to them. But before 
any steps would be taken, a further crisis was precipitated 
by the stoppage of a second Russian Volunteer Vessel, the 
"Kostroma". On this occasion, since the sultan was involved 
in religious duties, a delay of twenty-four hours elapsed 
before an Irade was issued. On 24 April Nelidov sent a 
second heated Note to the Palace. He pointed out that only 
fifteen days had elapsed since he had been obliged to make the
(1) A copy of the Russian note and of the Porte’s reply is 
enclosed in White to Salisbury, 20 May 1891; Ibid No.199 
Seer.
(2) Memorandum by P. Currie, 2 May 1891; Ibid (no number).
136.
last protest and demanded that the Porte should:
"Infliger une punition exemplaire aux coupables" et 
< "indemniser ceux qui ont eu à subir des dommages a la 
suite de cet incident et en prévenir dorénavant le 
retour".
The demands were great: the dismissal of the Commander of the
forts at Kavanak or his chief, who had been responsible for
the stoppage of the ships, an indemnify of 1,000 Turkish livres
and the issue of precise orders to the commanders of the
forts forbidding them absolutely to stop under any pretext
(1)
whatsoever, a ship under the Russian commercial flag.
The agreement which was eventually reached between the 
Powers was a complicated transaction. The official reply of 
the Porte, on 5 May, was not so apologetic as previously. It 
stated that, since the Russian ambassador had recognized that 
the Commandant of the forts of Kavanak was not at fault, but 
that the stoppage of the boat was the result of a misunder­
standing, the Commandant would retain his position, but that 
an order would be given to the authorities at the Straits
not to stop "aucun paquebot portant pavillon de commerce
(2)
Russe". Nelidov, in a private letter to the Porte, made
(1) A copy of the Russian note is enclosed in White to 
Salisbury, 20 May 1891; F.0.78/4473, No.199 Seer.
(2) A copy of Said Pasha’s note is enclosed in White to 
Salisbury, 11 May 1891; Ibid, No.194 Confid.
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known that, conforming to the desire expressed by the Sultan, 
the necessary measures had been taken for the Porte to be 
informed beforehand: , ,
"lorsque des détachements de soldats en activité"" de 
service et armés quelqu’en soit le nombre ou bien de ' 
transports de forçats seront embarquer a bord de ' E
bateaux de commerce Russes, qui auraient a traverser 
les détroits". (1)
This concession, significantly made in a private letter 
and not.a public note, was in striking contrast to the ground 
first taken up by Nelidov. Even so, Russia had achieved con­
siderable , success. As matters stood, the Porte was to allow
the passage of all steamers provided they hoisted the oommer-
(2)
oial flag and to limit that permission to Russian steamers.
The other Powers were not happy about the arrangement, but
they found no opportunity to take action until a further
controversy occurred in August.
.On 4th the Porte detained the "Moskva" on the ground
that it had. on board soldiers on active service and that no 
- (3) . 1
notice had been given. Nelidov maintained that the soldiers
were discharged men and no longer en activité. In the
(1) A copy of Nelidov*s private letter is enclosed in White 
to Salisbury, 24 May 1891; Ibid, No.217 Seer.
These copies of notes were obtained by White from the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs under promise of 
strict secrecy.
(2) White to Salisbury, 11 May 1891; Ibid, No.194, Confid.
Minute by Cadogan. «
(3) White to Salisbury, 8 Aug. 1891; Ibid. No.330 Confid. 
enclosing a Memorandum by Sandison on the stoppage of the 
"Moskva".
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discussions which followed Russia demanded the dismissal of 
the Commandant of the Dardanelles and an indemnity of £2,000. 
The Porte was completely excluded from participation in the 
negotiations, which were carried on by the Palace through 
Munir Bey, with the result that an abject apology was conveyed 
to Russia, (the Commandant dismissed and the indemnity promptly 
p a i d . - '( : ^  ' :. : - ■ ' : ' ; : ' ' _
Although this dispute had much in common with the earlier 
ones, the whole issue was magnified out of all proportion by
the fact that the agreement reached was kept secret at a
; ; ;
time when Europe was still uneasy about the rapprochement of
France and Russia, demonstrated by the Cronstadt visit and
the dismissal of Kiamil Pasha, which followed closely on that
event. ' \ E / .  ^ . : . :
The English newspaper the Standard caught the tone of the
prevailing atmosphere when it published an alarmist article:
"Turkey has yielded to Russia on the Straits question, 
thus completing the partial surrender of Treaty rights 
which was made some short time ago ... Russian diplomacy 
has achieved a complete victory on this question and 
henceforth the Straits will be open to her .vessels, 
whilst closed to those of other nations". (1)
(1) The Standard, 31 Aug. 1891.
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standard had, of course, confused the special question
under discussion as regards the passage of particular vessels
flying the merchant flag and belonging to the Volunteer Fleet
with discharged soldiers on board, with the general question
of the rights of ships under the Straits Treaties. But
confusion on this point was general at the time in all but the
best - informed circles. It was remembered that in July there
had appeared a significant article in the Nord stating that
Russia did mot aspire to possess Constantinople; it was
sufficient for her to make effective the closure of the
(1)
Straits. From Sinai, General Lowther sent a despatch in
: ,
which he wrote that Bulow, during an audience with the king,
had been told that the king was in possession of confidential
information which convinced him.that some arrangement had
been.arrived at between the Russian and French Governments
with regard to the passage of the Russian fleet through the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and that H.M. thought that this
12)
arrangement had taken the form of a written engagement.
 ^Further fuel to the flames of European speculation was
(1) The Nord, No.30 of 25 July 1891; quoted in White to 
Salisbury, 28 Aug. 1891; F.Ü.78/4473, No.365 Seer.
(2) General Lowther to Salisbury, Sept. 1891; Ibid No.112
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supplied, on 13 September, by the news that a British force
had landed on the island of Sigri, a deserted rock to the
west of %tilene. Although it transpired that the landing
had been made solely on the .initiative of the British Rear
Admiral, who had thought the island suitable for carrying out
mining exercises, combined with a sham night attack by torpedo
boats and, on account of the isolated position of the island
he had thought it unnecessary to ask the permission of the
local authorities before carrying out the operations, foreign
consular agents and press correspondents interpreted the
action as a naval demonstration staged by the command of the
(1)
British Government# The official denials issued by the
Government.were nowhere taken seriously. It seemed strange
that, just at the moment when the Dardanelles question was in
•the forefront, British ships should have found it ncessary to
carry out so spectacular an action at the most strategic point
(2)
" near the entrance to the Dardanelles. Two days after the 
landing there appeared in the Standard the significant state­
ment ; - . ,v À - ..a ,:' .
"If Russia were to seize Constantinople, England and 
the Triple Alliance would drive her out again". (3)
(1) Copy of the Report of Rear Admiral Walter Kerr to the
Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, 5 Oct.1891
; M.2573; F.0.78/4572, Minute by Sanderson.
(2) W.L. Danger, The Franco-Russian Alliance, p.205.
(3) The Standard, 15 Sept. 1890; £bia, p.205.
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The Porte was so alarmed by what had taken place that, on 24
September, it Issued a circular with the object of dispelling
the mystery surrounding the recent Eusso-Turkish agreement
regarding the passage of ships of the Volunteer Fleet. It
stated explicitly the instructions given to the Turkish
officers: '  ^ '
^Lorsqu’ils (les bateaux de la Flotte Volontaire) auront 
a bord des déportes ou des soldats, leur passage, sur 
l’avis donne par l’ambassadeur de Russie, sera permis 
par Irade impériale".
In conclusion, it stated:
"Vous voyez qu’il n’y a la rien de nouveau et que /, (1)
c’est l’ancien regime qui continuera a 'être appliquer".
■ Unfortunately^ this was not strictly true. The Porte had
always required that permission should be asked for the
passage of ships, having soldiers on board. In the Circular
there was an implicit assumption that Russia would not ask
for such permission - she would merely give notice of the
intended passage of such vessels.
Britain and Austria quickly wrent into action. First, they
exchanged views on the manner in which it would be best to
(2)
reply to the Porte’s circular. Then, on 2 October, Salisbury
(1) The Circular was dated 19 Sept. 1891; communicated 24 Sept.
1891 and it was enclosed in Salisbury to White, 2 Oct.
1891, F.0.78/4473, Mo.214.
(2) Paget to Kalnoky, 1 Oct. 1891; W.S.A.VIIl/lII Varia d ’ 
Angleterre, 1891. Foundations, p.467.
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sent to White a despatch which was to he read to the Turkish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs;
^"In the opinion of H.M*s Government, it is the essence 
of the rule sanctioned by the European powers that it is 
applicable to all countries alike and that any right in 
respect to the passage of the Straits, which is a depar­
ture from the provisions of the existing treaties, will, 
if granted to one Power, be as a matter of course and 
ipso facto granted to all". (1)
This declaration has been considered important by his­
torians, as being the foundation of a new doctrine regarding 
the Straits. But the utility of the doctrine, when put to a 
practical test^was doubtful. Russia, because of her geographi­
cal position and the possession of ports in the Black Sea, 
could make use of her rights in a more practical way than 
the other powers, whose ports were much further away from that 
vital area. In September 1891 Kalnoky approved of Salisbury’s 
doctrine. He was so enthusiastic that, although he had
presented to the Porte his own reply to their Circular, he
\
sent a further communication in which he stated "la manière
de voir anglaise festj entièrement partagée par le Gouverne-
( 2j
ment Imperial".
It was important that the friendly Powers should appear
(1) Salisbury to White. 2 Oct. 1891; F.0.78/4473, No.214.
(2) A copy of Kalnoky’8 communication is enclosed in White 
to Salisbury, 7 Nov. 1891; Ibid, No.465.
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publicly in complete agreement with Salisbury* For this reason 
Some disappointment was felt when Germany gave only a verbal 
reply, as opposed to the written replies of the other Powers* 
Kalnoky told Salisbury that he regarded "the fact merely as an 
instance of the traditional policy of German non-intervention 
in Eastern affairs and not as a reversion to what might be
called the Blsmarckian era at Constantinople".
But, in December, when Hatzfeldt went to Berlin, the 
Austrian ambassador there pointed out to him that it should 
not be forgotten that such a divergence of action, even if it 
existed only in form, might be taken in Constantinople as a 
substantial difference and give the enemies of the Triple 
Alliance an opportunity to attach an unfavourable interpreta­
tion to it. Hatzfeldt assured Schiessl that Salisbury had not 
taken the Straits incident tragically, but had only wished to
make certain that Britain could obtain the same privileges
I - (2)
which the Porte was allowing to another state. Hatzfeldt*s 
view was borne out by the opinion expressed by Salisbury in a
private letter to White:
"I should be disposed to guess that Kelidow is in great
spirits over his supposed victory in the matter of the
(1) L. Phipps to Salisbury, 21 Oct. 1891; Ibid No.214 Confid.
(2) Schiessl to Kalnoky, 8 Dec. 1891; H.H. v. St.A. Wien, Pol.
A. Rot., 465. Geheim XKV/A.
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Straits, but that his exultation is unfounded. The 
buitan has conceded nothing essential and is only 
playing with him". (1) ^
The use to which Russia could put her "supposed victory" 
was, however, demonstrated by the events of 1897, when there 
were disturbances in the island of Crete. Russia asked the
Porte to allow the passage through the Straits of ships
■ ' ■ ' D-.: ( , (2) 1 ■ x  ^ r' \ , ■ :
carrying 600 soldiers. The Porte consulted the Powers.
Russia took exception to this move of the Porte and maintained
that, in reality, she had not asked the consent of the Porte,
but had merely given notice of the passage of the ships. She
founded her right to do this on the stipulations laid down in
the Turkish Circular of 24 September 1891, maintaining that
the agreement was not limited to the passage of tropps intended
for the Far East. Sir Philip Currie, then British Ambassador
at Constantinople, concluded his despatch on the subject with
the words ;
"I am informed that the Russian embassy habitually
notifies the passage of soldiers too late for the
Sultan’s Irade to issue before vessels conveying them
arrive at the Bosphorus and that they pass the forts , 
without any other formality than that observed by 
ordinary merchant vessels"^ - (3)
Russia had completely achieved her aim.
The Salisbury stipulation, which Kalnoky had received with
(1) Salisbury to White, 14 Sept. 1891; Salisbury Papers Vol.
76, No.122.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 15 March 1897; K.0.78/4884, Tel.No.122.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 22 March 1897; Ibid, No.190.
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such pleasure in October 1891 was, within a year, discarded by 
him because it did not meet a similar case: the case presented
to the Powers by Russia’s attempt to secure the insertion in 
the new Commercial Treaty, which she negotiated with Turkey 
between 1890-93, of a clause which could be interpreted to 
mean that Russian ships, flying the merchant flag and passing
in transit through the Straits, should be allowed to pass
freely, whatever the nature of their cargo.
•A The true nature of the innovation which Russia was hoping
to achieve can be clearly seen if the new draft article 17
is compared with the corresponding article 14 of the old treaty
(1)
of 1862. The third paragraph of article 17 contained ' 
entirely new words: "les bâtiments de commerce russes se
rendant d ’un port russe à un^^autre port russe", which would 
imply that vessels were to be affected which not only came
into the Straits, but also went out of them; the old article
14 referred only to incoming vessels. Another addition was 
to be found in the phrase: "pourrant traverser en transit,
sans arrêt, les dits détroits quelle que soit la cargaison 
ou les passagers a bord sans aucune formalité douanière".
In order to understand the implications of this phrase
(1): Ford to Rosebery, 21 Oct. 1892; F.0.78/4473, No.324 
Confid.
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it is necessary to refer to the Porte’s Circular of 1888, which 
required that notice should be given of the passage of ships 
with war material on board, so that the Sultan’s permission 
for the passage of such ships could be given. The British 
and other foreign embassies did give such notice, failing 
which their ships were stopped. Russia, however, never accep­
ted the terms of the Circular and never admitted in a formal 
note the right of the Porte to exercise supervision over 
ships having ammunition on board. She hoped that she would be 
able to utilise the words "sans arrêt" - placed in article 
17 - so that, if a Russian ship,.carrying arms, were to be 
stopped, she could say that they entitled.her to demand that 
her ship should circulate freely, with or without permission.
The words "sans aucune formalité^ douanière" had a double 
meaning. Russia probably meant by this that her ships need 
not have a "guardier de surveillance" on board, as was required 
in the case of other foreign Powers having cargoes of 
ammunition on board, since "formalité' douanière” there could 
not be. Turkey hoped to claim that she had reserved for 
herself the right to put a guardier on board and that Russia 
could not escape this by putting forward the word "douanière", 
since the "guardier de surveillance" was not charged with 
carrying out custom formalities. But, in any case, the phrase 
was too ambiguous to be safe.
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Attached to Article 17 ,'was a declaration which at first 
seemed to contain a concession by Russia. She deferred to 
the wishes of the Porte in consenting to give, before arrival 
in Ottoman waters, the names, ports of departure and destina­
tion of ships, flying the merchant flag and having on board 
munitions of war and also information concerning the nature 
and quantity of the munitions. But, here again, no mention 
was made of the word "permission". The second paragraph 
contained the words:
"les bâtiments de commerce transitant librement 
et sans arrêt quelque soit le cargaison à bord".
Any remaining doubt as to Russia’s intentions was entirely
cleared up by the concluding paragraph:
I "lea declarations qui seront faites dans le but 
surmentionë' . ne pourrant jamais et sans aucun 
pré"texte ^tre interprétées comme une demande d’une 
autorisation".
Sir Clare Ford, British.ambassador at Constantinople in 
1892, drew the conclusion that the British Government might 
consider whether, if Russia was to enjoy more favourable 
treatment than that accorded to Britain under the Turkish
Circular of 1888, H.M.’s Government would consent to be further
-    —    (1 ) ' '  .
bound by the stipulations of that Circular.
(1) Ibid.
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In Vienna, Kalnoky was also aware of the privileges which 
Russia was hoping to gain. In an interview with the British 
ambassador on 31 October 1892 he suggested that, if the "
Porte showed signs of yielding to Russian pressure, it would be 
advisable to remind them of the stipulation made by Salisbury 
in his reply to the Turkish Circular of 19 September and ' 
afterwards adopted by himself - that "any privilege in respect
of the Straits granted to any one Power is ipso facto granted 
- (1) ■ ; ■ ■ - 
to all". When Mr. Paget sent home a report of this conver­
sation, Rosebery (now Foreign Secretary) minuted "The Russian
proposal is so framed that the article quoted would not serve
(2) • ■ : '
the Powers". Kalnoky himself was not slow to realise
this and, in a further conversation with Paget of 3 January,
he said that, since his last conversation, it had occurred to
him that Salisbury’s stipulation:
"Would hardly meet the present case, because there was 
no other Power having, like Russia, ports in the Black 
Sea and it, therefore, appeared better to intimate to 
the Porte that, in the event of its being contemplated 
to grant to Russia any privileges or concessions going 
beyond those already accorded, they should be made 
known to the other Powers who should be consulted 
thereupon". (3)
(1) A. Paget to Rosebery, 31 Oct. 1892; Ibid, No.200 Confid.
(2) Ibid. Minute by Rosebery undated. V.
(3) Paget to Rosebery, 3 Jan. 1893; F ^ . 78/4592, No.2 Confid.
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Rosebery approved of Kalnoky*s suggestion and the ambassadors
of Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy acted at the
Porte on these lines. Nelidov, howeverJ continued to press
the Porte and the Palace. At the end of August, the Austro-
Hungarian ambassador, in an interview with Said Pasha, warned
him of the far-reaching scope of the Russian demands, advanced
"under the innocent garb of a simple commercial article" and
said that the concessions demanded by Russia had a practical
meaning for that Power alone and would have a very serious
meaning if a Russian fleet were ever permanently established
(1)
in the Mediterranean.
Some indication of the development of British policy is 
given by an examination of the minutes on a despatch which 
was received from the British ambassador at Constantinople 
on 29 August. Sir Philip Currie, at this time Permanent 
Under-Secretary, asked whether Britain should repeat to the 
Porte that she demanded similar privileges - which, it had 
been pointed out, was an empty phrase - or whether Britain 
should simply point out to the Porte the danger of such conces­
sions which was aggravated by the intention of Russia to 
maintain a fleet in the Mediterranean. Rosebery replied:
(1) Nicolson to Rosebery, 29 Aug. 1893; Ibid No.414 Confid.
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"I think we had better say that any such concession 
will reopen the Eastern Question and compel us to 
review our position. ;But, whatever may be the result 
of that review, we shall, of course, insist upon 
similar privileges for ourselves". (L)
Instructions were accordingly sent to the ambassador, instruc- 
tions which were the most forceful yet sent. Any mention 
of a reopening of the Eastern Question could always be cal­
culated to send shivers down the spines of all Foreign 
Mnisters.
It appears that the great perseverance, which was extended
over a period of three years, of Britain and the Powers of the
Triple Alliance finally resulted in the prevalence of their
view. The last available reference to the subject is the
record of a conversation of Sir Clare Ford with Said Pasha,
the Turkish Foreign Minister, who said on 25 October 1893;
"The concessions which were desired by the Russian 
; Government would, owing to their political bearing, 
never be allowed to pass or be sanctioned by the 
. Sublime Porte. His desire was to deal in the matter 
of Commercial Treaties with Italy, Austria-Hungary,
France and England first, and to leave the negotiations 
with Russia to the last, so that in the event of
(1) Minutes on Nicolson to Rosebery, 29 Aug. 1893.
Ibid.
(2) Rosebery’s Minute became; Rosebery to Nicolson, 30 Aug. 
1893, Ibid, No.258 Confid.
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serious difficulties arising with that Power in 
the negotiations, the Turkish Government might 
dispense with concluding any treaty at all with 
that country". (1)
Britain and her continental friends might think that they 
had won a great victory in this matter, hut, in fact, it was 
only a Pyrrhic victory because, as has been shown, Russia 
had already achieved the object she sought to gain by Article 
17 of the Commercial Treaty.
In reality, Russia had, in the 1890s, pursued her object 
of the opening of the Straits in peace time for her war 
ships and for hers alone by three different methods; by 
sending war ships through, which, at the time of passing, 
were unarmed but which could be armed immediately after they 
had passed; by coming to an agreement with the Porte 
according to which she merely notified the Porte of the 
passage of ships which were virtually war ships; by the 
new stipulations, inserted in article 17 of the proposed 
Commercial Treaty. She failed only in the latter attempt; 
as a whole, she was so successful that the other Powers 
came to consider whether they had any longer anything to
(1) Ford to Rosebery, 25 Cot. 1893; Ibid, No.487 
Confid.
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gain by maintaining the old treaty stipulations and whether 
it would not be better to come to an entirely new inter­
national agreement regarding the Straits.
153.
CHAPTER V
Salisbury Returns .
It has been said of Salisbury that he never became keen 
about anything which "he did not think and work out for 
himself". But Foreign Secretaries do not begin their work 
in a vacuum. When Salisbury took office in June 1895 for the 
third time as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he had 
to face the philanthropic tempest which had been raised in 
England by the Armenian question. The liberal Foreign Secre­
tary, had attempted to ameliorate the conditions of the 
Armenians by drawing up a scheme of reform for the Asiatic 
provinces of Turkey which had been presented to the ^ultan 
on 11 May 1895. The greatest task - that of persuading the 
Sultan to accept the reforms and securing their execution - 
was still unaccomplished when Kimberley left office.
V , The reform policy was Kimberley’s not Salisbury's. 
Salisbury was not keen about the project of reforms; but 
he was practically forced, for the sake of continuity, to 
execute the policy begun by his predecessor. Carrie accurately
(1) G. Cecil to Earl St. Aldwyn, 23 Jan. 1914; Hicks Beach 
Papers, PCC/69.
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summed up the position in a letter to his chief:
;  ^ "France and Russia are pledged to the plan. The other 
powers of Europe have expressed their approval, and 
any change of front now, besides laying the Government 
open to the charge of having deserted the Armenians, - 
would give us all our work to do over again on some 
other lines". (1)
Salisbury accepted the reform plan, but he could not resist
expressing to Currie his distaste for it* He referred to it 
■ - . (2) 
as a very unsavoury omelette",left to him to cook. Through­
out 1895 he continually reminded Currie that Kimberley was 
the man really'responsible for the enterprise. Salisbury 
wondered what issue Kimberley had expected from the reform 
policy when he had initiated it. Why had not Kimberley bound 
France and Russia more definitely? Why had Kimberley not 
ascertained how far Austria was prepared to go?
Salisbury posed these questions without much hope of 
finding the answers. In the summer of 1895 he resigned himself 
to his enforced task of pushing through, in some form or 
other, the proposed reforms. Once he had convinced himself 
that this was the only course he could take, he was determined
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 1 July 1895; Salisbury Papers,
Vol.135, No.10.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 12 Aug. 1895; Salisbury Papers, Vol. 
138, No.7. - ■
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to make no new departure from it: any new departure would
place the responsibility for what might happen wholly on 
himself. Although the immediate issue was the Armenian
question, any such upheaval as that caused by the Armenian 
troubles was bound to raise the more serious questions; what 
would be the future of the Ottoman Empire and who would control 
the Straits? Sach questions were pondered by the Foreign 
Secretaries of all the major countries of Europe in the 
summer of 1895. Salisbury was convinced that, unless the 
administration of the Ottoman Empire was improved, Europe would 
take decisive action concerning the future of the empire. He 
had a number of conversations with Hatzfeldt during which 
reference was made to possible future eventualities in Turkey. 
In the circumstances, it was quite natural that the future 
of Turkey should be discussed. But Hatzfeldt*s reports of 
his conversations with Salisbury caused great concern in 
Berlin, and, when they were communicated to the Austrian 
Foreign Minister, also in Vienna. They conveyed the impression 
that Salisbury was contemplating the formulation and execution, 
in the near future, of a plan for partitioning the Ottoman
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 24 Aug. 1895; F.0.195/1862 
Priv.tel.
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1  (1) '  '  k "  -  , ' - -  i- - , ' , , • » : • ■ ■  r  ■•■'  , - ; ■
Empire. ....
In 1895, Hatzfeldt*3 despatches were accepted by the 
German Foreign Office as accurate accounts of Salisbury's 
views. Since that time historians, hampered by the deficiency 
of the English source material, have been forced to base 
their reasoning on Hatzfeldt's despatches and so they also 
believed that Salisbury contemplated a partition of the Otto­
man Empire in 1895. Only recently has more evidence become 
available in Salisbury’s private papers and the official 
Austrian archives which enables the student seriously to ques­
tion the accuracy of Hatzfeldt’s reports.
An examination of the reports themselves, even without 
any comparison with other source material should be sufficient 
to advise caution against accepting them as reliable evidence 
of Salisbury’s ideas. ' Hatzfeldt reported Salisbury’s words 
only rarely; for the most part he expressed his own opinion 
of what he thought Salisbury had in mind. The most startling 
of the ideas Hatzfeldt attributed to Salisbury - that the 
Foreign Secretary contemplated giving to Russia "Constantinople
(1) Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe,' 10 July 1895; G.P.X, No.2396.
Hatzfeldt to Holstein, 31 July 1895; ibid, No. 2372.
' Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, 3 Aug. 1895; Ibid,
. No.2375. . : ; :
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avec tout qui s’ensuit" was not reported by Hatzfeldt at the
time when he first sent home his description of Salisbury’s 
( 1)
"plan". Hatzfeldt related Salisbury’s views on the,compen­
sation to be given to Russia only after he had heard that 
Holstein suspected Salisbury of deliberately attempting to
stir up trouble in the East and bring about dissension between
(E)
the powers of the Triple Alliance and Russia.
When Currie heard from the Austrian Ambassador 
at Constantinople that it was believed that Salisbury had 
hinted to Hatzfeldt that Britain might agree to hand over 
the city to Russia, the ambassador informed Salisbury. The 
latter immediately disclaimed with.indignation:
. . .  12 j _
"I never said anything of the,kind". - 
According to Salisbury, Hatzfeldt had begun the conversations 
by urging that Britain should join the Triple Alliance.
In order to support his arguments, the German ambassador 
asked how otherwise could Britain defend Constantinople 
against Russia. Salisbury replied that, in case of war with 
France, Germany would be the first to give Russia Constantinople
(1) Hatzfeldt to Holstein, 5 Aug. 1895; Ibid, No.2381.,
(2) Holstein to Kiderlen, 3 Aug. 1895; Ibid, No.2377.
(3) M i n u t e  o n  Currie to Salisbury, 2 S e p t .  1895; Salisbury 
Papers, Vol.135, No.42#
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(1)
and everything connected with it.
I When the two versions of the Salishary-Hatzfeldt conver­
sations are related to what is known of the general outlook 
and policy of Salisbury and the leaders of Germany, it must 
be recognized that Salisbury’s version is far more likely 
to be true than Hatzfeldt’s. One might go further and 
suggest that the "partition plan", attributed by Hatzfeldt to 
Salisbury, had its origin in the mind of Hatzfeldt father than 
in any words of Salisbury’s to Hatzfeldt. ,
• Throughout the summer and autumn of 1895 the leaders of 
German policy were much occupied with the possibility of the 
collapse of Turkey and the necessity of making arrangements 
for the redistribution of her territory. In August, the 
Kaiser wrote a long marginal note on a despatch of the German 
ambassador at Vienna, in which he argued that the collapse
of Tarkey was inevitable and that the Triple Alliance must
■ .. ' _ '  ^. . ' ' " " (2) . .
look out for its share of the spoils. He even spoke on the
subject to the Austrian ambassador, sketching out the compen­
sations the Powers might receive and stating his belief that
(1) - C a l i c e  to Goluchowski, 12 Sept. 1895; Priv. letter;
Austrian Archives, Geheimakten XXV, 462#
(2) William II’s note on despatch of Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, 
18 Aug. 1895; G.P.X, No.2391.
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Russia could not be prevented from occupying Constantinople.
Little more than a week after this conversation, the Kaiser
spoke in a similar way to Colonel Swaine:
"Give Asia Minor and Constantinople to Russia 
indemnify Austria by leaving her the Balkan States 
down to Salonika".
Britain could take an island and satisfy Italy in the 
< (2)
Mediterranean.
Hatzfeldt also chose Colonel Swaine as a confidant and
remarked to him that the departure of the Sultan out of Europe
would have to be faced sooner or later:
"It would be well if Germany and England, by confidential 
conversations, came to some agreement on the subject to 
prevent either being taken by surprise at the moment 
of its occurrence". (3)
The true nature of the conversation between the Kaiser
and Salisbury at Cowes, on 5 August, is still unknown.
Holstein later maintained that Salisbury then proposed to the
^ (4)
German Emperor.a partition of the Ottomon Empire. When, in
1896, Sir Valentine Chirol - after a conversation with
(1) SzSgye'ny to Goluchowski, Private, 19 Aug. 1895, A.A. 
Preussen, Varia.
(2) Lascelles to Salisbury, 30 Aug.1895; F.0.64/1351, No.194 
Seer., enclosing a secret and confidential Memorandum by 
Colonel Swaine of 30 Aug.
(3) Swaine to Barrington, 27 Sept.1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.122, No.92.
(4) Memorandum of Holstein, 31 Oct. 1901, G.P.XVII, No.5026.
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Marschall - brought to the attention of Salisbury this version
of the conversation, Salisbury remarked;
"It showed the expediency of having a third party present 
r when talking to the Emperor, if he made it his practice 
to put into his interlocutor’s mouth proposals which 
emanated from himself". (1) .
In 1902 Lord Lansdowno was told by the German,ambassador of
Salisbury’s alleged proposal, to the German Emperor at Cowes.
Lansdowne replied in no uncertain terms :':
 ^  ^ "I was convinced that no such proposal had been made by
my predecessor, who must have been entirely misunderstood 
by. the German Emperor".. (2) -
Both the German and English sources show that, in 1898, 
when the subject of the partition of the Ottomon Empire was 
again raised in conversation between Salisbury and Hatzfeldt, 
it was the German ambassador who initiated the discussion.
He wished to obtain from Salisbury "an undertaking" that, 
when,the Empire disintegrated, its fragments should not be 
allowed to fall into Russian hands. Salisbury did not contest 
the soundness of such a policy. But he was not enthusiastic 
about going forward on the lines Hatzfeldt indicated and nothing
(1) Account of Chirol in the Times, 11 Sept. 1920.
(2) Lansdowne-Buchanan, 3 Nov. 1902; F.0.78/5248, No.284#
(3) Salisbury to Lascelles, 11 May 1898; P.O.64/1436, No.109a, 
Seer. G.P.XIV (1) 230-31.
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was done..
The whole tenour of the evidence points to the conclusion 
that, even at the time of the famous Salisbury-Hatzfeldt con­
versations of July and August, 1895, the German ambassador 
rather than Salisbury led the way in the discussion. Perhaps 
Hatzfeldt came to realise that he had gone too far. When, 
after the Cowes ,episode, he was instructed to reopen the
discussion, he wrote that it would be well to let the matter
(1)
rest for a little while.
When'Salisbury took up office in 1895, the one aspect 
of policy upon which he was adamant was the necessity for 
Britain of retaining the friendship of Austria-Hungary. Again 
and again he stressed this conviction. In a letter to the 
Queen he described how, at a Cabinet meeting, he had "expres­
sed himself strongly against any policy that would cut Austria
adrift". It would reconstitute the Dreikaiserbund - a state
(2)
of things which must be injurious to Britain. The friendsh|) 
of Austria had a certain positive value to Britain. She had 
influence with Germany and she was a clog to Russia, so long 
as the two countries were opposed. But, if Austria and Russia
(1) Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, 7 Aug. 1895; G.P.%, No.2385.
(2) Salisbury to the Queen, 19 Feb. 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.84, No.10.
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were to unite, they could carry everything in the 8.2. of 
Europe before them.
"Therefore", wrote Salisbury, "I shrink from any action 
which would weaken the tie that binds England and Austria 
together", (l)
: Coupled with his conviction of the practical value to
Britain of Austrian friendship was Salisbury’s feeling that 
Britain had an obligation to Austria. Having pursued her 
policy side by side with Austria for so many years, there 
would be something of "bassesse" in Britain’s conduct, if 
she were to leave Austria in the lurch.
Now, it was well known that the policy of the Austrian 
Foreign Minister was dominated by two considerations; the 
desire to maintain the status quo in the Near East and to 
keep Russia out of Constantinople. Even if there were to be a 
general redistribution of Turkish territory and Austria were 
given her fair share, the arrangement would be unsatisfactory 
to Austria, because it would expose her to the danger of 
upsetting the balance between the Slavonic and non-Slavonic 
elements of her Empire. If Russia occupied Constantinople the 
Balkan states would crystallise themselves about that centre 
and Austrian influence there and in the Adriatic would be
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 15 %ec. 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.138, No.35.
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(1)
lost.
There is every indication that Salisbury understood and 
appreciated the Austrian point of view. At the same time as 
he had with Hatzfeldt the conversations, discussed above, 
Salisbury also had conversations with the Austrian ambassador. 
The subject matter of the conversations with Deym is illumina­
ting. Salisbury began by assuring Deym that he would do all 
in his power to maintain the complete entente between the two
countries: Austria could rely on Britain’s support in all
(2)
questions ©f common interest. Britain’s policy was still
directed towards the maintenance of the status quo in the
Ottomon Empire, though Britain would have to insist on the
(3)
introduction of some measure of reform. It was in Britain’s
(4)
interest to see that Russia was kept out of Constantinople.
All this is in contradiction to Salisbury’s alleged 
statements to Hatzfeldt. Should one believe that Salisbury
(1) .Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, 8 Nov. 1895; G^.%, No.2497.
(2) DEym to Goluchowski, 3 July 1895; A.A. England, Geheimakten
XXV, 462.
(3) Deym to Goluchowski; 11 July 1895; A.A. England, N0.I8B.
(4) Deym to Goluchowski; 25 July 1895; A.A. Geheimakten, 462, 
No.20 A-D.
164.
was so double-faced a diplomat that he could proclaim one 
policy to Hatzfeldt and another policy to Deym? Was Salisbury 
trying to keep Austria’s friendship by making reassuring 
statements, while he secretly harboured sinister designs? 
Surely not. Such tortuous conduct was wholly foreign to 
Salisbury’s nature. If, then, one accepts as a premise 
Salisbury’s fair dealing, one must conclude that one set of 
his remarks was incorrectly reported. The probability of 
Hatzfeldt having misreported Salisbury has already been 
demonstrated. It remains to show how, in the light of other 
evidence, it is certain that his statements to Deym represented 
his real views on policy.
Among Salisbury’s private papers, which have only recent­
ly become available, is a very valuable account by the Foreign 
Minister of the opinions he held in 1895 on the place which 
Constantinople should occupy in British policy. He set 
forth this very full exposition of his views in a private 
letter of 3 December 1895 to Lord Goschen, the First Lord 
of the Admiralty. The document is of extreme value for two 
reasons. It is the only known document in which Salisbury 
related, in 1895, the motives behind the actions he took in 
that year regarding Constantinople. There is no reason to 
question the reliability of Salisbury’s exposition: it is
a first-hand account to a member of the Cabinet. There could
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be no reasons for not telling the truth. Salisbury wrote:
"I am not at all a bigot to the policy of keeping 
Russia out of Constantinople. On the contrary, I  ^ ! 
think the English statesmen who brought about the 
' Crimean war made a mistake. But the keeping of Con- 
out of Russian hands has now for near 
half a century been made a vital article of our 
political creed; it has been proclaimed such by 
statesmen of all parties, at home and in the Bast; 
our fame and prestige are so tied up with it, that, 
when it ^a118% the blow will be tremendous. Meanwhile, 
the world at large, including everybody except the 
circle round the Admiralty, believes that the Straits 
can, under the Turk, be easily forced and that, if we 
are distanced in the race for Constantinople, it will 
be only due to our own neglect. I do not envy the 
Foreign Secretary who is in office when the surprise 
of Constantinople happens. I hope it may not be %
Here is valuable evidence that, in December 1895, Salis­
bury still thought it imperative that Constantinople should 
be kept out of Russian hands. His conviction was founded 
on the belief that, since British statesmen had proclaimed 
the policy for so long, its maintenance had become a matter 
of prestige. In fact, Salisbury still held to the views he
had expressed in 1886;
"The possession by Russia of Constantinople will be an 
awkward piece of news for the Minister who receives it. 
The prestige effect on the Asiatic populations will be 
enormous and I pity the English party which has this 
item on their record". (2)
(1) Salisbury to Goschen, 3 Dec. 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Goschen box.
(2) W.S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (London, 1951), 
p.515—6. cf. p. 3-2-. .
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Salisbury, then, was quite sincere when, on 24 July 1895,
he told Deym that he believed that Russia must be prevented
from taking possession of Constantinople, Deym enquired whether
Salisbury was sure that British public opinion would not
suffer such action by Russia. The Foreign Secretary answered
that he was completely convinced that the great majority of
people in England shared his opinion. He knew that Sir
William Harcourt believed that Constantinople should be
surrendered to Russia, but, even in the Liberal camp, there
(1)
were few politicians who shared Harcourt’s opinions.
When Salisbury decided that, for the sake of continuity; 
he must carry out the Liberal reform policy for the Asiatic 
provinces of Turkey, he had in fact decided to maintain 
as far as possible the status quo in the Ottomon Snpire.
The main idea behind the reform policy was to so improve 
conditions in Asiatic Turkey that Russia would have no excuse 
to advance into the territory on the pretext of restoring 
order. There should be no excuse for any alteration in the 
status quo•
In the execution of the reform policy Salisbury made 
two mistakes. The first arose from his method of trying to
(1) Deym to Goluchowski; 25 July 1895; A.A. Geheimakten, 462, 
NO.20A - D.
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obtain the Sultan’s acceptance of the reforms. He began
by continuing Kimberley’s policy of "terrifying through
Rustem". Although Salisbury’s warnings to the Turkish
ambassador were usually prefaced with the statement that his
own object was to maintain the;Ottomon Empire, Salisbury
used very strong language. He told him that, on coming back
to office, he had been much struck by the ground which the
Empire had lost in English opinion. -A settled conviction was
(1)
growing that "nothing could be done but to finish with it".
; Language of this kind appeared to have little effect.
By 5 August, Salisbury was regretting that he could not swear
in French, because he knew of no other method of convincing
(2)
Rustem Pasha that he was ih earnest. Driven to extremities, 
Salisbury decided on the method of public warning. In his 
speech in the House of Lords, on the occasion of the opening 
of Parliament, he said:
"If generation after generation, cries of misery come 
up from the various parts of the Turkish Empire, I am 
sure that the Sultan cannot blind himself to the poesi- 
bility that Europe will at some time or other become 
weary of the appeals that are made to it and the 
fictitious strength that is given to the Empire will 
fail it". (3)
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 10 July 1895; F.0.78/4626 Tel.No.109.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 5 Aug. 1895; F.0.195/1862, Priv.tel.
(3) Hansard, Vol.XXXVI, p.50.
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Such language was not very different from that which Salisbury 
had already used in private conversation. Its purpose was to 
intimidate the Sultan. Abdul Hamid was no more afraid of 
the public warning than the private warning, but the Foreign 
Ministers of Germany and Austria were afraid. When they 
heard of the speech, they question whether Salisbury was 
really sincere in his protestations of his desire to maintain 
the status quo. At a time when the atmosphere in Europe was 
charged with suspicion, Salisbury’s speech added fuel to the 
flames of speculation.
Hatzfeldt was already suspicious. Salisbury’s second 
mistake lay in the conduct of his relationship with the 
German ambassador. Throughout his previous ministry Salisbury- 
had often had very confidential discussions with Hatzfeldt.
The two men had pondered over all kinds of possible future 
eventualities. Such discussions had been made possible by 
the relationship of mutual trust which existed between them.
In 1895, Hatzfeldt no longer had the same confidence in 
English policy; . y  e t , Salisbury did. not perceive this and 
attempted to carry on as before. Although, in the light of 
the new evidence, it is certain that Salisbury did not enter­
tain the ideas which Hatzfeldt attributed to him, the Foreign 
Secretary must have made some remarks which gave Hatzfeldt
169.
some grounds for the fears he expressed In his despatches 
that Salisbury contemplated a partition of the Ottomon
Empire. ' ' >• ■' - , : , '
The content of Hatzfeldt's despatches was made known by
Hohenlohe to Goluchowski when the two statesmen met at Alt
■ ■ ■ " -■' - - ■- (1)
Aussee on 4 August. Goluchowski was appalled. Until then
he had fully accepted Salisbury’s assurances regarding
Britain’s desire to maintain the status quo. Goluchowski
now questioned whether Salisbury really regarded himself
bound by the accords of 1887. The Austrian Foreign Minister’s
misgivings were increased when he heard of Salisbury’s speech
in the House of Lords. He instructed Deym to sound Salisbury
on the subject of Britain’s Eastern policy.
On 16 October, Salisbury found that Deym "appeared to be
affected by some speculations published in England regarding
the retirement of England altogether from the Mediterranean
(2)
as a field of political action". It is noteworthy that the 
ambassador did not mention that the Austrian fears were based
(1) Notes of Goluchowski on discussion with Hohenlohe, 9 
Aug. 1895; A.A. Geheimakten, XXV, 462.
(2) Salisbury to Monson, 16 Oct. 1895; F*0*7/1224, Tel.No.98. 
Deym to Goluchowski, Seer. 17 Oct. 1895; A.A. Geheim­
akten XXV, 461, No.3GB.
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primarily on the information given by Hohenlohe.^  ^ If the
whole matter had been openly discussed, Salisbury could have
dealt with it decisively. As it was, he could meet the general
fears, expressed by Deym, only with general assurances:
"There was no fear of any movement of public opinion 
in this country which would result in the withdrawal 
from the Mediterranean as a field of political action".
Deym then urged the importance of maintaining the Turkish
Empire for the longest possible period, because Austria
could not tolerate the presence of Russia on the Bosphorus.
Salisbury concurred with this statement of policy, as being
the policy for a long time professed and supported by England
and to which England still adhered.
Deym was quite satisfied. He told Hatzfeldt that,
personally, he had never believed that Salisbury had ever
seriously intended to partition the Ottomon Empire. This
confidence drew from Hatzfeldt a grudging acquiescence:
perhaps Deym was right. But Hatzfeldt added that Salisbury
had harmed himself by his speech in the House of Lords and
people were justified in mistrusting him. The ambassador
(2)
thought that mistrust had not entirely disappeared. It still
(1) Equally significant is the fact that Hohenlohe, in his 
report of his conversation with Goluchowski at Ault 
Aussee made no mention of his communication of the con­
tents of Hatzfeldt*s despatches. G.P.X, No.2405.
(2) Deym to Goluchowski; Seer. 31 Oct. 1895, A.A.Geheimakten, 
XXV, 461.
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lingered in Austria and Germany.
Salisbury never understood the reason for the suspicion 
with which his policy was regarded. In March 1896, he wrote 
to his ambassador in Berlin that he had heard that the 
Kaiser was dissatisfied with the conduct of Britain in the 
Armenian matter of 1895 - that the Kaiser thought it incon­
sistent with an unreserved resolve to uphold the Turkish 
Empire. Salisbury denied that there had been any inconsis­
tency. He explained;
”I followed to its endthe policy to which my 
predecessor had pledged England, but I did nothing 
more". (1)
He was speaking the truth. Far from contemplating, in 1895, 
a heroic solution of the Eastern question, Salisbury showed a 
strange reluctance to depart in any way from the lines of 
policy which Kimberley had laid down. Salisbury disliked 
having to execute another's policy. He was determined to 
devote all his efforts to carrying that policy, as quickly 
as possible, to its logical conclusion, so that, having ful­
filled his obligations, he would be quite free to make his 
own decisions.
Although Salisbury perceived the basic weaknesses of the
(1) Salisbury to Lascelles, 10 March 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol.122, No.6.
172.
Liberal policy, he found it almost impossible to overcome them, 
As early as 11 July he observed that there was little likeli­
hood of gaining much help from Russia in carrying through 
the reforms. B^t Kimberley had associated British action 
with Russian action in the compilation of the scheme and 
Salisbury could do little else but appeal to Bussia for help 
in carrying out what had been a joint undertaking. He asked 
whether, if the Sultan remained obdurate, Russia was prepared
for any form of coercion? If not, would she object to the
(1)
exercise of it by Britain?
The Russian reply was as unsatisfactory as Salisbury had
anticipated it would be;
"The idea of the employment of force was personally
• repugnant to the Emperor", loianow "completely shared
the views of H.M. in this respect". (2)
Lhbanow maintained that he had never concealed from Lascelles 
his opinion that the reform scheme, drawn up by the ambassa­
dors at Constantinople, was unworkable. But, he graciously 
recognized that, after all that had taken place^the Saltan 
should be induced to grant some reform. He professed himself 
willing to accept a compromise suggestion, which Currie had 
put forward.
(1) Salisbury to Lascelles, 27 July 1895; F.0.65/1494, Tel.
No.146.
(2) Lascelles to Salisbury, 9 Aug. 1895; F.p.65/1491 No.196 
Confid.
(3) Ibid.
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Carrie urged that, since the Powers had had little 
success in their efforts to impose on the Sultan a mixed local 
government, they should try to gain their object - the intro­
duction of a non-Turkish element in a position of authority - 
by pressing upon the Sultan a mixed Commission to superintend
the application of such reforms as were demanded by local 
(1)
requirements. This demand could be made on the basis of 
the 61st article of the Treaty of Berlin. The suggestion 
had been adopted and developed by Salisbury. He thought 
the Commission should be composed of three Europeans (one each 
from Britain, France and Russia) and four Turks, with the 
power to act separately for the purpose of collecting informa­
tion, but with instructions to report collectively as far as
(2)
they could agree.
It soon became clear that Lobanow was willing to press 
the mixed Commission only so long as he thought the Sultan 
would accept it. When Abdul Hamid, frightened by the temper 
of the population at Constantinople, returned the latest 
summary of the reforms, which had been presented to him by 
the ambassadors, with the information that, instead of granting
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 4 Aug. 1895; F.0.195/1867, Priv.tel.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 27 Aug. 1895; Salisbury Papers, Vol. 
138, Wo.10.
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new reforms, he had withdrawn some of those he had previously
granted, Lohanow reacted to the new mood of the Sultan.
The Russian ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to
demand that the Powers of the Triple Alliance, who were also
signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, should be invited to
(%)
participate in the proposed Commission. The prime motive
was to restrain Britain.
It might have been expected that Salisbury would seize
this opportunity to broaden the basis of the "Near Eastern
entente" by inviting the co-operation of Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Italy, who had formerly been of assistance to
Britain at Constantinople. But Salisbury recognized that the
German Powers disliked Britain's Armenian policy: they
(3)
thought it "quixotic and dangerous". They would be far 
more likely to hinder than help:
"If we desire to take active measures, it will be
more difficult to do so with five Powers hanging on
our coat tails than two". (4)
Salisbury refused to do more than inform the Powers of the
Triple Alliance of the proposed appointment of the Commission
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 21 Aug. 1895; F.0.78/4616, No.540.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 20 Aug. 1895; F.0.195/1867, Priv.tel
(3) Salisbury to Currie, 27 Aug. 1895; Salisbury Papers,
Vol.138, No.10.
(4) Salisbury to Currie, 24 Aug. 1895; F.0.195/1862, Priv.tel
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and to request their approval. The Austrians returned the
friendly answer that, while reserving the rights of all the
signatory Powers, they would do nothing to endanger the success
(1) (2)  
of the Commission. Lohanow had to accept the situation.
But Russia did not mean business. She was only playing
for time. Could Britain, in the absence of the co-operation
of the other European Powers, apply force to coerce the
Sultan? The Liberal Government had made tentative efforts,
ordering fleet movements in Turkish waters. But there had not
been a decisive show of force. Salisbury recognized this
fundamental weakness. On taking office, he wrote to Currie;
"It is indelicate to say anything disparaging of one's 
predecessors; but my impression is that they have 
forced you into a very awkward corner. Without using 
force to deprive the Sultan of his independent sovereign­
ty , you are imposing on him terms which no independent 
sovereign would accept". (3)
Force was an excuse to men who had to yield - especially in
the East, where the Moslem submitted religiously to a decree
of fate. The Sultan's subjects would accept a position into
which the Sultan had been forced: they would be discontented
only if the Sultan had yielded without force having been
applied. The problem was to find some part of the Sultan's
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 30 Aug.1895; F.0.78/4628 No.391.
(2) Lascelles to Salisbury, 28 Aug.1895; F.0.65/1491, No.209 
Confid.
(3) Salisbury to Currie, 1 July 1895; Salisbury Papers, Vol. 
138, No.2.
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dominions where Britain alone could apply force without arous­
ing the susceptibilities of the other European Powers. Through 
out 1895, Salisbury tried hard to find a solution. But, he 
was little more successful than Kimberley.
Salisbury considered most carefully the possibility of 
Britain's acting at Jeddah, on the Red Sea littoral. There was 
much to recommend such a course. Britain could act alone 
without causing the alarm which she would undoubtedly cause 
if she attempted action nearer the Straits. Just as the 
Straits, because of their strategic position, were sensitive 
spots in the Sultan's political body, so Jeddah, because of
its position as capital of the Hadj, was also a sensitive spot.
(1)
Salisbury contemplated occupying Jeddah. But the British 
Military attach/ at Constantinople had warned the Foreign 
Office that, unless the operation were supported by a consid­
erable contingent of Indian troops, it would prove a very 
difficult business. Even a naval demonstration in the Red Sea
was not a measure to be recommended owing to climatic condi-
(2)
tions.
There were undoubtedly great difficulties in the way of
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 12 Aug. 1895; Salisbury Papers,
Vol.138, No.7.
(2) Memorandum by Col. Chermside, enclosed in Currie to 
Kimberley, 6 June 1895, ^.0.78/4613, No»368.
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action in this area. They were responsible for keeping the
idea of action in the realms of discussion. But Salisbury
never openly referred to the difficulties. As late as December
he was still writing about the possibility of sending iron
( 1 )
dads down to Jeddah. For him, it had become a form of 
reassurance.
He turned to the Admiralty for immediate assistance. Here
again he was confronted by difficulties. There was a
difference of opinion between him and Goschen as to the
purpose to which the fleet should be put. Salisbury thought
a major duty of the fleet should be to reinforce diplomatic
operations: he wanted ships to "over-awe" the Sultan. Goschen
thought the prime purpose of the fleet was to ensure the
/ (2) 
safety of Britain and to be prepared to fight, if necessary.
Consequently, he was very cautious in giving his permission
for any fleet movements. Nevertheless, he did his best to
provide Salisbury with the necessary naval support. In
October he responded immediately to Salisbury's request that
the fleet should not sail from Lemnos to Zante, but should
(3)
remain in Turkish waters.
(1) Salisbury to Goschen, 3 Deo. 1895; Salisbury Papers,
Goschen box.
(2) Goschen to Salisbury, 23 Dec. 1896; ibid.
(3) Salisbury to Goschen, 1 Oct. 1895; ibid.
Goschen to Salisbury, 4 Oct. 1895; ibid.
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The Saltan was alarmed hy the proximity of the fleet.
On 7 and 8 October he sent messages to Currie, asking that it
(1)
should he removed to a more distant point. He believed that 
the action of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee (at 
that time provoking disturbances) was based on the proximity 
of the British fleet. Currie replied that, only after the re­
forms demanded by the ambassadors had been promulgated, could 
a change be made in the position of the fleet*
The diplomatic pressure which Britain exerted over the
(2)
Jeddah affair and over the mixed Commission, as well as
(3)
the naval pressure, all combined to break the Sultan's
resistance. On 17 October he issued an irad/, accepting the
reforms of the ambassadors. But such is the irony of fate
that, almost immediately afterwards, the very situation which
the reforms were meant to obviate, developed. A state of
anarchy, arising from massacres at Constantinople, spread
throughout the Empire.
How were the Powers to deal with the crisis? Goluchowski
took the lead. He urged that the Powers should come to agree­
ment
(1) Carrie to Salisbury, 7 & 8 Oct. 1895; F.0.78/1868, No.461,
F.0.78/4629, No.468.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 21 Sept. 1895; F.0.195/1867, Priv.tel. j
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 18 Oct. 1895; F.p.78/4619, No.687.
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on three points: the protection of the embassies at Constanti­
nople, the manner in which European unison could be openly dis­
played, a decision as to the concerted employment of force 
in the event of a serious revolutionary outbreak in the Turkish 
capital. For the first, he thought that the suggestion, 
already made by Kelidow - that the Powers should call up a 
second stationnaire - was adequate. For the second, he sugges­
ted the despatch of a squadron to the Levant by France, Italy 
Germany and Austria. If events should render necessary such a 
step as the concentration of a combined naval force in the 
Bosphorus, the diplomatic representatives at Constantinople 
should decide on "the opportuness of such action and there
(1)
should be no question of referring home for instructions".
The last two suggestions caused great consternation in 
St. Petersburg. The Russians had, throughout, devoted all 
their energies to preventing the very action Goluchowski now 
recommended. They decided to mobilise their Black Sea Fleet.
If British ships entered the Dardanelles, Russian ships would 
enter the Bosphorus and arrive at Constantinople at the same 
time as the British ships. Nelidow and others urged that.
(1) Monson to Salisbury, 14 Nov. 1895; F.0.7/1229, No.233.
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whatever happened, Russia should take advantage of the crisis
(1)
to seize control of the forts of the Bosphorus.
British agents at the Black Sea ports sent home accounts 
of the Russian preparations. A common factor was a note of
urgency. The British consul general at Odeassa wrote that
. / ... . , / . 
the Black Sea fleet, although officially reported to he out
of Commission, was in a state of readiness for sea at a few
(2)
hours ' notice. Lloyds reported from Sevastopol that 4
iron dads, 2 gunboats and 3 of the best torpedoe^{were
"waiting with steam, ready for further orders". Two of the
biggest transports of the Volunteer Fleet were ready to
start with them. The greatest precautions had been, and were
still being taken, to prevent all news of the preparations
(3)
from leaking abroad.
The sudden putting into commission of the Black Sea 
fleet aroused the suspicions of Salisbury. He asked himself: 
did Russia wish to seize Constantinople? Had she the 
audacity to do it? They were difficult questions to answer.
(1) V. Khvostov: "Blizhne-Vostochnyi Krizis, 1895-97 gg". 
(Istorik Marksist, XIII, 1929, pp.19-54.
c?'.' W.ti.‘LangerV'’The Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp.25-8, 
p.207.
(2) A.J. Harder, op.cit. p.246.
(3) Salisbury to Currie, 30 Nov. 1895; F.0.195/1863, No.386 
enclosing copy of letter from Admiralty.
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Salisbury thought the only prudent course was to assume an
( 1)
unfavourable answer. Thus he was face to face with the 
situation he had discussed hypothetically with Deym. Here was 
the test case. Now was the time for Salisbury to prove, by 
his actions, the sincerity of his words to Deym.
Salisbury considered that the seizure of Constantinople 
was really a question of surprise; Russian ships could be 
there in four days and troops to cover them in ten. If they 
once manned the Dardanelles their position would be impreg­
nable. But if the British ambassador could act immediately 
and summon the British fleet through the Dardanelles, Salis­
bury thought he would have a fair chance of seeing the
( 2 )
British ships arrive at Constantinople first. As early as
the beginning of October Salisbury had asked Goschen to give
the Commander of the British squadron in the Levant instruc­
ts)
tions to conform to the orders of Currie. He had justified 
his request by observing that, before the days of the tele­
graph, the ambassador had the disposal of the fleet. In 
time of great emergency, that power should still be in the
(1) Salisbury to Goschen, 3 Deo. 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Goschen box.
(2) Ibid.
(3) A.J. Harder, op.oit. p.243. . ^
Salisbury to 'Goschen, 9 Oct. 1895; Salisbury Papers,
Goschen box.
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ambassador's hands. Goschen had thought Salisbury's request
"a very large o r d e r " . H e  consistently refused to give
Currie carte blanche:
"Without knowing (and I do not know) what Currie would 
do with the fleet, v/hat end the policy he might pursue 
might have in view, I cannot reconcile myself to the 
expediency of that one step as at present advised ...
It is a different taing to support your policy and to 
support Currie's". (2)
The day for ambassadors like Stratford Canning was well and
truly over.
But in November the situation was so grave that Salis­
bury thought the time had come to appeal to the Cabinet, He 
called a special meeting and proposed that, in case Russia 
menaced a descent on the Bosphorus, Currie should be allowed 
to summon the British fleet through the Dardanelles. 
Objections were raised by Goschen and Richards, the First 
Sea Lord; also, by Balfour and Chamberlain. Richards
flatly declined to have anything to do with the idea and left
(4)
the r o o m . T h e  objections prevailed in the Cabinet and
Salisbury accepted its decision. He was "much put out". 
He wrote to Goschen:
(1) Goschen to Salisbury, ^ O c t . 1895; Ibid.
(2) ibid.
(3) Private letter of Admiral Custance; A.J. Harder, op.cit. 
p. 244
(4) Memorandum by Earl St. Aldwyn, d. between 16 Dec. 1913 
and 23 Jan. 1914; Hicks Beach Papers, P.C.C/69.
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My position is becoming one of exceeding difficulty - 
for, in deference to the apprehensions of the Admir- 
alty, and I am bound to add - of Balfour and Chamber- 
lain - I am administering a policy in which I entirely 
disbelieve and which may lead to much disgrace". (1)
Salisbury believed that the keeping of Constantinople out of
Russian hands had been proclaimed as a policy by British
statesmen for so long that, if the city were surrendered to
Russia, the blow to British prestige would be tremendous.
He had asked that precautions against the latter contingency
should be taken by giving to Currie permission to summon the
British fleet. That permission had been refused and
Salisbury thought the refusal meant, or might mean, the
surrender of Constantinople to Russia. From that time he
felt constantly that he was administering a policy in vhich
he disbelieved.
12)
He was "cut to the heart". He had not expected the
members of the Cabinet to be so greatly influenced by the
opinions of the Admiralty. As for the Admiralty, Salisbury
thought there was something "theological" in the absolute
(3)
confidence they had in the opinions of their experts. The 
latter continually stressed the danger the British fleet would
(1) Salisbury to Goschen, 22 Nov. 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Goschen box.
(2) Goschen to Salisbury, 23 Dec. 1896; ibid.
(3) Salisbury to Goschen, 12 Dec. 1895; ibid.
184.
incur at the far end of the Mediterranean, if the French 
fleet should emerge from Toulon: it would he trapped between 
the French and Russian fleets. Salisbury himself did not 
believe that the junction of Russia and France in a maritime 
war was "at all a probable contingency"; and, if it were, he 
did not believe that the Admiralty figures properly repres­
ented the force of their combined fleets, which it was sup-
^ (1) 
posed to be necessary for the -British to over-top. In
January 1896, he stated his belief that war with America
was "more of a reality than the future Russo-French co- ^2 j
alition".
Since Salisbury held these convictions so strongly, it is 
surprising that he did not make more effort, in November 
1895, to overrule the opinions of the members of his Cabinet. 
Lord St. Aldwyn, in the memorandum which he sent Lady 
Gwendoline in 1914, remarked that Lord Salisbury never 
exercised the same control over his colleagues in or out of 
the Cabinet, that Lord Beaconsfield had done. Lord St.
Aldwyn had known Lord Beaconsfield over-rule the opinions of 
every member of his Cabinet but one. Lord Salisbury
(1) Salisbury to Hicks Beach, 2 Jan. 1896; Hicks Beach 
Papers, PCC/69.
(2) Ibid.
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frequently allowed important matters to be decided by
majority vote, even against his own opinion. Lord St. Aldwyn
thought that Salisbury's record as Prime Minister and Foreign
Secretary would have gained if his nature had been harder
(1)
and more self-assertive.
It is impossible not to concur with this opinion. One
cannot but regret that Salisbury did not, in November, make
more effort to over-rule the opinions of his colleagues. It
is now known that, in many of his ideas, Salisbury was more
near the truth than the Admiralty. Investigation showed
the Russians that their Black Sea Fleet was not in such good
order as had been imagined. Requests for armed assistance
to their French ally brought the discouraging reply that:
"Only a great national interest, like the regulation 
anew" of the Alsace-Lorraine question, "would be 
sufficient to justify ... engagements implying 
military action in which the Great Powers might 
find themselves successively involved". (2)
There was to be no French support for a Russian offensive in
the Near East.
It is probable that the British fleet could have passed 
the Dardanelles and arrived safety at Constantinople in
(1) Memorandum by Bari St. Aldwyn, d. between 16 Dec. 
and 23 Jan. 1914; Hicks Beach Papers, PGC/69.
(2) D.D.F.. 1871-1914, Series III, Vol.II, No.202, quoted by 
W.L. Langer, op.cit., p.208.
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November 1895. But this chance was missed because Salisbury
did not assert his authority in the Cabinet. He failed not
only to over-rule the opinions of his colleagues, he
failed also to make completely clear the prime reason for
his request to send the fleet through the Dardanelles.
Hicks Beach understood that Salisbury wanted the fleet sent
(1)
to "coerce Turkey into proper treatment of the Armenians".
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, like many other Ministers,
believed that few people in Britain would run the risk of a
European war on the chance that further intervention by
(2)
Britain would help the Armenians. Goschen noted that 
discussion in the Cabinet was confused and he doubted
(3)
whether they ever came to any definite decision at all.
Goschen himself did not believe that Russia really meant
(4)
to descend on Constantinople. As the outcome showed, he was 
right: when the Russians discovered that their fleet was
inadequately prepared for action, they devoted their efforts 
to preventing action by the other Powers. Although Goschen 
objected, on this particular occasion, to sending the British
(1) cf. Memorandum of 16 Dec.
(2) Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 20 Dec. 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Hicks Beach :i #
(3) Goschen to Salisbury, 22 Dec. 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Goschen box.
(4) Ibid.
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fleet through the Dardanelles, he did not maintain that that
decision should he final and operative from that time onwards.
He always thought that the Dardanelles could he passed, though
(1)
he did not believe it would be an easy operation. On 7
December he was still writing to Salisbury about the necessity
of examining the question as to a seizure of the outer forts
of the Dardanelles in certain contingencies. He asked whether
the War Office had lately had before them the possibility of
co-operation at the mouth of the Dardanelles;
"Whether or not to go through the Straits, every step 
which might be taken at this neck of the bottle should 
be considered". (£)
But Salisbury took very much to heart the Cabinet's 
refusal. For him it marked a turning point. Although, at 
the time, his prime motive for the request to send up the 
fleet was to safeguard Constantinople from possible Russian 
aggression; afterwards, he realised that the same Cabinet 
decision would hold good, should he wish to send the fleet 
through the Dardanelles to coerce the Saltan: the Cabinet
and the Admiralty thought the undertaking too dangerous.
(1) Goschen to Salisbury, 7 Dec. 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Goschen box.
(2) Ibid.
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In the past Britain had always relied on naval measures in 
this vital strategic area to coerce the Sultan. Since such 
action was no longer considered practicable, unless Britain 
could find other means of coercing the Sultan, or unless she 
could institute a new governing power in Turkey, she would 
have no hold on any of the Turkish territories - except, 
possibly, Egypt. The realisation that such a state of affairs 
would necessitate the formulation of a new policy came 
slowly in the following years*
189.
CHAPTER VI 
Salisbury Remains Loyal to Austria.
It was evident by the turn of the year I895 that the 
major part of Britain's Armenian policy had failed. The 
Sultan had given in words nearly all that had been asked, 
but Britain was, as Salisbury bitterly lamented, "no 
forrarder".'  ^ The execution of the reform^ accepted by 
the Sultan in October, had "gone no further than the 
filling up of a large register, beautifully bound".
In Turkey, it was expected that words should be accepted 
as deeds.
The Sultan considered that he had triumphed and that 
he owed much of his success to Russia, who had refused to 
consider Britain's proposal to apply coercive measures.
He showed his gratitude by sending to St. Petersburg a 
special embassy, led by Arif Pasha, with magnificent gifts 
for the Tsarina. A more than usually earnest appeal was 
made to the Tsar for protection. Russian engineer officers 
were given permission to inspect the fortifications of the
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 17 Dec., 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 135, No. 19.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 5 March, I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 18.
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Dardanelles, with a view to strengthening t h e m . T h e s e
significant actions were observed by Currie, who quickly
reported that "something was going on between Russia and
(2)
Turkey". Currie believed that it was impossible that 
Russia would completely abandon her role as protector of 
Christians and he, therefore, thought it likely that she 
contemplated some scheme of occupation of the Asiatic 
provinces. His view seemed confirmed when he learnt that 
the Tsar had intimated that he would guarantee the Sultan's 
safety on condition that Russia should occupy the six 
Anatolian provinces as far as Diabekir and Trebizond for 
at least ten years, paying the surplus revenues to T u r k e y .
The negotiations were kept secret and, although the 
general opinion was that an entente existed between the 
two countries, no one knew to what lengths it went. On 
23 January the Pall Mall Gazette published an alarmist 
telegram from Constantinople positively affirming that an 
offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded 
between Russia and Turkey on the basis of the Treaty of
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 7 Jan., 1896; P.0 .195/1914.
Tel. No. 18. Seer.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 13 Jan., 1896; Salisbury Papers,
Vol. 136, No. 2.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 10 Jan., I896; P.0.78/4723,
Tel. No. 25 Seer.
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Unkiar Skelessi and ratifications exchanged by Arif Pasha 
at St. Petersburg.
The news greatly troubled Salisbury, who, as in former 
years, turned for support to the Powers of the Triple 
Alliance. The reception given to his overtures showed how 
greatly the confidence of the Continental Powers had been 
undermined by Britain's Armenian policy. Salisbury himself 
had observed how curious it was that two "psychological 
climates" could exist so utterly different as those of 
Britain and Continental Europe. He did not believe that, 
from Archangel to Cadiz, there was a soul who cared whether 
the Armenians were exterminated or not. But in Britain the 
sympathy for them, though the area over which it extended 
was not very large, approached to frenzy in its intensity. 
Salisbury had been forced by the pressure of public opinion 
to do what he could for the Armenians. He denied that his 
action had been "inconsistent with an unreserved resolve 
to uphold the Ottoman Empire". But people on the Continent 
found it difficult to believe that Britain had acted purely 
from humanitarian motives. Salisbury was surprised to 
learn that Goluchowski was not absolutely convinced that
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 23 Jan., 1896; F_.0 .78/4722,
Tel. No. 15.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 27 Aug., 1895; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 10.
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Britain herself would not give some encouragement to Russia 
to occupy the disturbed provinces Asia Minor for the 
purposes of pacification.
The immediate cause of Goluchowski*s suspicions was 
eventually found to be the result of a misunderstanding of 
the purport of a communication which Salisbury had made to 
Russia in January. When Salisbury heard from Currie that 
the only obstacle which prevented the ambassadors from 
concerting measures for remedying the state of things in 
Turkey lay in the fact that the concert, as far as the 
Russian ambassador was concerned, was limited to the pro­
tection of foreigners,Salisbury sent a despatch to St. 
Petersburg, asking that Nelidov should be given instructions 
to discuss the general situation, lobanow immediately pro­
claimed that Salisbury had proposed to Russia to put the 
Sultan under ^a sort of tutelle of the Powers".
Goluchowski thought it highly suspicious that Britain should 
have made the communication to Russia alone. Was Britain 
contemplating some scheme which went far beyond her avowed
(1) Monson to Salisbury, 1 Jan., 1896; JliO.7/1241,
No. 2 Seer.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 19 Dec., 1895; P.O.78/4625,
No. 967 Confid.
(3) Goschen to Salisbury, 30 Jan., I896; P.0 .65/1514,
No. 18 Confid.
Gosselin to Salisbury, 25 Jan., I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 121, No. 26.
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policy? He was not completely reassured by Salisbury's 
explanations. He believed that Neli&ov must be able to 
discuss the general situation without special instructions 
from his Government.
There was a fundamental difference of opinion between 
the British and Austrian Ministers as to the mode of 
procedure most likely to delay the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. Goluchowski thought the Powers ought to 
sit still and give time to the Sultan, who alone had the 
necessary authority to re-establish order and carry out 
the necessary r e f o r m s . S a l i s b u r y  believed that this 
negative policy would not arrest the evils by which the 
Ottoman Empire was afflicted. While he did not propose 
any definite course of action, he thought it wise to seek, 
the advice of the ambassadors on the spot, with a view to 
finding a remedy for the existing state of things.
Goluchowski explained frankly to Monson that he was 
assailed by doubts as to British policy on two matters. 
First, the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East.
(1) Monson to Salisbury, 23 Jan., 1896; P.0 .7/1241,
No. 28 Seer.
(2) Monson to Salisbury, 16 Dec., 1895; P.O.7/1229,
No. 370.
(3) Salisbury to Currie, 28 Jan., I896; P.0.195/1910.
No. 11.
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Britain had always professed herself anxious to maintain it, 
hut her recent actions aroused the suspicion that British 
policy "did not mean this at all". Then, there was the 
principle of opposing Russian aggression in the East. He 
had always regarded that principle as the basis of the 
identical policy which Britain and Austria pursued there.
But he was now forced to ask whether Britain considered 
her interests in the Mediterranean to be still the same 
or whether they had changed?^^V Goluchowski felt the need 
for a definite assurance as to the objectives of British 
policy. But his craving for reassurance was such that he 
was no longer content with the vague statements of principle, 
exchanged between the two Governments in 1887* He now 
asked for an agreement in which Britain would definitely , 
pledge herself,to oppose with force any attempt by any 
Power to force the Straits or attack Constantinople. In 
fact he instructed his ambassador, Deym, to attempt to
( 2^negotiate a very far-reaching new treaty with Britain.' ^
The importunities of the Austrians forced Salisbury to 
define very clearly the aims of his policy and to explain
(1) Monson to Salisbury, 18 Feb., I896; P.O.7/1241,
No. 60 seer.
(2) This fact is elaborated in the article by J.A.S. Grenville: 
"Goluchowski, Salisbury and the Mediterranean Agreements, 
1895-97"; Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXXVI,
No, 87, June, 195Ü, pp. 355-361.
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the difficulties in the v/ay of the execution of that policy. 
Salisbury declared that he himself would always do his 
utmost to keep Constantinople and the Straits out of Russian 
hands. He was quite willing to renew the accords of I887. 
But he could not commit his country to any written engage­
ment involving an obligation to go to war. That attitude 
was prescribed to him by Britain's "popular constitution": 
the power of the Government to act depended upon the prac­
tical sentiment prevailing at the moment when the necessity 
arose and it v/as impossible to foresee that sentiment.
The constitutional objection was to Salisbury a very real 
one. He did not put it forward simply to avoid the 
necessity of admitting other objections. In I887, after 
the Mediterranean Agreements had been concluded, Salisbury 
expressed to the Queen his opinion that they constituted 
"as close an alliance as the Parliamentary character of 
British institutions would permit".
In 1896, Salisbury was quite prepared to admit that 
other difficulties had presented themselves in the
(1) Salisbury to Monson, 4 Feb., I896; P.O.7/1240.
No. 17 seer, printed in BO VIII, pp. 4-5.
Deym to Goluchowski, 23 Jan., I896; printed in the 
Slavonic Review. Vol. XXIX, 1950-51: unpublished documents 
îrom the Austrian archives selected by Eurof Walters.
Deym to Goluchowski, 29 Jan., 1896; Ibid, p. 278.
Deym to Golochowski, 6 Feb., I896; Ibia, pp. 279-83.
(2) Salisbury to the Queen, 2 Feb., 1887; Letters of Queen 
Victoria. 3rd. Series (1930) Vol. I, pp. 2&8-70.
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intervening years. A major consideration was the change in 
the attitude of the British public towards the Sultan. The 
cruelties which had recently been exercised upon the 
Christian subjects of the Sultan, without any apparent 
discouragement on the part of the Turkish Government, had 
"excited feelings of deep horror and indignation in Britain". 
Salisbury thought that "for some time to come the recollec­
tion of what had taken place would prevent the growth of 
any sympathy for the Sultan's Government or any desire to 
shield him from any danger by which he might be threatened." 
He very much doubted whether "public opinion would sanction 
a war to defend the Ottoman Empire". He could not consent 
to enter into an engagement, on behalf of the Government, 
which he had no certainty of being able to fulfil. On the 
other hand, Salisbury emphasized that this statement should 
not be taken as a declaration that Britain would not, under 
any circumstances, act in defence of the Ottoman Empire 
against Russian aggression. He thought;
"It was probable that a sight of any attempt, 
if ever it were made, to make Russia master 
of the Straits, would create a violent 
revulsion of feeling in England and as strong 
a desire for resistance as was aroused by the 
approach of the Russian armies to Constantinople 
in 1878." (1)
(1) Salisbury to Monson, 26 Eeb., I896; P.O.7/1240, 
Ho. 24 Seer.
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This expression of opinion was of extreme importance,
because it was the opinion, not of Salisbury alone, but of
the majority of the British C a b i n e t . T h e  demands of
Goluchowski and the Emperor of Austria that Britain should
explain her Mediterranean policy more clearly had been so
imperative that Salisbury had called a special Cabinet to
discuss the Eastern question. The fact that Salisbury had
gone so far as to lay the matter before the Cabinet was in
itself significant: he had undertaken more than Rosebery
had been prepared to undertake. The manner in which
Salisbury presented the problem to the Cabinet was also
significant: Jit^Was a question of deciding whether Britain
should be the friend of the Triple Alliance or the friend
of Russia. Salisbury:
"expressed himself strongly against any policy 
that would cut Austria adrift. It would recon­
stitute the Dreikaiserbund - a state of things 
which must be injurious to Great Britain."
Chamberlain declared that the world situation was such that
antagonism to Russia was a mistake: Britain would occupy a
stronger position in Europe if she were the friend of
Russia. Opinions in the Cabinet were "much divided", but
it was generally agreed that, although the feeling in
Britain (even on the Tory side) was much more favourable to
(1) Salisbury to the Queen, 19 Eeb., I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 84, No. 10. (Copy)
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Russia and much more adverse to the Turks than it used to 
he, the Government might he allowed hy the people of Britain 
to go to war in defence of the Straits to prevent them being 
appropriated by Russia.
Salisbury had won over the majority of the Cabinet 
Ministers to his view, but there remained the practical 
problem of whether Britain would, in fact, be able to 
defend the Straits. Salisbury told Beym quite frankly 
that the Admiralty were very apprehensive of the dangers 
involved in such an undertaking - the fortifications of 
the Dardanelles were much stronger than they had been in 
1887. But Salisbury gave it as his personal opinion that 
Britain would certainly be able to defend the Straits if 
she were sufficiently supported from the land by Austria.
The strategic problem was not fully discussed by 
Salisbury and Deym. Salisbury did not stress the matter 
unduly because he had recently received encouragement from 
a memorandum by Colonel Chermside, who argued that, in case 
of hostile action by Russia against the Straits, it would 
be possible for Britain to seize the S.W, extremity of the 
Gallipoli peninsula and hold that position until reinforce­
ments arrived. The locality was an important strategic
(1) Deym to Goluchowski, 29 Jan., 1896; printed in 
Slavonic Review, on.cit., vol. XXIX, p. 278.
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position and, if taken in conjunction with the occupation 
of the island of Leianos, it would enable Britain to control 
the D a r d a n e l l e s . T h e  scheme was accepted as feasible 
until the D.M.I. and D.N.I. raised the insuperable objections 
that Britain would be unable to muster and dispatch in time 
the requisite number of s o l d i e r s . E v e n  then, however, 
Salisbury did not despair. Throughout 1896, the Defence 
Department was urged to study all the possible measures 
which Britain could take to counter a Russian attack on the 
Straits.
At this time, Salisbury was more concerned with "the 
result, upon the safety of Constantinople of the recent 
conversion of Prince Boris" and the subsequent reconcilia­
tion of Bulgaria and Russia. As long as Bulgaria was 
hostile to Russia, any Russian expedition against 
Constantinople would have to depend upon communications 
with the sea and it would be liable to interruption by any 
power, stronger than Russia upon the sea. But, if Russia
(1) Copy of a Secret Memorandum by Colonel Chermside, 
enclosed in Currie to Salisbury, 29 Jan., 1896;
P.O.78/4884, No. 78 Seer, .
A. J. Marder. op.cit.;: p. 248.
(2) D.M.I., E. P. Chapman, to permanent Under-secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, 26,Feb., I896; A.J. Marder, 
op.cit., pp. 249-50.
(3) Salisbury to Monson, 26 Feb., I896; E.p.7/1240,
No. 24 Seer.
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could command an uninterrupted road from the Pruth to the 
Bosphorus, she would he comparatively indifferent to any 
dangers which might menace her communications with Sebastopol. 
It was still too early to forecast with certainty the course 
of events in Bulgaria. There were indications that the new 
relations which Bulgaria had established with Russia would 
lead to considerable difficulties and inconveniences for 
Bulgaria.^ Currie believed that, if Britain were "to 
hold out the hand of friendship to Bulgaria" the principality 
would be encouraged to take an independent attitude.
The conversations of Salisbury and Deym, in January and 
February 1896, were inconclusive. Goluchowski was dis­
appointed that he had failed to bind Britain more closely, 
but he still believed that, if an emergency arose, Britain 
would co-operate loyally with Austria and Italy and so he 
did not see any need for changing Austria's foreign policy. 
Salisbury repeatedly stated that Britain's policy had not 
changed; Britain wished to be as good friends with the 
Powers of the Triple Alliance as she had been in 1892:
"We wish to lean on the Triple Alliance, without 
belonging to it. But, in 1892, as now, we kept 
free from any engagement to go to war in any 
contingency whatever. That is the attitude
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 30 March, 1896; F.0.78/4705,
No. 247. '
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 16 April, I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 23.
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prescribed.to us by our Parliamentary constitu­
tion ... Whether the attitude is reasonable or 
not, it is the attitude we maintained from 1886 
to 1892." (1)
Although the Armenian troubles, Britain's refusal to
allow the Italians to occupy Zeyla^^^and the Kruger telegram^
had introduced elements of estrangement into Britain's
relations with the Powers of the Triple Alliance, in March
it seemed that friendly relations were once again restored.
The Kaiser had found it more difficult than he had expected
to form a coalition of the Continental Powers against 
(/l\
Britain.' ' The support of Britain had become essential to
the Italians, if they were to retrieve their position in
Abyssinia. William II executed a complete volte face and
stated his wish to maintain friendly relations with Britain:
"She and Germany were the two great Protestant 
Powers, standing in the forefront of civilization 
and united by ties of blood, religion and mutual 
interests." (5)
(1) Salisbury to Lascelles, 10 March, I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 122, No. 6.
(2) W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit.,
Vol. I, p. 276.
(3) Ibid, pp. 234-238.
(4) Ibid, pp. 228-233, p. 248.
(5) Lascelles to Salisbury, 6 March, 1896; P.O.64/1376,
No. 61 Seer, enclosing Gen. M. Grierson's secret despatch 
to Lascelles, 3 March I896.
Gosselin to Salisbury, 7 March, I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 121, No. 30.
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The Kaiser promised German aid for the proposed British 
expedition against the Dervishes in the Sudan, provided 
Dongola was made its first objective: an advance against
that city would compel the Dervishes to abandon their cam­
paign against the Italian colonies. Britain could extricate 
her old Mediterranean ally from a dangerous position at the 
same time as she extended her own power in Egypt.
The situation which developed as a result of the Dongola 
advance served to define very clearly the grouping of the 
European Powers: the parties of the Triple Alliance con­
fronted Prance and Russia, with Britain on the side of the 
former. On 17 April, Monson found Goluchowski anxious to 
emphasize:
"The belief entertained at Rome, Berlin and Vienna 
that England now occupies towards the Triple 
Alliance the same position as that which subsisted 
until the discussion of the Armenian reforms 
brought into strong relief her apparent isolation."' '
Goluchowski*s one complaint was that British influence
at Constantinople had greatly diminished. He deplored "the
material brutal fact" that the dominating influence, once
(1) Memorandum by Marschall, 4 March, I896, GP IL,
No. 2771.
(2) Monson to Salisbury, 17 April, I896; P.O.7/1242,
No. 121 Conf. ^
Monson to Salisbury, 17 April, I896; Salisbury Papers,
Vol. 91, No. 34.
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exercised by Britain, was now wielded by R u s s i a . H i s  
observations moved Currie to write a long despatch, des­
cribing the situation at Constantinople.The despatch 
was regarded as being sufficiently important to warrant 
printing for the use of the Cabinet. Currie refused to admit 
the correctness of Goluchowski * s estimation of the state of 
British influence at Constantinople. Britain's task, for 
the last eighteen months, had been to obtain reforms for 
the Christians and security for their lives and property. 
Although she had not been able to force the Sultan to 
execute the main body of reforms, Britain had achieved a 
number of her aims:
"Many excesses have been prevented, many lives 
have been saved, some objectionable officials 
have been removed, mediation has been success­
fully employed, many prisoners have been released."
No doubt the Sultan bitterly resented Britain's action, but
his hatred of Britain, which dated from the time of Sir
Henry Bayard's departure, could hardly be stronger than it
was before the Armenian question occurred:
"It is now, at any rate, tempered by fear."
"He fears us more from having felt how ,
intensely disagrekble we can make ourselves. /
Therefore, our influence, after the present /
(1) Lascelles to Salisbury, 11 March, 1896, P.O.64/1376, 
No. 71 Very Confid: reporting a conversation with 
Goluchowski who was on a visit to Berlin.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 12 April, 1896; P.O.78/4705, 
No. 273.
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crisis has subsided, will remain much what it was."
The exceptional position of Nelidov did not really betoken 
any important change in the situation. The power of Russia 
over Turkey was due to her geographical position and the 
material force at her command: recent events had only
increased it in so far as they had diminished the probability 
of Britain's interference on behalf of the Ottoman Empire.
As long as Russia gave the Sultan the support which enabled 
him to neglect his treaty engagements, her ambassador would 
always be received with favour.
Currie's despatch, besides constituting a defence of 
his own work as ambassador, presented a fairly accurate 
description of the state of affairs at Constantinople. The 
only criticism which could be levelled against the despatch 
was that it did not sufficiently emphasize one important 
change which had occurred: the ambassadors of the Powers
of the Triple Alliance no longer wholeheartedly supported 
Currie in any action he might take against the activities 
of the Russian and French ambassadors. The united front of 
former times had been broken and Russia was reaping the 
benefit. Once the Armenian troubles had demonstrated just 
how easily the'status quo in Turkey might be upset, the
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 20 Feb., I896, Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 12.
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Austrians became extremely cautious: often their views
were more in harmony with the Russians than the British - 
everything possible should be done to maintain the status 
quo, even at expense to other aspects of policy. For some 
time the Germans had pursued an independent line at the 
Turkish capital, which consisted in doing nothing which 
would be distasteful to the Sultan. Political considera­
tions were^sacrificed to economic considerations: nothing
should be done which might result in loss of orders for 
German food stuffs and other c o m m o d i t i e s . T h e  new 
Italian ambassador was "not nearly so pertinacious" as 
Catalani and little reliance could be placed upon him.
The fluid state of the grouping of Powers at Constan­
tinople was demonstrated when troubles in Crete made some 
action on their part imperative. Some of the Cretans, who 
were anxious for the union of Crete with Greece, having
formed an influential committee in Greece, organised a 
large-scale agitation in the i s l a n d . I n  May, a viole; 
outbreak at Canea, in which many Christians were killed.
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 23 April, 1896, Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 25.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 10 Feb., 1896, Ibid, No. 9-
(3) W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit.,
Vol. I, p. 317. o .
Herbert to Salisbury, 10 June, 1896; P.O.78/4701,
No. 458 Seer.
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caused Britain, Prance, Russia and Italy to send war ships. 
Unless the Great Powers could quickly enforce a settlement, 
it seemed likely that outbreaks would also occur in 
Macedonia and a general conflagration would ensue, which 
would bring down the Turkish Empire.
At Constantinople, the British and French ambassadors
at first took the lead in pressing the Sultan to grant
reforms to the Cretans. But the Turkish Government seemed
determined to,suppress the insurrection by force. At a
meeting of the ambassadors on the 10 fune, Cambon insisted
that the Turks should be given a lesson and that Turkey
should be compelled by the common action of the six Powers,
fl)to hold her hand in Crete., /. It was noteworthy that Cambon 
was able to take so strong a line only because the Russian 
ambassador was absent: once Nelidov returned, Cambon had
to moderate his language. When the Porte finally accepted 
the measures advocated by the six ambassadors for restoring 
tranquillity in Crete, it was influenced primarily by the 
action of Calice. The Austrian ambassador, being afraid 
that prolonged agitation in Crete would encourage insurrec­
tion in Macedonia, addressed to Izzet Bey (the Sultan's 
chief adviser) a private letter which contained a very
(1) Herbert to Salisbury, 11 June, 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 31.
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strong warning as to the risks Turkey was running.
throughout the negotiations, the Russian chargé
d'affaires had shown himself extremely hostile to Britain.
He suspected that Britain was working for a protectorate
over Crete and devoted himself to seeing that Britain should
he given no opportunity to act alone there. He protested
against a journey which Mr. Biliotti (the British Consul in
Crete) proposed to make to distribute money which had been
collected in Britain for the relief of the Cretanst^^He
proposed that the ambassadors at Constantinople should write
to their consuls in Crete, requesting them to instruct the
commanders of their ships of war in Cretan waters "to act
together as much as possible."'^' Mr. Herbert, the British
charge d'affaires at Constantinople, described, in a private
letter to Salisbury, the position taken by the ambassadors
when these two matters were discussed:
"Cambon supports him (the Russian chargé 
d'affaires) because he is obliged to and the 
German agrees, because, for some reason or 
other, he is also inclined to be suspicious 
as to our action in Crete. The Austrian does 
not believe the Russian stories, but he humours
(1) Herbert to Salisbury, 4 July, 1896; P.O.78/4709. 
No. 518 B. Seer.
(2) Herbert to Salisbury, 8 July, I896; P.O.78/4709, 
No. 542 Confid.
(3) Herbert to Salisbury, 23 July, I896; P.0 .78/4724, 
No. 294 Seer.
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the French and Russian representatives in order 
to keep them in line. The Italian frankly 
supports me, hut we are only two against four 
and we have to give way if we want to keep up 
the accord." (1)
The concert of the ambassadors had succeeded in 
persuading the Sultan to offer reasonable terms to the 
Cretan insurgents, but it still had to persuade the insur­
gents to accept the terms. As long as they received aid 
from Greece, it was unlikely that they would be satisfied 
with anything less than annexation to Greece, which the 
Powers could never permit. In July, Goluchowski took the 
matter temporarily out of the hands of the ambassadors at 
Constantinople, when he proposed that the Powers should 
address a collective note to the Greek government, calling 
on them to take effective measures for the prevention of 
the importation into Crete of arms and ammunition and the 
dispatch of volunteer reinforcements to the island. If this 
step were not sufficient to stay hostilities, the Powers l
should agree to a pacific blockade of the island by their
(2)combined fleets.'
The ambassadors at Constantinople considered the latter
(1) Herbert to Salisbury, 23 July, I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 42.
(2) Memorandum by Sanderson, 25 July I896; P.0.7/1240. 
Gosselin to Salisbury, 28 July, I896; P^O.64/1378,
No. 245.
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proposal to be premature. Goluchowski had omitted to
consult Calice before making it. The Austrian ambassador
was hurt at the slight and said openly that, if he had been
consulted he would have spoken strongly against such a
measure being taken at that time.(^) But the British
Government effectively quashed the proposal by its refusal
to take part in the blockade; it was against the traditional
policy of Britain to intervene by force between a Sovereign
and his subjects and, in any case, British public opinion
would never allow the Government to ally themselves with
(2 )the Sultan against his Christian subjects.' ' The action 
of the British Government produced a very painful impression 
upon Goluchowski. He considered the treatment awarded to 
his suggestion as "somev/hat contemptuous and scornful" - 
he felt the manner of its rejection more than the rejection
Y 3 ^
itself.'^' The Austrian Foreign Minister was notoriously 
vain and a blow had been struck to his vanity. The 
soreness he felt influenced his attitude to Britain for 
some time to come.
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 6 Aug. 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 43.
(2) lascelles to Salisbury, 4 Aug., 1896; P.0.64/1378. 
No. 259 Confid.
(3) Rumbold to Salisbury, 27 Sept., 1897; F.0.7/1259, 
No. 326, Very confid.
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In Germany, the reaction to Britain's refusal to join 
with, the Powers in a blockade of Crete was even more pro­
nounced. The views prevailing there were reflected in two 
articles in the Cologne Gazette;
"It used to be the boast of England that she 
maintained the integrity of Turkey. The Armenian 
question was the first occasion for the change 
and certaihly England's action might well have 
resulted in a general conflagration. In this 
last matter (the Cretan question) we hoped that 
. England would be found on the side of the Powers
who, without selfish end, aimed only at the \
, maintenance of peace ••• we find we are mistaken.
The second article continued in a similar vein:
England "always begins with the most beautiful 
speeches about liberty and humanity and, behind 
them, pursues, in decent obscurity, her own 
shop-keeping business. England will go to war 
to propagate the blessings of opium or sacrifice 
in the cause of humanity as many leading 
articles as you wish, but you v/ill never get the 
world to believe that England will stir a hand 
in the cause of humanity for sentimental reasons."
England remained the defender of the integrity of Turkey only
until, as a reward for her exertions, she gained possession
of as much Turkish territory as suited her private ends.
The writer of the Cologne Gazette was convinced that
England's present object was to secure the independence of
Crete under a chieftain who would be dependent upon England^
(1) Cologne Gazette, 1 Aug. 1896, Precis- inclosed in 
Lascelles to Salisbury, 3 Aug, 1896; P.O.64/1378. No.257.
(2) Cologne Gazette, 2 Aug., I896, Ibid.
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As it happened, the Cretan question was settled, early 
in September, in a manner satisfactory to all the Powers 
when the insurgents finally accepted further concessions, 
made by the Sultan on the advice of the ambassadors at 
Constantinople.The suspicions of the Continental Powers 
that Britain had abandoned her traditional policy of main­
taining the status quo in Turkey were temporarily allayed. 
Complete unanimity was restored to the ambassadors at 
Constantinople when a fresh outbreak of violence in the city 
compelled them to act together.
On 26 August, an attack by Armenian revolutionaries on 
the Ottoman bank at, Gal at a was the signal for a general 
uprising, which was put down with great ferocity by the 
Turks. Pive to six thousand Armenians were killed.
Currie wrote on 3 September that the last few days had 
enabled him to realize what St. Bartholomew's Day was like.(^) 
The Russian and Austrian ambassadors were jolted out of the 
cautious attitudes which they had adopted in their dealings 
with the Sultan. On 28 August the ambassadors addressed a 
telegram direct to the Sultan, calling his attention to the
(1) W,K:. Danger, on.cit.. vol. I, p. 320.
(2) Ibid, pp. 323-4.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 3 Sept., 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 47.
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horrors which were being committed and urging him to "put 
an end to a state of things, likely to have the most disas­
trous consequences for his Empire". At mid-night, the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Calice and 
asked him, in the Sultan's name, what the telegram meant. 
Calice let Tewfik Pasha clearly understand that:
"If such excesses continued to be committed under 
the eyes of Europe, public opinion would become 
convinced that the Turkish Government was incapable 
of maintaining order, and would seek some more 
satisfactory substitute." (2)
The Russian ambassador was even more violent in his language. 
He said that, if order were hot restored at once, he would 
send his gun boat to bombard and raze to the ground a 
Turkish quarter. Most of the ambassadors were so moved
by the recent events that they looked forward to "action on 
the part of the Powers as inevitable and d e s i r a b l e " . (4)
Even Nelidov was Convinced that the state of affairs could 
not be allowed to last much longer, without outside inter­
ference. Currie thought that Nelidov personally would not 
be adverse to common action on the part of the Powers, if
(1) Herbert to Salisbury, 31 Aug., 1896; P.0.78/4713,
No. 688.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Currie to Salisbury, 16 Sept., 1896; P.0.78/4714,
No. 734.
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the objections of his Government could be overcome.
It was natural that the ambassadors at Constantinople, 
who had all witnessed scenes of horror should be united in 
their desire to see some common action taken. It was just 
as natural that the rulers of the countries which they 
represented should be more concerned with the international 
complications which would ensue, if the status quo in Turkey 
were in any way altered.
Towards the end of August, the Emperor of Russia, 
accompanied by Lobanow, visited Vienna. There, the Austrian 
and Russian Emperors and their Foreign Ministers agreed that 
Turkey, if left alone from outside interference, was likely 
to maintain itself for a considerable time; everything
/I \
possible should be done to maintain the status quo.' '
The Tsar proceeded to Breslau, where he met the Kaiser, who 
in turn, expressed his desire to maintain the territorial 
status quo in Turkey.' '
Salisbury did not share the views of the Emperors that 
Turkey, if left alone, could survive. He was convinced that 
the Sultan's misgovernment was reducing his Empire to frag­
ments and that it was bound to perish if Europe remained
(1) Monson to Salisbury, 29 Aug., 1896; P.O.7/1243, No.271.
(2) William II to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 Sept., 
1896; GP XI, No. 2861.
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inactive. If it perished in a storm of military mutiny it 
was more likely to create hitter hostility among the Powers 
than if some action were taken to arrest the process of dis­
integration. He felt so strongly on this matter that he 
went so far as to consider the possibility of Britain occupy­
ing some part of Turkish territory. He discussed the subject 
with Rosebery. But the two men, once they leamt of the 
unanimous decision of the Emperors to maintain the territorial 
status quo, decided that any occupation of the territory by 
Britain would mean war with some of them and so that course 
would have to be put a s i d e . T h e  only other mode of acting 
directly against the Sultan was to go "in personam" and not 
"in territorium". Salisbury turned with enthusiasm to the 
idea of deposing the Sultan. He thought that, if the 
present Sultan could be deprived of his position by the 
Powers and, if a new Sultan could be selected according to 
the rule prevalent in the House of Ottoman, the Powers would 
obtain a sure guarantee of good government: the new Sultan,
influenced by the knowledge of his predecessor's fate.
(1) Salisbury to Hicks Beach, 5 Oct., 1896; Hicks Beach 
Papers, P.C.C./69.
(2) The iimnediate reaction of the Emperor William to the 
news of the massacres at Constantinople was: "The Sultan 
must be deposed." GP XII, Nos. 2898 & 2901 footnote.
But Marschall was sTrongly against it.
lascelles to Salisbury, 4 Sept., 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 121, No. 45.
215.
would pay due regard to the advice of the Powers. The
prime aim of Salisbury was, therefore, to bring about a 
change of Sultan. But he had another policy in reserve: 
the instruction of the ambassadors at Constantinople to 
consult together as to the changes which would have to be 
made in the Turkish administration, in order to secure better 
government ; after a preliminary condition had been agreed 
upon that the reforms, once unanimously agreed upon by the 
six Powers, should be enforced by the six, and, if any did 
not like to take an active part in enforcing the reforms, 
he should not hinder the other six from doing so.
Salisbury, having formulated his policy, set to work 
to execute it. By a fortunate coincidence the Tsar was at 
that time at Balmoral on a private visit to Queen Victoria. 
Aware that his programme would have more chance of success 
if the Russian Government's suspicions of British policy 
could be removed, Salisbury went to Balmoral to discuss 
the Eastern question with the Tsar. In the course of two 
long conversation^ the Russian Emperor and the British 
Foreign Minister entered into explanations of the points
(1) Cabinet Memorandum by Salisbury, 29 Sept., 1896 (printed) 
Very Seer.: Salisbury Papers, F.O. (Priv. Corr.) Vol. 89.c.f-
(2) Salisbury to Monson, 23 Sept., I896; F ^ . 7/1240,
No. 112 Very Conf.
216.
about which, they entertained mutual s u s p i c i o n s . T h e n  
Salisbury tried, by means of careful arguments, to persuade 
the Tsar to join in deposing the Sultan. At the first 
interview Nicholas II seemed inclined to agree, but, on 
reflection, he thought that it was "too big a job". He 
thought that the Turks were very likely to refuse to obey 
the successor whom the Powers would put in place of Abdul 
Hamid and then the burden of pacifying and governing the 
Turkish Empire would fall upon the six Powers.
The Tsar had listened attentively to what Salisbury had 
to say. Later, Nicholas II advanced his own view, "on which 
he dwelt at considerable length and was thoroughly in 
earnest."
"It was that the Straits should be under Russian 
control ... The Straits were the door to the 
room in which he lived and he insisted he must 
have the key of that door."
Salisbury pointed out mildly that the Tsar's view implied
that the Sultan had disappeared, for, "while he was there,
it was only he that could have control of the Straits".
The Tsar replied that, to some extent, that was true; he
was forecasting the future. But he could conceive the
Sultan remaining, even though Russia had command of the
Straits:
(1) Cabinet Memorandum by Salisbury, 29 Sept., 1896, No. 20; 
Salisbury Papers, P.O. (Private Correspondence) vol. 89, 
Cabinet Memoranda; cf. AppendixIH, pp.333.-54.4-.
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"Russia did not want Constantinople or any of 
the territory on either side. She only wanted 
the door and the power of fortifying it."
Salisbury quietly interposed by asking how the Tsar thought
Rumania would like such an arrangement or how he thought
Italy and France would like the introduction of a new naval
power into the Mediterranean? Italy had a deep interest in
the question whether she had to defend the long line of her
maritime coast against one Power or two. Salisbury had been
assured by Waddington that France's Mediterranean policy
"was unchanged from what it was at the time of the Crimean
War". Britain herself had a maritime objection to the
establishment of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean,
though Salisbury did not pretend that Britain's maritime
interest in the matter was of so urgent a character as that
of Italy or France. But Salisbury had to consider a more
serious objection and that was the one which came from
Austria. She believed that the master of the Straits would
have full control over the present Turkish dominions, lying
between Bulgaria and the Aegean Sea. Austria could not
allow herself to be surrounded by Russia. Salisbury expressed
"in strong language" his feeling that, after Britain had
pursued the policy of maintaining the status quo in the
Straits question by the side of Austria for so many years,
there would be something of "bassesse" in Britain's conduct,
if she left Austria in the lurch: _
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"I did not see how we could abandon the allies 
by whom we had stood for so long. The task of 
Russian and Austrian statesmen should be to 
see whether there was no contrivance by which, 
not only compensation, but also security could 
be given to Austria, in the case of any such 
change taking place on the disappearance of the 
Turkish Empire. I thought that if Austria,
France and Italy were (in that event) in favour 
of Russia having control of the Straits,
England would not maintain her objection alone, 
but would seek for some arrangement by which 
it could be met."
The words of Salisbury and the Tsar have been quoted 
at length because the exact nature of the conversations at 
Balmoral was, until recently, only a matter of conjecture. 
The discovery of a memorandum of the conversations by 
Salisbury has made possible a more accurate understanding 
of them. The other English source material, which is 
meagre,' ' taken in conjunction with some German documents, 
which are misleading^^^has led even so careful a historian 
as W. L. Langer to the erroneous conclusion that Salisbury, 
in September 1896, was so anxious to bring about an entente 
with Russia that he dangled before the Tsar the prospect of 
concessions in the Straits question.'-'' It is now known
^) The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd. Series (1930) 
vol. Ill, pp. ti2-b.
Salisbury to Iwan-Muller, 31 Aug, 1896; B.D. VI, p. 780. 
Hansard, 4th. Series, XLV, pp. 28-29.
(2) William II to Marschall, 27 Aug., 1896; GP XII, No.2918. 
Chargé d'affaires at London to Hohenlohe, 15 Oct.,
1896; GP. XII, No. 3064.
William II to Hohenlohe, 15 Jan, 1897; XII, No.2932.
(3) W. L. Langer, on.cit; Vol. I, p. 330.
219
that Salisbury quite firmly stated not only Austria's, but 
also Britain's objections to any control of the Straits by 
Russia as long as there was a Sultan at Constantinople. As 
to the situation which would be created on the disappearance 
of the Turkish Empire, Salisbury made it quite clear that 
Britain would withdraw her objection to Russian control of 
the Straits only after she had learnt that Austria, France 
and Italy had withdrawn their objections. Salisbury quali­
fied even this statement:
"I had colleagues and H.M.'s Government had 
allies and past traditions and therefore he 
must not take any expression of opinion as a 
pledge."
The most Salisbury was prepared to offer was that the
Straits should be open to all nations. This concession, he
could offer without any disloyalty to Austria, because he
had learnt from Goluchowski that "if ever, owing to events
which might occur, such a proposal were made, it would not
(1)be one to which Austria would raise any great objection."' ' 
Nicholas II, however, stated emphatically that Russian 
opinion would never accept such an arrangement. The Tsar 
and Salisbury concurred in the view that there seemed no 
cause of opposition between Russia and Britain except the 
question of the Straits. But, as yet, nothing could be done
(1) Milbanke to Salisbury, 15 Sept., I896; F.O.78/4884, 
No. 289, Very Confid.
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to remove this obstacle to complete Anglo-Eussian friendship
It is unlikely that Salisbury ever expected that, at 
this time, he would be able to bring about a complete Anglo- 
Russian entente. His aim was rather to bring about a 
general understanding respecting questions in which Russia 
and England were interested so that it would be easier to 
devise common action at Constantinople.Although 
Salisbury would have preferred to deal with the situation 
there by deposing the Sultai^ as soon as he discovered that 
the Tsar would not assist him, he realised that this 
programme could not be carried out and he reverted to his 
reserve plan, devoting his efforts to securing the assent 
of the Tsar to the "mild dose of coercion" which he thought 
would be essential in order to compel the Sultan to accept 
any changes in the Turkish administration which the ambassa­
dors at Constantinople might, in concert, decide to be 
necessary. At Balmoral, Salisbury succeeded in gaining the 
Tsar's assent to his proposal for coercion "in its most 
homeopathic form".
Austria had already returned a half-favourable answer 
to the same proposal.Fortified by the measure of
(1) Salisbury was following the advice of Nelidov.
Currie to Salisbury, 22 Sept., 1896; F.O.78/4724,
Tel. No. 405 Seer.
(2) Monson to Salisbury, 24 Sept., 1896; F.O.7/1243,
No. 302 Confid.
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success he had thus far achieved, Salisbury launched, on 
20 October, in a circular to the six Powers, his programme 
for maintaining the Ottoman Empire through reform.
The circular is an extremely impressive document. In its 
authoritative tone and masterly survey of the existing 
situation and suggestion of the practical remedy to be 
fi-ppli^ d it was reminiscent of the famous Salisbury circular 
of 1 April, 1878. There were, however, fundamental differ^ 
ences between the situations of I878 and I896. In I878, 
Salisbury's aim was to unite the European Powers in opposi­
tion to Russian encroachments upon the territory of the 
Turkish Empire. In 1896, his aim was to persuade all the 
six Powers, who were already united in their desire to 
maintain the territorial status quo, to work together to 
impose upon the Sultan such reforms as were essential if 
the Ottoman Empire were to be saved from internal decay. 
Salisbury's reform proposal of October I896 differed from 
previous reform proposals in two respects. It envisaged 
reforms not only for the Christian inhabitants of the 
Empire, but for all the subjects of the Sultan - to whatever 
race or religion they might belong. It was distinguished 
by the proviso that the reforms, once unanimously agreed to
(1) Text of Circular in AyP. (1897), ci, 279-283. Extracts 
in W.E. langer, op.cit. Vol. I, pp. 333-334.
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by the six Powers, should be enforced by the six.
The business-like tone assumed by Salisbury in the 
circular has led historians to the conclusion that Salisbury 
was hopeful of achieving his object. But the private papers 
now available reveal the numerous doubts wdth which Salisbury 
was troubled. He was uncertain as to whether the Porte 
retained vital force enough to improve its system of govern­
ment. He knew that, in reality, the Powers had "little 
stomach" for the duty of coercing it and he thought that 
the slaughter of Christians would be likely to go on for 
some time longer, until the growing penury of the Empire 
induced "some ruined Turk to cut the Sultan's throat".
Above all, he very much doubted whether, when it came to 
the point, either Austria- Hungary or Russia would join in 
coercing the Sultan. Salisbury regarded the only certain 
merit of his circular to be that it served to make the 
situation more defined and that it marked time. He was 
quite prepared to find that it would have no other effect.
Salisbury's doubts as to the reliance to be placed 
upon Russia were very soon justified. M. Chichkine, who 
was temporarily in charge of the Russian Foreign Office,
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 22 Sept., 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 31.
(2) Salisbury to Lascelles, 21 Oct., I896; Salisbury Papers,
Vol. 122, No. 9 . o  ^ _
Salisbury to Hicks Beach, 5 Oct., I896; Hicks Beach 
Papers, P.C.C./69.
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told Goschen that the idea of coercion was "extremely dis­
tasteful to the Imperial Government" and that, before coming 
to a decision, they must learn what the other Governments 
thought on the subject.Nelidov, on the other hand, 
told Currie that he was convinced that Turkey was in a 
state of decomposition and that some definite steps should 
be taken by the Powers. He had asked permission to go home 
to explain his views to his Government. Nelidov also stated 
to Currie his belief that it would be easier to carry out 
common action at Constantinople if the Powers first came to 
a decision as to the steps to be taken if the Ottoman 
Empire should collapse. He envisaged "something in the 
nature of an understanding as to the spheres of influence 
within which the Powers would respectively be at liberty 
to interfere in such an eventuality". Currie reported 
this statement to Salisbury, who asked Hatzfeldt if he had 
heard of the rumour that Nelidov had gone to St. Petersburg 
with a ready-made map, indicating the spheres of influence 
to be allotted to the Powers on the occasion of the fall of 
the Turkish Empire. Hatzfeldt replied in the negative, but 
added that Salisbury, no doubt, would like to think that
(1) Goschen to Salisbury, 6 Nov., I896; P.O.65/1517, 
Tel. No. 60.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 3 Nov., I896; P.O.78/4724. 
Priv. tel.
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his (Salisbury* s) desires concerning the Euphrates valley 
would be taken into consideration at St. Petersburg;. 
Hatzfeldt reported home that Salisbury acquiesced with a 
nod of the head, while throwing Hatzfeldt a knowing look.^^^ 
Hatzfeldt was once again very suspicious of Salisbury's 
intentions in the Near East. He had ceased to believe that 
consideration of the interests of Austria-Hungary and Italy 
would prevent the British Government from concluding an 
agreement with Russia. He thought it could scarcely be 
doubted that Salisbury would be disposed to come to a 
peaceful agreement with Russia for the partition of the 
Turkish heritage, if Russia would offer suitable compensa­
tion. On 15 October, in the course of a discussion with 
Lascelles on the unsatisfactory relations existing between 
England and Germany, Hatzfeldt gave it as his opinion that 
this state of affairs was due to:
"The change which took place some years ago in 
England with regard to Turkey. Before then, it 
was a recognized axiom that England would do all 
in her power to maintain the Turkish Empire.
There was now, however, considerable doubt as 
to the line which England would take if the 
Eastern question were reopened." (3)
(1) Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, 22 Lee., I896; G^. XII,
No. 3086.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Lascelles to Salisbury, 15 Oct., I896; P.0.64/1379. 
No. 310 Confid.
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Hatzfeldt personally did not attribute much importance to 
the colonial questions which had arisen between England and 
Germany. "They were not of sufficient importance to bring 
about a permanent estrangement between the two countries."
But it could not be denied that considerable irritation 
existed on both sides and Hatzfeldt repeated his conviction 
that the irritation in Germany arose from the doubts which 
existed there as to the line which England would take if 
the Eastern question were reopened.
Hatzfeldt did not fail to reveal to Beym his suspicions 
of British policy.. The German ambassador said that previously 
Salisbury had always consoled him with the assurance that, 
if he (Salisbury) had a larger majority, he would be prepared 
for anything. But now Salisbury had come to power with a 
colossal majority and had not approached Hatzfeldt.
Beym thought that the distrustful mood recently shown by 
Hatzfeldt might have been brought about by Hatzfeldt*s 
failure to influence Salisbury. Pormerly, persons in the 
confidence of Salisbury had frequently expressed astonish­
ment at the way in which the Poreign Secretary allowed 
himself to be influenced by the German ambassador. But, 
lately, Hatzfeldt had had little success in his efforts in
(1) Beym to Goluchowski, 7 Jan., 1897; A.A. VIII, England, 
Karton 120, Private letter. Very confid.
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this direction.
On 10 December, Hatzfeldt, in a conversation with 
Salisbury, introduced the subject of the Straits, emphasi­
sing the intention which people attributed to Russia of 
assuring for herself free passage through the Dardanelles, 
while forbidding to other Powers accesstc the Black Sea.^^^ 
Hatzfeldt reported Salisbury as saying that Britain could 
not do anything important in such an eventuality, but that, 
probably, in no casé ' would Austria accept suchi action by 
Russia. Hatzfeldt regarded the Minister in astonishment, 
while replying:
"Do you really believe that Austria would be able 
to oppose Russia alone and risk the dangers which 
such an attitude would bring?
Salisbury replied that Germany would stand behind Austria
and Austria would not be alone. Hatzfeldt, not possessing
instructions for discussing the question, was forced to
close the conversation with the remark that the content of
Germany's engagements with Austria was well known and
Salisbury could judge for himself in what measure those
engagements were applicable to the Eastern question.
Goluchowski soon learnt that, on several occasions.
(1) Deym to Goluchowski, 12 Jan., 1897; Ibid. Private 
letter, confid.
(2) Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, 10 Dec., 1896; G.P. XII, 
No. 2929, Strictly Confid.
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Salisbury had observed that Austria would act "in the first 
line" if Russia attempted to alter the status quo in the 
Straits question. When he learnt also that Salisbury was 
apprehensive that, if a great divergence of opinion appeared 
among the ambassadors at Constantinople, when the question 
of compulsory measures against the Sultan came to be dis­
cussed, Russia would proceed alone with compulsory measures 
against Turkey, Goluchowski thought that the time had come 
for an open discussion between the Vienna and London 
Cabinets as to the policy which they would pursue in that 
e v e n t . O n  13 January 1897, Goluchowski told Rumbold 
(the new British ambassador at Vienna) that Salisbury was 
"completely wrong" in his assumption that Austria "would 
step into the first line". Goluchowski held to the opinion, 
which he had always expressed, that it was primarily 
Britain's task to oppose any Russian aggression against 
Constantinople or the Straits. If Austria could obtain an 
assurance that Britain still held to her traditional policy 
and would fight for the defence of Constantinople and the 
Straits, then Austria would be prepared to come to an under­
standing with the London Cabinet as to the way in which she 
could best support Britain. But it was out of the question
(l) Goluchowski to Beym, 13 Jan., 1897; A.A. VIII, 
England, No. 601.
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that Austria would fight for the maintenance of the status 
quo in the Bosphorus, without first receiving an assurance 
that Britain would fight. Austria could not count upon the 
support of Germany and the risk would be too great for any 
Austrian Government to undertake. Goluchowski instructed 
Beym to make this quite clear to Salisbury and, at the same 
time, to ascertain the real attitude of the British Government 
Bor some time, Salisbury had given his serious attention 
to the Straits question. In September, he had learnt that 
General Chickhachev, the Russian chief of staff of the 
Odessa military district, had made a detailed inspection 
of the forts of the Dardanelles, which resulted in the 
Sultan taking additional measures for their defence.
The British Defence Department expressed the opinion that, 
if the forts were under the direction of Russian officers, 
it would not be possible for Britain to force the Dardanelles 
without undergoing considerable l o s s e s . Salisbury was 
at last obliged to recognize that, as time went on, the 
prospects that Britain would ultimately keep the Straits out
(1) Ibid.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 17 Sept., I896; B.C.78/4715, 
No.744, transmitting a letter from the Commander of 
H.M.'s ship "Imogens".
Currie to Salisbury, 1 Dec., I896; B.C.78/4719, 
No. 993 Confid.
(3) Deym to Goluchowski, 21 Jan., 1897î A.A., VIII, 
England, No. 4A-C.
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of Russian hands became fainter and fainter. But the 
chief importance of the attitude which Britain took in the 
Straits'question lay in the fact that it was a "question 
between the alliance of Austria and Russia". Salisbury did 
not believe that Austria would acquiesce in any portion of 
the Straits being surrendered to Russia. Austria was still 
Britain's "only real friend in Europe". Her friendship had 
a certain positive value, because she had influence with 
Germany and because she was a clog to Russia, as long as 
they were opposed. Salisbury shrunk from any action that 
would weaken the tie which bound England and Austria 
together.Therefore, although his hopes that Britain 
could defend the Dardanelles were fainter, he felt he must 
continue "to hold the old language", because, although his 
hopes were fainter, his views of policy were unaltered.
But his loyalty to Austria forced him to explain to Deym 
some of the difficulties of the situation.
On 20 January 1897, Salisbury admitted to Deym the 
interest of England in the Straits question, while maintaining 
that England did not have a more vital interest than Austria
(1) Salisbury to Currie , 23 Nov., 1896; Salisbury Papers,
Vol. 138, No. 34.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 15 Dec., I896; Salisbury Papers,
Vol. 138, No. 35.
(3) Salisbury to Currie, 23 Nov., I896; Salisbury Papers,
Vol. 138, No. 34.
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or Brance.' ‘ There were, however, three considerations 
which altered the condition of the problem from what it had 
been in the l880s: the increased hostility of the British
public towards the Sultan's Government, the fact that the 
Sultan had strongly fortified the Dardanelles and neglected 
to fortify the Bosphorus and the fact that the balance of 
opinion among British nautical experts was strongly 
unfavourable to any attempt to force the Dardanelles by 
action of the fleet alone, without accompanying it by 
military measures against the forts by land. Salisbury 
was careful to point out that he had made this statement 
to Deym before and that it did not mean that Britain 
renounced the right to act if, when the contingency arose, 
it was thought desirable. Salisbury made no kind of pledge 
one way or another: he merely reserved full liberty of
action.
Salisbury afterwards maintained that his statements to 
Deym on 20 January 1897 were precisely the same as those he 
had made in Bebruary 1896:
"There has been no change of tone or policy on
our part." (2)
(1) Salisbury to Rumbold, 20 Jan., 1897; B.0 .78/4884,
No. 6, Very Confid; printed in B.D.IX, part I, p. 775*
( ; Deym to Goluchowski, 21 Jan., 1897; A.A., VIII, 
-England, 4A-C.
(2) Salisbury to Rumbold, 28 Jan., 1897; B.C.7/1261,
Tel. No. 8, Seer.
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But Deym had perceived a change. He pointed out that, in 
Spring 1896, Salisbury had refused to give binding assur­
ances, pledging Britain to go to the defence of the Straits, 
because, he said, the ability of the Government to act would 
depend upon the opinion of the British public when the time 
to act came. In 1897, Salisbury had admitted that the 
position was threatening, but that the events of the past 
year had made the British public so hostile to the Turkish 
Government that no British Government would dare to consider 
undertaking to involve Britain in a war with Russia solely 
for the purpose of maintaining the status quo in Turkey.
In Spring I896, Deym had believed that, under certain con­
ditions, should Russia carry out a coup on Constantinople, 
Salisbury would not accept the situation and that he would 
have the majority of the British people behind him in 
carrying out his policy for the defence of Britain's 
interests in the Mediterranean. But in 1897, Deym had 
received the impression that, although Salisbury himself 
would be prepared to defend Constantinople and the Straits, 
he would be powerless "in the face of English public 
opinion" to take up the fight. Deym reported his opinion 
to Goluchowski, who announced that:
(1) Deym to Goluchowski, 9 Feb., 1897; A.A. VIII, 
England, 7A-E.
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"He could not but feel that there was no counting 
any longer on (Britain's) support in an 
emergency." (1)
Goluchowski requested that Britain's change of attitude
should be kept entirely secret, because, if it became known,
Russia might be encouraged to attempt a coup de m a i n  on
Constantinople.
Goluchowski regretted that he would now be "forced to
forget" the "earlier understanding with Britain". Under
the circumstances, Austria too must retain a completely
free hand. But Goluchowski still thought it desirable to
remain in the most intimate contact with the British Cabinet
respecting the treatment of all questions arising in the
East.(^) He instructed the Austrian ambassador at Berlin
to inform the German Government of the interchange of views
between Vienna and London, but to stress that Goluchowski
had been mainly concerned to disabuse Salisbury of the idea
that Austria would, "in the first line", take up the fight
to defend Constantinople and the Straits. Goluchowski was
satisfied that the necessary clarity as to the respective
(1) Rumbold to Salisbury, 27 Jan., 1897; B.C.7/1255,
No. 30 Seer.
(2) Rumbold to Salisbury, 27 Jan., 1897; B.C.7/1254, 
Paraphrase of tel* No. 30 Seer.
(3) Goluchowski to Deym, 10 Beb., 1897; A.A. VIII, England, 
No. 649 Secret.
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positions of the British and Austrian Governments had been 
achieved and he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet would culti­
vate in the future the most intimate relations with 
Britain.
In actual fact, the "intimate contact" of Britain and 
Austria respecting the treatment of questions arising in the 
East had, throughout the discussions as to the line which 
the Governments would take on the higher planes of policy, 
remained uninterrupted on the lower level of every-day 
diplomatic activity. When the consent of the Russian 
Government to the programme outlined in Salisbury's Circular 
had finally been won, the ambassadors at Constantinople 
had begun their deliberations and had once again arranged 
themselves into groups: Gambon put himself entirely under
the Russian wing and the Austrian, Italian and British 
ambassadors supported one another. On 22 December, Nelidov 
introduced a diversionary proposal respecting the execution 
of the law of I88O for the European provinces, suggesting 
that the step should at once be recommended to the Govern­
ments, leaving other measures to be taken up or not, later.
(1) Goluchowski to SziJgyeny, 3 Feb., 1897; A.A., Berlin 
Embassy Archives, No. 641.
(2) Salisbury to O'Conor, 25 Nov.,, I896; B.C.195/1913,
No. 302.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 24 Dec., I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 136, No. 62.
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Currie met the attack by insisting that the ambassadors* 
recommendations must cover the whole ground of the evils 
to be remedied and that each point should be discussed before 
any conclusions were reached. The strong support of Calice 
and the Italian ambassador enabled Currie to gain his end. 
Calice did not like the idea of the execution of the law for 
the provinces. He thought it would increase the danger of 
serious d i s t u r b a n c e s . C u r r i e  decided to follow Calice*s 
lead on the question, as it so closely concerned Austria's 
interests. Although Currie had gone so far as to draw up a 
formula respecting the execution of the law, which he thought 
would be acceptable to the Governments, he withdrew his 
formula at the request of Calice.
■ The Austrian ambassador, as doyen of the diplomatic 
corps at Constantinople, insisted that everything should be 
done with due deliberation. Each of the ambassadors drew 
up a list of the most crying evils to be remedied and the 
Austrian and Italian ambassadors prepared a memorandum, 
embodying the points mentioned in the list, which served 
as a basis for discussion. All the ambassadors were agreed 
in attributing the worst features of the situation to the
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 25 Dec., 1896; B.C.78/4724,
Tel. No. 497 Seer.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 3 Jan., 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 137, Tel. No. 2.
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interference of the P a l a c e . B y  21 January, a general 
body of opinion was established regarding the questions in ' 
the memorandum. The chief remaining difficulty was the 
financial arrangement. Calice suggested a scheme whereby 
a loan to Turkey, should be raised under the guarantee of 
the Powers, with the stipulation that their delegates 
should supervise the expenditure of it. He thought that 
practical European control of the entire Turkish finances 
would, in a short time, grow out of the arrangement.
Goluchowski and Salisbury were agreed that the scheme 
had little chance of success, because in Britain and Austria 
the consent of Parliament would be necessary before any 
financial assistance could be given to Turkey. Goluchowski 
thought "it was very doubtful whether such consent could be 
obtained";'^' Salisbury was certain that it could not be 
obtained. The British Foreign Secretary pointed out privately 
to Currie the difficulty of adjusting the motions of two 
machines so different as that of the ambassadors* conference 
at Constantinople end Parliament in Britain;
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 27 Dec., 1806; P.O.78/4724,
No. 501 Seer.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 16 Jan., 1897; P.O.78/4813, 
Tel. No. 15 Seer.
(3) Lascelles to Salisbury, 20 Jan., 1897; P.O.64/1409, 
No. 20 Confid.
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"Parliament in its heart of hearts would like 
to see the Turkish Empire disappear, both for 
’ the sake of the pickings and to get rid of 
these intolerable philanthropic agitators.
Therefore, it is not alarmed by the threat 
that, if a certain course is not pursued, the 
Turkish Empire will fall to pieces and it 
will require some very evident advantage, 
sentimental or material, before it will run 
any kind of risks for the Turks." (1)
Currie had anticipated the difficulties, which Salisbury
described and, on 14 January 1897, had initiated a further
discussion of the financial situation. It was then suggested
(and the suggestion was subsequently adopted) that the
situation could be met by the appointment of a permanent
mixed commission - to be composed of Ottoman and European
members in equal numbers (the latter to be named or
accepted by the Powers) - which would study the financial
situation of Turkey, prepare a genuine Budget and supervise
its e x e c u t i o n . S u c h  a commission would certainly not
be accepted by the Sultan without pressure, but the same
could be said of all the reforms which the Powers were about
to propose.
Throughout January and February 1897, Goluchowski had 
not ceased to concern himself with the problem of the 
coercive measures to be applied to the Sultan, if he proved
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 26 Jan., 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 36.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 15 Jan., 1897; F.0.78/4813,
Tel. No. 12, Seer.
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intransigent. , The Austrian Foreign Minister thought that 
it was not sufficient for the Powers to have reached.an 
agreement on the principle of coercion - they must also 
reach an agreement on the exact nature of the coercive 
measures contemplated, before the reforms were presented 
to the Sultan for acceptance.' ' Deym communicated 
Goluchowski*8 opinion to Salisbury, who called it a "very 
Dappy idea". At first Salisbury suggested that the dis­
cussions as to the most suitable coercive measures to be 
applied should be left to the ambassadors at Constantinople. 
He assured Deym that he would instruct Currie to support 
Calice warmly, if the latter suggested that the ambassadors 
should discuss the s u b j e c t . B u t  Goluchowski thought 
that Currie should introduce the subject. Goluchowski con­
sidered that it fell naturally to the British ambassador to 
take the initiative in the discussion of coercive measures, 
because they had been suggested by Salisbury in his Circular 
of October 1896. The most pressing reason for Goluchowski*s 
desire that Currie should take the initiative was that such 
action would bind the British Cabinet more tightly and would 
compel them morally to act in the case of a Russian advance
(1) Goluchowski to Deym, 13 Jan., 1897, A.A. YjTII, England, 
No. 601.
(2) Deym to Goluchowski, 28 Jan., 1897; Ibid. Tel. No. 13 
, Very Confid.
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against the S t r a i t s . O n  5 February, however, Deym found 
that Salisbury advocated that the Powers themselves should 
discuss the nature of the coercive measures, which they 
might employ; although Salisbury, told Deym that he would 
not mind leaving the discussion to the ambassadors, if 
Goluchowski thought that that v;ould be more appropriate.
The communications between London and Vienna indicate 
how close the contact between the two Cabinets remained 
throughout the period when Goluchowski was suffering dis­
appointment as a result of his failure to gain explicit 
assurances that England would defend Constantinople and the 
Straits. The confidential nature of the communications shows 
that Goluchowski was still determined to work closely with 
England in the management of the affairs of the East. He 
still hoped that, although Salisbury would not formally 
commit England to fight to defend Constantinople and the 
Straits, if a dangerous situation were to develop at Con­
stantinople in a certain way, a change would occur in 
English public opinion and "the English guns would go off 
thems elve s".  ^^  ^
(1) Goluchowski to Calice, 5 Feb., 1897; A.A.I, karton 462,
No. 642.
(2) Deym to Goluchowski, 5 Feb., 1897; A.A.,VIII, England,
Tel. No. 21 Very confid.
(3) Goluchowski to Galice, 5 Feb., 1897; A.A.I, karton 462,
No. 642.
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The discussions as to coercive measures to be used to 
press the Sultan to execute the reforms, drawn up by the 
ambassadors, were brought to an abrupt conclusion when it 
was learnt that the real object of Nelidov, in visiting St. 
Petersburg, had been to persuade the Russian Government to 
take advantage of the situation, as it might develop at 
Constantinople, to occupy the northern sKorea of the 
Bosphorus. ' The situation was so delicate that the Powers 
thought it better to let matters rest. The British Channel 
squadron was sent on a "visit" to Gibraltar, so that the 
ships of that squadron could be available for use in the 
Medi ter ranean.Once the leakage of "the Nelidov plan" 
had occurred, the Russian Government decided that it was too 
dangerous to execute it and no action was taken. But the 
fears which the knowledge of the plan had aroused in the 
minds of the Foreign Ministers of other countries and the 
outbreak of serious trouble in Crete resulted in the dropping 
of the reform scheme, which had been completed by the 
ambassadors in February. In October Salisbury wrote to
(1) The subject is fully discussed in W.L. Langer,
The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit, Vol ,1, pp. 336-349•
(2) Ibid. p. 349.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 10 Feb., 1897; F.0.78/4797, No. 88, 
Seer., transmits copy of the proposals, signed by the
six ambassadors at Constantinople on 8 Feb., respecting 
the introduction of reforms into Turkey.
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Currie that he supposed that the reforms might "he considered 
as relegated to the Greek K a l e n d s " . T h e  Powers could only 
hope that, by judicious management, an acute crisis in the 
internal affairs of Turkey might be averted.
(1) Salisbury to Currie, 19 Oct., 189?/Vol. 138, No. 43.
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CHAPTER VII 
The Shadow of the Dreikaiserbiind.
If the Powers had really believed that the settlement 
which they negotiated between the Sultan and the Cretans in 
September I896 would be lasting, they were very soon dis­
appointed. In February 1897 serious disturbances again 
broke out in Crete and on this occasion the situation was 
rendered more critical by the active intervention of Greece 
On 6 February, the insurgent leaders in Crete declared 
union with Greece and appealed to the King of the Hellenes 
to assume possession of the island. Four days later.
Prince George, the second son of the King, left Greece for 
Crete with four torpedo boats. The Prince did not land on 
the island; but Colonel Vassos, who left Greece on 
13 February, with I5OO men, landed at Canea and joined the 
insurrectionary f o r c e s . T h e r e  was considerable unrest 
in Serbia, Bulgaria and Macedonia and it seemed likely that 
the flame, lit in Crete, would set ablaze the whole of the 
Balkan peninsula. The only hope for the localization of
(1) Colonel Vassos had orders to occupy Crete in the name 
of King George of Greece.
cf. G.S. Papadopoulos, England and the Near East, 
1896-98. an unpublished Ph.D. thesis of the University 
of London, 1950, pp. 210-211.
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the conflict lay in the action the Great Powers might take.
All the Great Powers condemned the Greek expedition to 
Crete, and none so violently as Germany. On 12 February 
Marschall reminded Lascelles that it was in consequence of 
the representations of the Powers that the Sultan had with­
drawn most of his troops from Crete. While Marschall was 
strongly of the opinion that the Sultan should not be 
allowed to send more troops to Crete, as that would probably 
be the occasion for fresh massacres, Marschall believed that, 
if the Powers prevented the Sultan from sending troops:
"They were equally bound, by every consideration 
of honour and fair dealing, to prevent a Power 
or rather an impotence, like Greece, from taking
advantage of the military weakness of the Sultan,
which was due to their action, to annex Turkish 
territory." (2)
If the annexation of Crete by Greece were permitted by the
Powers, it would be the beginning of the dismemberment of
the Turkish Empire, as Bulgaria and Serbia would certainly
demand compensation for the aggrandisement of Greece and
would be encouraged to seize portions of Macedonia. It
was evident that diplomatic representations and remonstrances
at Athens would have no practical result: active measures
were necessary. On 14 February, William II, who was very
(1) W.L. Langer, op.cit, vol. I, pp. 355-360.
(2) Lascelles to Salisbury, 12 Feb., 1897; F.0.64/1409,
No. 42 Confid.
243.
hostile to King George of Greece, took the matter out of the
hands of his Ministers and began his personal conduct of the
affair by suggesting that the Powers should blockade the
coast of G r e e c e . T h e  Continental Governments immediately
reacted favourably to the Kaiser*s suggestion, but Salisbury
was more cautious in his comment. He said that he saw
"little objection", thus implying that he saw some objection.
William II took Salisbury*s reply as a personal insult and
became violently excited against England, whom he accused of
following a selfish policy and wishing to fish in troubled
(2)
waters.' The Kaiser complained to Prince Christian that 
he could never obtain a definite answer from Salisbury, 
lascelles reported privately that the Kaiser's suspicions of 
England appeared "to verge on i n s a n i t y " . T h e  ambassador 
urgently requested Salisbury to send him instructions which 
would enable him to allay William II's apprehensions.
- The situation presented considerable difficulties for 
Salisbury. In England, there was much sympathy for Greece; 
it was part of the classical tradition and part of the 
political credo of those who prided themselves on their
(1) A & P (1898), cvi, 390-391.
(2) lascelles to Salisbury, 16 Feb., 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 121, No. 52.
(3) Ibid.
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championship of enlightened i d e a s . O n e  of the sisters
of the King of Greece was married to the Prince of Wales
and the eldest son of the King was married to the daughter
of the Empress Frederick,eldest daughter of Queen Victoria.
The English Queen received many letters from her Greek
relatives, which she constantly pressed upon Salisbury. In
the Cabinet, the Liberal Unionist element, Balfour, Goschen
and Hicks Beach expressed themselves strongly against a
blockade of Greece. The prevalent opinion was that no
blockade of Greece should be considered until the future of
Crete had been resolved. Although Crete should remain a
portion of the Ottoman Empire, it should not remain under
the Turkish Government, but it should become a privileged
(2 )province.' ' The British Cabinet's decision was communicated 
in a Circular to the ambassadors abroad.
- When Rumbold informed Goluchowski of Britain's views 
and told him that he was instructed by Salisbury to request 
his opinion upon them, Rumbold stressed that Salisbury, in 
desiring Goluchowski*s opinion, "was marking the value" he 
attached "to the agreement of views which generally existed
(1) W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit, 
vol. I, p. 360.
(2) The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd. Series, vol. Ill,
p. 133.
(3) Circular tel., A. & P . (I898), cvi, 411.
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between the two Governments in the affairs of the East."(^) 
Although Salisbury had, in January, refused to give definite 
pledges that Britain would defend Constantinople and the 
Straits, and although Britain and Austria had j u f e r : reserved 
for themselves complete liberty of ac t i o n , S a l i s b u r y  and 
Rumbold were clearly hoping that Britain and Austria would 
associate closely in the negotiations for the settlement of 
the Cretan question. Goluchowski, however, was very 
definitely of the opinion that the most important considera­
tion was that Greece should not be permitted to derive any 
immediate advantage from her ill ■•‘Considered action and that 
the principle of the status quo should be carefully guarded 
He agreed with the Germans that if Greece were allowed to 
gain her end in the face of the opposition of the Powers, 
the moral bankruptcy of the Powers would be proved. While 
Goluchowski was ready to mediate between Germany and Britain 
in order to find some compromise measure upon which the 
Powers could base their action, the Austrian Minister was 
more in sympathy with the German than with the British
(1) Rumbold to Salisbury, 18 Peb., 1897; P.O.7/1255, 
No. 52, Confid.
(2)' cf. pp.
(3) Rumbold to Salisbury, 18 Peb., 1897, P.0 .7/1255, 
No. 52 Confid.
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attitude.
The Russians finally took the initiative in proposing 
that there should h# no annexation of Crete, hut the island 
should be given autonomy and that an ultimatum should be 
sent to Greece, requiring the Government to withdraw its 
troops, failing which "suitable rigorous measures" would 
be used in the form of a blockade of the Piraeus or direct 
action against the Greek forces in C r e t e . T h e  Russian 
suggestion was accepted by all the Powers and it was embodied 
in two identic notes presented to the Greek and Turkish 
Governments on 2 M a r c h . T h e  Turks accepted, but the 
Greeks refused and continued to demand the annexation of 
Crete on the basis of a plebiscite, with Greek troops 
remaining on the island until it was pacified.
There followed long discussions among the Powers as to 
the measures to be taken to compel Greece to submit to their 
demands. In the course of the discussions the isolation of 
Britain was many times demonstrated. It was true that 
Salisbury was in complete agreement with the Continental
(1) Rumbold to Salisbury, 12 Peb., 1897; P.O.7/1255,
No. 45 Confid.
(2) Muraviev to Be Staal, 23 Peb., 1897; P.0.65/1543, tel.
(3) Text of notes in A.& P . (1897), cii (0-8333), 3-5.
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Powers that the integrity of the Turkish Empire should he
preserved. When Kimberley, at the annual gathering of the
National liberal Federation, repudiated any policy that had
as its basis the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
Salisbury was seriously disturbed. On 19 March, in the
House of Lords, the Foreign Secretary commented caustically
on Kimberley*s announcement;
"If the policy adopted for so many years by his 
party is to be given up because of tv/o or three 
condemnatory events in the Turkish Empire, then 
I think the policy was either very lightly 
adopted or very lightly abandoned." ,
Salisbury considered that Kimberley* s declaration was a
"heavy blow" to British policy and he stressed that he
separated himself "as strongly as possible" from it.^^^
But at the same time as he upheld the integrity of the
Turkish Empire, Salisbury considered it essential that
"a bridge of gold" should be made for^Greece in order to
enable her to retire from the position into which her rash
action had precipitated her. Salisbury advocated that the
Greek suggestion that their troops should be employed to
preserve order in Crete should be considered by the Powers.
He believed that, if the Greek forces were divided among the
(1) The Timest 18 March 1897.
(2) Hansard. 4th Series XLVIII, 1009-1014.
As G.S. Papadopoulos has pointed out in his thesis, 
England and the Near East. 1896-98. p. 234, this speech 
should be read in conjunction with Salisbury's "wrong 
horse" speech of 19 Jan., 1897.
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Great Powers and placed under European officers, the
gendarmerie force so constituted would he the most effective
body of police that could be organized and in this way the
subsequent restoration of Crete to the Sultan * s authority
would not be e n d a n g e r e d . T h e  Continental Powers objected
to the idea of using the Greek troops as a gendarmerie force
(2 )and their objections prevailed.'* / As Salisbury remarked to 
the Russian ambassador, he could not expect his suggestion 
to be adopted "if, as it appeared, it was resisted by Russia, 
Germany and Austria.
The three Powers were determined that Greece should be 
coerced and they wished for an immediate blockade of the 
Piraeus. Salisbury felt unable to promise that Britain 
would participate in the blockade unless he was first assured 
that Crete would be occupied by the European Powers. He 
adopted a proposal - already made by Russia^^)- for the 
military occupation of Crete by a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 
men, the force being furnished by Prance and Italy conjointly:
(1) Salisbury to O'Conor, 9 March, 1897; P.O.65/1535, 
Tel. No. 104 (Paraphrase).
(2) Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 11 March, 1897; 
G.P. XII, vol. II, No. 3184.
(3) Salisbury to O'Conor, 11 March, 1897; P.0.65/1535, 
Tel. No. 110.
(4) O'Conor to Salisbury, 10 March, 1897; P.0.65/1536, 
Tel. No. 19.
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Austria and Germany had already declared themselves unwilling
to send troops. Britain was willing to agree that Crete
should be occupied by 5,000 Frenchmen and 5,000 Italians
or by 10,000 of either Power alone; or by 5,000 Russians
and 5,000 Englishmen or by 10,000 of either Power alone.
Unless such an occupation was agreed upon, Britain would be
compelled to confine herself to the blockade of Crete alone(^^
The announcement was very unfavourably received by the
Continental Powers* Russia pretended that she had never
made such a p r o p o s a l . E v e n  Goluchowski, who had up till
this time tried to keep Germany and Britain from moving too
far apart, condemned the British reply. He accused
Salisbury of receding from his recently avowed intention of
blockading the Greek coast. He complained that the British
decision would increase the suspicions, already prevalent
on the Continent, that Britain
"had some deep design in allowing the existing 
complications to increase, that in short 
/Britain w a ^  playing for /Eer7 own hand 
instead of working disinterestedly with the 
other Powers for pacification and for the 
general peace." (3)
(1)n Salisbury to O'Conor, iB March, 1897; P.0.65/1535, 
Tel. No. 121.
(2) O'Conor to Salisbury, 17 March, 1897; P.0,65/1531, 
Not :70 Confid.
(3) Rumbold to Salisbury, 17 March, 1897; P.O.7/1256, 
No. 100 Very Confid.
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As a result of Britain's policy, the Powers were forced to
limit themselves to a minimum programme of announcing the
granting of autonomy to Crete, of proclaiming the blockade
of the island and of despatching 600 troops each - except
for Germany and Austria.
On 25 March Salisbury left England for Beaulieu. He
interrupted his journey to have an interview with the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hanotaux, during which
the Cretan question was fully discussed.Salisbury's
aim was to gain the co-operation of France and Russia for
the settlement of the question. But France would not act
without Russia and Russia was most reluctant to part company
(with Austria and Germany.'-'' Under the circumstances, 
Britain was forced to keep within the Concert in order to 
avoid public isolation. When, on 30 March, Russia again 
came forward with the proposal that the Piraeus should be 
blockaded, Salisbury signified his readiness to a g r e e .
Britain was now placing her hopes for the solution of
(1) G.S. Papadopoulos, op.cit., p. 231.
(2) Hanotaux to Montebello, 26 March 1897, Conflit Gréco- 
Turc pp. 230-31.
Ibid. p. 237.
(3) The letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd. Series, Vol. Ill, 
p. 149.
(4) O'Conor to Salisbury, 30 March, 1897; F.0 .65/1536. 
Tel. No. 30.
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the difficulty on negotiations at Constantinople. If the 
Sultan could be persuaded to accept a programme which would 
ensure a satisfactory regime in Crete and if he would with­
draw all Turkish troops, Greece might find the "golden 
bridge" which would enable her to r e t i r e . C u r r i e ,  aided 
by his French and Italian colleagues, worked towards this 
end. They succeeded in persuading the other ambassadors to 
join them in drawing up recommendations for Cretan autonomy 
which they submitted to their Governments. The crucial 
point was the selection of a governor. The only person who 
might reconcile Crete to the Sultan's suzerainty was Prince 
George; but, in view of the difficulty of persuading the 
Sultan to accept a Greek nominee, it was thought better 
that his election should be ensured without mentioning his 
name. The fourth article of the ambassadors' recommendations, 
therefore, provided for the election of a ruler "on princi­
ples analogous to those adopted for Bulgaria". The Austrian 
Government accepted this recommendation in principle, but 
nullified it in practice by declaring itself opposed to the
(1) Sanderson to Salisbury, 30 March, 1897; F.O.78/4891. 
Tel. No. 14.
Salisbury to Sanderson, 31 March 1897; Ibid.
(2) Conflit Gréco-Turc, p. 274.
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election of any member of the Greek royal f a m i l y . N o n e  
of the European Governments was enthusiastic about the 
ambassadors' recommendations; even Salisbury did not regard 
the fourth article as practicable. There was a general 
feeling that the only way out of the impasse lay in a 
resort to arms. On 12 April Salisbury wrote to Sanderson 
that he thought that Germany and Austria meant that there 
should be a fight upon the Macedonian frontier and that 
the "Greeks should get thrashed; they will make no effort 
to escape from that r e s u l t . N o  one was surprised when, 
on 17 April, the Ottoman Government declared war on Greece.
During the preceding years the Turkish army had been 
thoroughly re-organised by General von der Goltz Pasha who, 
immediately before the outbreak of hostilities, accepted 
the local command-in-chief of Turkish troops. They were 
issued with Mauser rifles and they went to war so well- 
equipped and so well-disciplined that their superiority 
over the Greek forces was very quickly demonstrated during 
the campaigns in Thessaly and E p i r u s . W i t h i n  a few days
(1) Rumbold to Salisbury, 12 April, 1897. P.0.7/1261.
Tel. No. 45 Seer.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 13 April, 1897; P.O.78/4811.
Tel. No. 13.
(3) Salisbury to Sanderson, 12 April, 1897, Sanderson Papers.
(4) W.D. Danger, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit.
Vol.I, pp. 369-72.
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it was obvious that the Greeks would be hopelessly defeated. 
The Germans looked upon such an event with equanimity, but 
Britain could not allow the complete defeat of Greece. On 
19 April, Queen Victoria told Salisbury that she thought 
it would be necessary for Britain to take action "regard­
less of Germany (who has been behaving so ill), in order 
to stop further bloodshed." Salisbury replied that the 
time was coming when Britain would "have to break away from 
Germany and Austria, but not quite yet. " Four days 
later, however, Salisbury telegraphed hastily to Russia 
proposing that a conference of ambassadors should be held 
at Paris to discuss terms of peace, without waiting for the 
conclusion of an armistice. When Salisbury made the 
same suggestion to Hanotaux, the latter expressed his belief 
that an armistice should be sought f i r s t . S a l i s b u r y  then 
suggested that if Britain, France and.Russia, "as the Powers 
by whom Greece was created at and after Navarino, should 
propose an armistice at Constantinople" that would enable 
them "to turn the German difficulty".(^) Hanotaux
(1) The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd. Series, Vol. Ill 
p. 151.
(2) Salisbury to O'Conor, 23 April, 1897; Tel. A & P .
(1898) Gvi, 556. Ibid. pp. 152-153.
(3) Monson to Salisbury, 24 April, 1897; F.O.27/3316,
No. 293, Seer, and Confid.
(4) Salisbury to Monson, 25 April, 1897; F.O.27/3321.
Tel. (no number).
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doubted whether Russia would venture upon any action inde­
pendently of Germany, for the latter carried Austria with 
her and Russia would fear the antagonism of the two.
At first it seemed as though Hanotaux*s doubts were unfounded, 
for, on 26 April, Muraviev and the Tsar accepted Salisbury's 
suggestion "in principle",^^^but three days later Russia 
"backed out". The Russian Government announced that it 
considered that it would be best:
"that the Cabinets of all the powers who are 
willing to participate should continue to 
treat directly between them respecting the 
steps to be taken for the re-establishment of 
peace." (4)
In the interval between Russia accepting and then 
rejecting Salisbury's proposal an important event took 
place in the form of the state visit to St. Petersburg of 
the Austrian Emperor, accompanied by Goluchowski, Baron 
Zwiedenek (head of the Oriental Department at the Ballplatz) 
and Baron de Beck (the Austrian Chief of Staff).
(1) Monson to Salisbury, 25 April, 1897; P.0.27/3322.
Tel. No. 104 Most Conf.
(2) O'Conor to Salisbury, 26 April, 1897; P.O.65/1536.
Tel. No. 46.
(3) letters of Queen Victoria. 3rd. Series, Vol. Ill, p.156.
(4) O'Conor to Salisbury, 29 April; 1897, P.0.65/1536. No. 50.
(5) Rumbold to Salisbury, 30 April, 1897; P.O.7/1256.
No. 150 Very Confid.
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Austrian advice may have been responsible for the backing 
down of Russia: on 28 April, 0'Conor had an audience with
Prancis Joseph during which the Emperor laid such stress 
upon "the importance of maintaining the concert of the 
Powers" that O'Conor presumed that he was aware of Salisbury's 
proposal and disapproved of it. An official of the German 
embassy at St. Petersburg wrote home that Salisbury's 
proposal had caused "a great sensation in well-informed 
circles":
"The British attempt to settle with Russia and 
Prance, over the head of Austria-Hungary,
.  ^ questions which especially affect the Empire
on the Danube - this deceitful blow ... calcu­
lated simply to push the Triple Alliance 
states out of the Areopagus of Europe, will 
have strangled in the Austro-Hungarian states­
man the last of the Anglophil feelings which 
might still survive from the beginning of his 
official activities and have made him all the 
more ready for an unreserved understanding with 
Russia." (2)
Of all the political combinations open to Austria- 
Hungary, Goluchowski would undoubtedly have preferred, even 
at this time, a close association of Austria-Hungary and her 
two partners in the Triple Alliance with Britain. But 
Germany was now openly hostile to Britain and ostentatiously 
friendly with Russia. Once Goluchowski had tried and failed
(1) O'Conor to Salisbury, 28 April, 1897, P.0.65/1536,
Tel. No. 48.
(2) Tschirschky to von Hohenlohe, 1 May 1897; G.P. XII (11), 
412-415, and the Emperor's marginal notes.
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to gain explicit assurances from Britain respecting the 
line which she would take with relation to Constantinople 
and the Straits, Goluchowski felt compelled to follow the 
advice of Berlin and to turn to Russia in the hope of 
arriving at some general understanding on Eastern affairs.
The reception which Goluchowski met with at St. Petersburg 
surpassed all his expectations in its cordiality. Goluchowski 
and Muraviev found little difficulty in arriving at a 
"gentleman's understanding". It was expressed in two 
despatches: one from the Austro-Hungarian Government to
St. Petersburg and the other - sent in reply by the Russian 
G o v e r n m e n t . T h e  basis of the agreement was the idea of 
maintaining the status quo in the Balkans as long as circum­
stances would permit. An important feature of it was the 
mutual recognition by the two Powers that the question of 
Constantinople and the Straits, having an eminently 
European character, was "not of a nature to be made the 
object of a separate understanding between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia". But Maraviev did declare that Russia held 
to the complete maintenance of the treaties relating to 
the Straits as they "gave full ... satisfaction to Russia
(1) W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp.cit., 
vol. I, pp. 374-375.
(2) A.P. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary. 
op.cit., vol. I, pp. 185-95.
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in prohibiting, by the closure of the Straits, access to 
the Black Sea to foreign war vessels." Bases of understanding 
were also established regarding the Balkan territories. The 
two Ministers immediately acted upon the understanding by 
sending to their representatives in the Balkan capitals 
telegrams, stating that they would not allow "even the 
least movement in the B a l k a n s " . I t  was largely due to 
their persistent warnings that the Graeco-Turkish conflict 
remained localised and that Bulgaria and Servia were forced 
to be satisfied with concessions in the way of bishoprics.
At the time of the Imperial visit to Russia, the Perma­
nent Under-Secretary at the Vienna Poreign Office had an 
important conversation with Rumbold in which he stressed 
that the fact of Austria's drawing nearer to Russia should 
not be interpreted as a "cooling down" towards Britain. 
Although there was considerable disappointment in Vienna 
that Britain.had not seen fit to enter into an engagement 
with Austria, Count Welserheimb thought that, in spite of 
this, the time-honoured tradition of friendship between the 
two Governments was sufficiently strong to continue.
(1) W.B. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, op.cit., 
vol. I, p. 374.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 27 April, 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
;Vol. 137, No. 13.
(3) Rumbold to Salisbury, 30 April, 1897; P.0.7/1256,
No. 150 Very Confid.
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Salisbury could not but welcome the Austro-Russian agreement,
in so far as it was & contribution to the maintenance of
p e a c e ; b u t  the drawing together of Austria-Hungary,
Russia and Germany made any solution of the Cretan question
on the lines which Britain desired much more difficult. A
forecast of what was to come was provided by an article in
the Keue Prei Presse of 27 April:
■ • ■  ^ ■ - . -
"Indeed both in Paris and in London the question 
of intervention (between the Turks and Greeks) 
is on all sides discussed, but it remains to be 
seen whether these utterances will find an echo 
at the three Imperial Courts. In the form in 
which these opinions are expressed the reply 
must be certainly not. They demand that the 
uplifted arm of recklessly provoked Turkey 
should be stayed by means of an intervention 
which conquered Greece has not yet solicitated.
Until it has become plain at Athens that Greece ... 
deserves the chastisement which has befallen her 
••• the three Imperial Governments will scarcely
care to take any steps to liberate her from the
Turkish scourge. To this point of view the
remaining Powers must consent, unless they wish 
to learn by experience that the three Imperial 
Governments are resolved to carry out without 
them that Eastern policy upon which they have 
agreed in the interests of Euopean peace." (2)
The Austro-Hungarian and German Governments lost no time in
making it known that the proposal for an armistice would
have to be begged for by Greece with the promise that she
would unconditionally submit to the verdict of the Powers,
(1) Deym to Goluchowski, 13 May, 1897; A.A. VIII, England, 
karton 120, No. 19B, Confid.
(2) Extract enclosed in Rumbold to Salisbury, 28 April, 
1897; P.0.7/1256, No. 155 Confid.
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■before they i nt e r v e n e d . S a l i s b u r y  was helpless in the
face of the united front presented by the Continental
Governments. In a despatch to Egerton he acknowledged that
Austria-Hungary and Germany were masters of the situation:
"Without their concurrence Russia and Prance will 
not act; and the Sultan would pay no regard to 
any mediation which was not supported by all the 
Powers." (2)
All that Salisbury could do was to strongly advise Greece 
to yield.
The Sultan was not slow to realise that the international 
situation was favourable to himself and when the ambassadors 
at Constantinople were finally instructed to arrange an 
armistice and terms of peace, they found that the Sultan's 
demands were high: he asked for the retrocession of Thessaly
and the payment of a considerable i n d e m n i t y . A l l  the 
Great Powers were agreed that the Sultan should not receive 
the whole of Thessaly; but, with the' exception of Britain, 
they showed a strange reluctance to contemplate measures to 
force Turkey to moderate her demands. Indeed, the role of 
Britain and the other Powers within the European concert
(1) The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd. Series, Vol. Ill, 
pp. 159-160.
(2) Salisbury to Egerton, 9 May, 1897; P.0 .32/699. Tel. 
No. 135: quoted by G.S. Papadopoulos, op.cit., p. 269.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 15 May, 1897; Tel. A & P . (1898) 
cvi, p. 608.
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was now completely reversed: when it was a question of
coercing Greece, Britain was hesitant and the other Powers 
were urgent;. but now that it was a question of putting 
pressure on Turkey, the Continental Powers found excuse/ to 
procrastinate v/hile Britain urged the expediency of rapid 
action.
: The great difficulty lay in finding an area within the
Ottoman Empire where force could be used without arousing
the fears of the European Powers. Salisbury discussed the
problem in a telegram to O'Conor of 15 May. He realised
that no means of coercing the Sultan by land existed, except
at the cost of a difficult and expensive campaign. But very
easy means existed of coercing the Sultan by sea: viz naval
action in the Bosphorus. This action could not at once be
applied because the Powers, and principally England and
Russia, were afraid of suffering some, damage from the
presence of others in the Bosphorus. Salisbury thought
that it was time
"for England and Russia to consider whether it 
is not possible to devise some form of agreement 
which would enable them, in company with any
(1) Salisbury to the Prince of Wales, 15 July, 1897;
Salisbury Papers, Cabinet Memoranda:
"With regard to Turkey, there was a strong 
disposition evident (in the Cabinet) to take 
drastic measures if the Sultan refuses to 
accede to the present proposals."
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other Powers who may wish to co-operate, to 
send a limited number of ships to anchor before 
Yildiz." (1)
He instructed O'Conor to speak in the above sense to Muraviev 
As the British ambassador was ill and unable to leave his 
room, he sent Goschen to talk to Muraviev in the sense of 
Salisbury's telegram, but with the recommendation that 
Goschen should be cautious and be guided as to the language 
he used by the tone which Muraviev adopted in preliminary 
conversation. It was as well that O'Conor had advised 
caution, for Muraviev, although sharing Salisbury's opinion 
that Turkey should not have Thessaly, was convinced that 
the Sultan would not persist in his demand "in the face of 
the well-known opposition of all the Powers". If, contrary 
to his belief, the Sultan remained obstinate, Muraviev 
thought that coercive measures should be resorted to only 
after every means of persuasion had failed and "after the 
most careful consideration by all the Great Powers 
together." In view of the pointed manner in which Muraviev 
made the last statement, Goschen realised that Salisbury's 
proposal had little chance of being favourably received and 
he closed the conversation by reiterating that the British 
Government would not consent to any condition of peace
(1) Salisbury to O'Conor, 15 May, 1897; P.0 .65/1533,
Tel. No. 244 Confid.
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involving the retrocession of Thessaly.
Although the ambassadors at Constantinople succeeded 
in arranging an armistice between Turkey and Greece on 
19 Ifey,' ' the negotiations as to the Thessalian frontier 
continued all through the summer. The military attaches 
of the Powers prepared a map showing a strategical frontier 
line which they regarded as just, but the Sultan held out 
for a frontier which would give to Turkey a number of Greek 
towns and v i l l a g e s . M e d i a t i o n  at Constantinople was a 
slow process due to the difficulties raised by the Germans. 
Currie was disgusted with their conduct. He wrote privately 
to Salisbury condemning the way in which they frequently 
tried to "curry favour" with the Sultan by taking the lead 
in holding out hopes of concessions which they had neither 
the intention nor the power of granting:
"The Germans are playing a shabby game here."^^)
The German ambassador was absolutely forbidden to agree, 
without referring for instructions, to any written
(1) O'Conor to Salisbury, 1? May, 1897; P.0 .65/1536,
Tel. No. 59 Confid.
. O'Conor to Salisbury, 17 May, 1897; P.0 .65/1532,
No. 112 Confid.
(2) G.S. Papadopoulos, op.cit., p. 272.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 21 June, 1897; P.O.78/4814.
Tel. No. 417.
(4) Currie to Salisbury, 4 June, 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 137, No. 16.
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communication to the Porte. When the other ambassadors
pressed Baron Saurma to let them send in what was little
more than an acknowledgement of receipt. Saurma replied
mournfully:
"Ah I daresay it is nothing to you if I am 
dismissed from my post, but it is a great 
deal to me!" (1)
The other ambassadors, being gentlemen of the old school,
"could say no more".
By the second week in July, it seemed that the spirit
of resistance to the demands of the Powers was growing in
Turkey and that it was being stimulated by the Sultan himself.
Under these circumstances, the ambassadors became convinced
that the negotiations would never be brought to a satisfactory
conclusion until the Powers came to an agreement to apply
coercion, if n e c e s s a r y . O n  19 July they sent identic
telegrams to their Governments in this s e n s e . M u r a v i e v
was very unfavourably impressed by the telegrams. He thought
that the ambassadors ought to have proceeded more calmly.
He was still convinced that the Sultan would give way
(1) Ibid. Por Currie's complaints of the attitude of the 
Germans, see also Currie to Salisbury, 2 July, 9 Jnly and 
19 Aug., 1897. Ibid, Nos. 21, 22 and 32.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 13 July, 1897; P.O.78/4814,
• Tel. No. 454.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 19 July, 1897, P.O.78/4814, No.471.
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without the Powers having to resort to actual menaces.
The opinion of Salisbury that a naval demonstration inside
the Straits would be the most effective means of breaking
the Sultan's resistance^^^must have become known in St.
Petersburg; for, Muraviev told O'Conor that
"Russia would not consent to coercion entailing 
hostile naval cation against Constantinople and 
the passage of the Dardanelles by foreign ships 
of war, being contrary to the conditions of the 
^ Treaty of Paris, would compel her to take 
measures on her own account." (2)
Muraviev made doubly certain that this view would be known
in London, by sending a telegram to M. de Staal in the same
ny
sense.'"' He also instructed his ambassador in Berlin to 
inform the German Government that the Russian Government 
would consider the passage of foreign ships of war through 
the Dardanelles to be a violation of the Treaties and that, 
in that case, Russia would take "ses propres mesures". 
O'Conor thought that Muraviev's object was to show the 
European Powers that "Constantinople was in a special and 
particular manner under the aegis of Russia.
(1) Memorandum by Sanderson, 9 July, 1897; P.0 .78/4846.
(2) O'Conor to Salisbury, 20 July, 1897; P.O.65/1536,
Tel. No. 70.
(3) Seer. tel. of Count Muraviev to de Staal, 21 July 1897; 
P.0.65/1543 (duplicate).
(4) O'Conor to Salisbury, 22 July, 1897; P.0 .65/1533,
No. 166 Confid.
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Currie believed that the German Embassy at Constantinople 
informed the Porte that the Powers were discussing the 
possibility of the use of coercion, for, by 23 July, Turkish 
public opinion was being prepared for peace. In view of 
the extremely uncertain attitude taken by the European 
Powers to the ambassadors* hint of the possible necessity 
of coercion, this was fortunate. Currie hoped that it might 
never "be revealed to mankind that the Concert of Europe was 
so little behind it."
The position of the British Embassy at Constantinople, 
in view of the new state of affairs arising out of the 
success of Turkey in the war against Greece, was a matter 
of concern to Currie in the summer of 1897. During the 
last years of White's embassy and the first months of 
Currie's embassy, Britain had relied on the support of the 
Powers of the Triple Alliance for carrying out her policy 
at Constantinople. But in the current negotiations for 
peace the attitude of the German ambassador was rather that 
of a "Representative of the Sultan" than one of the Great
nvPowers.'^' The Austrian ambassador showed a great deference
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 23 July, 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 137, No. 28.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 2 June, 1897; P.O.78/4802,
No. 372 Confid.
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to the views of his German colleagueand, for the first
time in Currie's experience. Calice ceased to show suspicion
of his Russian colleague, hut, on the contrary, followed
his lead with a docility which rivalled that of his Prench
colleague. On 2 June Currie wrote:
"The condition of affairs seems to be tending 
towards a revival of the Dreikaiserbund so far 
as the Eastern Question is concerned, with the 
objects of maintaining the status quo, support­
ing the Sultan against any attack from without 
or from his own subjects, repressing movements 
on the part of the Balkan states or of the 
Christian populations of the Turkish Empire, 
patching up temporarily the Turkish finances 
and limiting the reforms to such merely formal 
measures as the Sultan can be prevailed upon 
to accept without serious pressure." (2)
The British view had always been that the maintenance of
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire Could be secured only
by raising the condition of the Christian' subjects of the
Sultan and by reforming the general administration of the
Empire. Britain had energetically pursued that policy for
the last two and a half years and her views had so far
prevailed that a scheme of reforms had been prepared by the
ambassadors, which the six Powers had been more or less
(1) On 15 Sept. 1897 Currie wrote that Calice "for the last 
few' weeks has been more German than the Germans." Currie 
to Salisbury, 15 Sept., 1897; Salisbury Papers, Vol. 137, 
No. 34.
On 11 Nov., 1897 Currie wrote that Calice showed "all the 
zeal of a convert in pursuing the pro-Turkish policy 
initiated by Germany." Ibid, No. 40.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 2 June, 1897; P.O.78/4802, No.372, 
Confid.
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agreed to force upon the Sultan. The ambassadors had also, 
in consequence of Salisbury's suggestions, drawn up a plan 
of reorganization for Crete. The adoption of these measures 
by the Powers had been mainly due to the feeling aroused on 
the Continent by the Armenian massacres and the general 
feeling of revulsion aroused by the misgovernment of the 
Sultan, whose prestige had fallen very low. But this state 
of things had been entirely changed by the good organization 
which Turkey had shown in the conduct of the war with Greece. 
The victories in Thessaly had restored the Sultan's prestige, 
not only among his Mussulman subjects, but also in the eyes 
of the Powers of the Triple Alliance. They were now content 
to support the Sultan in order to maintain the status quo. 
Currie believed that the prestige of England would suffer 
and her interests would not gain if she abandoned her reform­
ing policy. She must, therefore, look for support to other 
Powers: Prance and Italy. Currie thought that there was
much dissatisfaction among Frenchmen at the subordinate 
part which France had played in the current negotiations 
and that, if England could offer France the prospect of a 
working alliance between England, Italy and herself, with 
the object of exercising a counter-balancing influence in
(1) Currie referred to an article by Ernest lavisse in the 
Revue de Paris of 15 May 1897 which expressed this 
feeling.
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the East, Frence might be tempted to take advantage of it. 
Practically, so far as the opinions of the three countries 
were reflected in the minds of their representatives at 
Constantinople, it had for some time been apparent that 
England, Prance and Italy were on the same side of all 
questions affecting the Christian subjects of the Sultan, 
either in Crete, Macedonia or the Asiatic provinces. The 
geographical position of the Western Powers must lead them 
to consider the maintenance of their maritime power in the 
East of the Mediterranean as the only possible counterpoise 
to the preponderance of Russia in that quarter, which, in 
the event of a close understanding with Austria, would 
become even greater. Currie believed that on such an under­
standing appeared to rest the only hope for the British 
Embassy of avoiding isolation in the future.
Currie's despatch of 2 June was submitted to the Cabinet
and circulated to the British ambassadors at the capitals of
the Great Powers. It must have been the subject of much
anxious discussion. There is nOiêVidence of any decision
reached in the Cabinet, but, on 19 October, Salisbury sent
Currie a very long private letter which in effect gave
Salisbury's.answer to the questions which Currie had
fl)indirectly posed.' '
(1) Salisbury to Currie , 19 Oct., 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 43.
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The events of the last two years had had a profound
effect on Salisbury's attitude towards the Eastern question.
The most important of these was the Cabinet decision of
November 1895, when Salisbury was refused leave to send the
fleet up the Dardanelles because it was impracticable.
Then, in October 1896, the Defence Department presented
memoranda which reiterated their view that any attempt to
force the passage of the Straits would be a "hazardous
proceeding", on account of the British fleet having to meet
afterwards the combined forces of France and Russia.
The Director of Naval Intelligence stated bluntly:
"Conditions are so altered that there is no 
practical way, as long as France supports 
Russia by force of arms, of preventing the 
latter from using the Straits, unless opposed 
by the Turks. There is no material advantage 
to England in the Straits being opened to all 
alike unless t^ ie fortifications are entirely 
removed." (3)
The D.N.I. foretold that, in time, Asia Minor would become 
Russian or at least entirely subject to Russian influence: 
Europe could not prevent it. %hen that was done, ïvlarmorice 
would be the naval base of Russia in the Mediterranean.
(1) Of. pp.
(2) Director of Military Intelligence's Memorandum on Naval 
Policy, 13 Oct., 1896, printed in A.J. Harder, op.cit., 
Appendix III.
(3) Director of Naval Intelligence's Memorandum on Naval 
Policy, 28 Oct., 1896. Ibid, Appendix IV.
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There was no avoiding the conclusion that the time for 
jealously guarding the inviolability of the Dardanelles 
was passing away and that it was no longer worth any impor­
tant sacrifice. The D.N.I. emphatically denounced the idea 
that any important effect could be produced to check Russia's 
advance by holding Lemnos or any point so advanced in closed 
waters and so far from Britain's base: it was illusionary.
Britain must provide permanently for meeting the power of 
Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean. The only way in which 
this could be done was to adopt a new naval and military 
policy in the Mediterranean. To make a successful stand 
against the France of the Atlantic, the France of the 
Western Mediterranean and the Russia of the Eastern Mediter­
ranean, England would require three fleets and three bases - 
Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria:
"There would be only one way in which England 
could not only maintain herself in the 
Mediterranean at all, but continue to hold 
India and that is by holding Egypt against \
all comers and making Alexandria a naval base."' '
England must, in the words of Eothen, "plant a firm foot on
the banks of the Nile and sit in the seats of the faithful".
Such was the recommendation of the Defence Department.
Salisbury had never been inclined to take much notice of
their advice. But it happened now that the experiences
(1) Ibid.
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which he had met with in the conduct of diplomacy in the 
last two years tended to lead him to conclusions similar 
to those of the Defence Department. In the course of the 
negotiations with Turkey respecting the Armenians and the 
Cretans, Salisbury had found over and over again that he 
had no means of enforcing his serious demands upon the 
Sultan. In 1895 he had been forbidden by the Cabinet to 
send the fleet through the Straits to coerce the Sultan.
In 1897 he had tried to reach an understanding with Russia 
so that the two Powers alone, or together with other Powers, 
could send their fleets to anchor before Yildiz. Russia 
had shown herself strongly averse to any such proceeding 
and without the concurrence of Russia, Britain could not 
act.(^) Salisbury had thought of using "blockades" to 
coerce Turkey, but it had been ascertained that (without a 
declaration of war) neutral nations need not accept them.' ^ 
In 1897 America had shown herself very much disinclined to 
do so. At one time Salisbury had believed that the occupa­
tion of Jeddah might be a possible means of bringing pressure 
to bear upon the Sultan, but he had discovered that "the 
costliness of Indian troops and the extreme unhealthiness of
(1) Of.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 19 Oct. 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 43.
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the climate made that idea i m p r a c t i c a b l e . I n  October
1897 a message from the Sultan with regard to articles in
the Standard newspaper about his position as Caliph offered
a gleam of hope that, in respect to his position as Caliph,
a rod might be found to fit his shoulders. The Sultan was
very sensitive on the question of the Caliphate. Salisbury
thought that, Britain should study the idea and see if it
could be developed;
"But, unless something can be made of that, we 
have really no hold on - and therefore no 
interest in - any of the Sultan's territories 
except Egypt." (2)
In November 1896 Salisbury had considered that as time 
went by the prospects that Britain should ultimately keep 
the Straits out of the hands of Russia became fainter and 
f a i n t e r . T h e  best that Britain could hope for was to 
put off that result until after the catastrophe of the 
Turkish Empire. Salisbury had then believed that the Sultan 
was going downhill so fast that it was probable that this 
could be done. If once the question of cutting up the 
Sultan became practicable, the sovereignty of the Straits 
might become, for Britain and for Austria-Hungary, a
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Salisbury to Currie, 23 Nov. I896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 34.
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question of compensation. Nothing should he said of such 
views at that time, as Austria would imagine that Britain 
was going to desert her, which was "certainly very far from 
being the case". Nevertheless, these were the views of 
Salisbury in I896. But, by October 1897, the idea that the 
Turkish Empire was on the verge of dissolution had been dis­
sipated. Salisbury was now certain that Britain was incapable 
of keeping the Straits out of Russian hands until the time 
when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire might allow them 
to be treated as questions of compensation in a general re­
arrangement of the Ottoman territories. Britain was now 
under no direct obligation to Austria-Hungary with respect 
to affairs in the Near East; in January 1897 Britain and 
Austria had reserved for themselves complete liberty of 
a c t i o n . S a l i s b u r y ,  therefore, concluded in October 1897 
that Britain's best policy was "to withdraw as much as 
possible from all responsibilities at Constantinople".' ^
It could only be done gradually, by reason of Britain's 
past engagements, but it should be done. At the same time 
as it was being done, Britain should continue to strengthen 
her position on the Nile, to its source.
For some time Britain's interest in Egypt had been
(1) Of .pp.^3o-3^_,
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 19 Oct. 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 43.
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growing s t r o n g e r . A f t e r  the Sultan's victories in the 
Sudan, it was clear that, if Egypt were given hack at all, 
it must he given hack to the Sultan, as Khedive: no one
else had any legal r i g h t . T h e  events of 1897 had con­
clusively proved that the Concert of Europe could never he 
trusted with even the slenderest portion of executive 
authority. It followed that
"either Egypt must he given hack to the Moslems, 
which no one except the Moslems would approve; 
or /Britain/ must use for the purpose of main­
taining peace and order there, the authority 
with which /phe h a ^  been invested by the 
victory of Tel-el-Kebir." (3)
Salisbury thought that this was the only policy left to
Britain.
As far as British influence at Constantinople was con­
cerned, Salisbury now despaired. It seemed unlikely that 
Currie's idea of forming a combination of the Western 
Powers could ever be realised; Hanotaux seemed determined 
to sacrifice the time-honoured policy of France in the East 
to the Russian a l l i a n c e . S a l i s b u r y  believed that it
(1) Ibid. W.L. langer. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 
op.cit.. Vol. I, p. 284; Vol. II, pp. 537-38.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 19 Oct. 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 138, No. 43.
(3) Ibid.
(4) This was also the opinion of Count Nigra, the Italian 
ambassador at Vienna.
Rumbold to Salisbury, 23 June, 1897; F.0 .7/1256,
No. 218 Confid.
275.
would be difficult, if not impossible, to break the solid 
front presented at Constantinople by the ambassadors of 
Germany, Austria and Russia. From this time onwards 
Salisbury's interest in the questions of the Near East 
declined. There are no more private letters to the British 
ambassador at Constantinople preserved among Salisbury's 
papers.
But it is not the end of the story; for, even before 
the ambassadors had finished their labours, in concluding 
terms of peace between Turkey and Greece, it was becoming 
apparent that the ever-increasing influence which Germany 
was acquiring in Turkey was arousing the jealousy of Russia. 
The latter Power would not relinquish her political 
influence in Turkey without a struggle. If two rival camps 
were to be established at Constantinople, Britain, standing 
between the two, would be in a powerful position. The 
British ambassador did not despair.
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CHAPTER VIII 
Echoes of the Past.
The Turks were aware that they owed their military
successes in the war against Greece to Germany. They knew
that the fine discipline and good equipment of their
soldiers were achieved as a result of the work of the German
Military Mission and, above all, of General von der Goltz
P a s h a . I n  the campaigns of Thessaly, a prominent part
was taken by German officers and, after the war, two of the
senior members of the Military Mission General von
Kamphoevner Pasha and General von Grumbchow Pasha continued
( 2.')to serve as instructors in infantry and artillery.' ' In 
1901, three additional German officers arrived in Turkey to 
serve as instructors.'^^ The German ambassador at Constan­
tinople considered that a great part of the prestige which 
Germany enjoyed in Turkey was due "to the German officer and 
his w o r k " . I t  had now become a settled policy of the
(1) In 1881 a group of German army officers first took up 
service in the Turkish army. In 1883 von der Gottz. 
became the leader of the German Military Mission.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 27 April, 1897; P.O.78/4801.
No. 291.
(3) 0*Conor to lansdowne, 22 April, 1901; P.O.78/5121. 
No. 149, transmitting a despatch from Ponsonby.
(4)_ Marschall to Hohenlohe, 5 March, I898; G.P. ZII(ll) 
No. 3339. Confid. ---
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German Government to encourage the Turkish army to engage 
German officers.
The Turks also recognized that Germany gave them con­
siderable diplomatic support at the time of the negotiations 
respecting the Cretan question. But the German axUbassador 
at Constantinople, Baron Saurma, was a "guileless being" 
and carried out the policy of his Government (which was to 
support the Sultan secretly, while outwardly conforming to 
the wishes of the other ambassadors in the Concert) in a 
blundering f a s h i o n . C l e a r l y ,  Germany needed a better 
representative if she were to embark on a forward policy 
in Turkey. The appointment of Baron Marschall von Bieber- 
stein as German ambassador to Con st antinople,in October 
1897, marked a significant step in the forward movement - 
the beginning of the Drangnachosten.
The activities of the Germans were closely watched from 
St. Petersburg. The Russians were not inclined to brook 
a rival to their political influence in Turkey, which had 
been increased at the time of the Armenian troubled, 
without putting up a ^ight. They chose as a battle ground 
the subject of the new governor for Crete. In December
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 19 Aug., 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 137, No. 32.
(2) Dascelles to Salisbury, 21 Oct., 1897; P.0 .64/1411, 
No. 278.
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1897 the Russians informed the German Government that their
representative at Constantinople had been instructed to
propose Prince George of Greece as a candidate for the
provisional Governorship of C r e t e . R u s s i a ,  in fact,
proposed a solution to the Cretan question v/hich Germany
and Austria-Hungary had made it their aim to prevent ever
since the outbreak of the Cretan troubles: it was sure to
be strenuously opposed. Currie believed that:
"the most plausible explanation of the Russian 
action was that she intended once for all to 
deal a blow at the growing German influence at 
Constantinople." (2)
Certainly, a vigorous diplomatic battle quickly began at the 
Turkish capital. Currie leamt that M. Zinoviev (the new 
Russian ambassador to Constantinople) had been instructed 
to inform the Sultan that, if he did not accept the candida­
ture of Prince George as Governor of Crete, Russia would be 
compelled to support the annexation of Crete to Greece.
The wider implications of the Russian move did not escape 
the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who perceived that 
it was a question of.a struggle between Russia and Germany
(1) Bulow to Radolin, 25 Dec., 1897; £^P.XII (11) No.3255.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 20 Jan., I898; Salisbury Papers,
. Vol. 137, No. 48.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 19 Jan., I898; P.O.78/4922.
Tel. No. 11, Confid.
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for influence in Turkey. In December 1897 the Russian 
Dragoman had warned him;
"You must choose between us and the Germans.
German support cannot help you. If you rely
on us, you need not care for the other Powers.
We will protect you." (1)
The new German ambassador, Marschall, was not slow to enter 
the lists. He informed the Sultan that he looked upon the 
nomination of Prince George as a virtual annexation of Crete 
to Greece and that he opposed it "in the most formal 
manner.
The Russian move created a great sensation at the foreign 
capitals, especially at Vienna. Goluchowski was very 
unfavourably impressed by the Russian proposal w^hich bore 
with it the possibility of reopening questions which he had 
thought closed. The ambassadors at Vienna were generally 
agreed that Goluchowski considered that Russia had infringed 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the recent Austro-Russian 
agreement on affairs in the Near East.^^^ The Russian move 
coming, as it did, so soon after the success Goluchowski 
had achieved in the Delegations, when he had given information
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 15 Jan., I898; P.O.78/4922,
Tel. No. 13.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, I8 Jan., I898; Ibid, Tel. No. 19.
(3) Rumbold to Salisbury, 2 and 5 Jan. I898; P.0 .7/1272, 
Nos. 2 Confid and 7 Confid.
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concerning the Austro-Russian Agreement, was a serious
embarrassment to the Minister, who showed considerable
hesitation when asked to comment upon it. There were other
signs that elements of discord were beginning to appear in
the relations of Austria-Hungary and Russia. There was a
great deal of latent agitation in the Balkan states and,
although the official Russian attitude was in harmony with
the agreement to maintain the status quo in the Balkans,
the character of certain Russian agents - such as M. Jadowski
and Baron Zaube, recently installed at Belgrade and
M. Bakhmetiev, recently sent to Sofia - was not reassuring
(2)
as to Russian designs.' ' Moreover, Russia had brought 
about the repatriation of Bulgarian officers who had been 
exoiled during Stambulov's administration and it was obvious 
that Russia was strengthening her hold on Bulgaria.
Under such circumstances, the attitude which Britain 
would take towards the proposed candidature of Prince George 
would have an important effect upon the minds of those who 
directed the foreign policy of the Great Powers. If 
Britain were to oppose the Prince's candidature, a way 
might be opened for dispelling the coolness which had arisen
(1) Rumbold to Salisbury, 22 Nov., 1897; P.0.7/1260, 
No. 394.
(2) Rumbold to Salisbury, 27 Jan., 1898; P.O.7/1272. 
No. 21 Confid.
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between London and Vienna as a result of Britain's refusal 
to give binding assurances with respect to Constantinople 
and the Straits and as a result of the differences of 
opinion which arose in the course of the earlier negotiations 
for the settlement of the Cretan q u e s t i o n . B u t ,  quite 
apart from the local Cretan question, Salisbury was at 
this time occupied with considerations of a diplomacy 
which had to take into account world policy. The Par 
East occupied the centre of the stage. After the German 
occupation of Kiao-chow in November 1897 and the sending 
of Russian ships to Port Arthur in December, it seemed that 
a scramble for Chinese territory had b e g u n . I f  Britain 
were not to be completely out-manoeuvred, she must reach 
an agreement either with Germany and Japan or with Russia. 
Whatever Salisbury's personal preference may have been, he 
was forced by the majority in his Cabinet to attempt first 
to reach an understanding with Russia.'^' On 17 January 
he sent O'Conor instructions to ask M. Witte whether it 
would be possible for Britain and Russia to work together 
in China.' ' Eight days later, Salisbury wrote again to
(1) cf.
(2) W.L. Danger, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 453-458.
(3) Ibid, p. 465.
(4) Salisbury to O'Conor, 17 Jan., I898; B.D. I, No. 5.
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O 'Conor and on this occasion he linked Turkey with China 
- these being two countries which contained large terri­
tories, some of which interested Britain more than Russia 
and vice versa. Salisbury enquired whether it would not 
be possible to arrange, that where, in regard to these 
territories, British and Russian counsels differed the 
Power least interested should give way to and assist the 
o t h e r . I n  order to demonstrate to Russia the value of 
British assistance, Salisbury ^filised the current issue 
of the candidature of Prince George as Governor of Crete: 
on 17 January he instructed Currie to support the candida­
ture, if it was again brought before the S u l t a n . B u t ,  
although Muraviev expressed satisfaction at the harmony of 
views, existing between Britain and Russia with regard to 
the Governorship of Crete, the Russian Minister was averse 
to a discussion of Turkey at that time and his object in 
China was to define spheres of influence so that Russia 
would have an absolutely free hand in the sphere which 
she would claim for herself. Britain's efforts, on the 
other hand, were directed towards securing the open door 
in the territories which would be lost to her in China.
(1) Salisbury to O'Conor, 25 Jan., I898; B.D. I, No. 6.
(2) Salisbury to Currie, 17 Jan., I898; A . & P. (1899) 
ex, 509.
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The aims of the two Governments were opposed and it soon 
became clear that no agreement could reached.
Prom the first there had not been great enthusiasm on. 
the British side. Britain had not given Russia much encourage­
ment: Russia was not in any great need of diplomatic
assistance at Constantinople in her attempt to secure the 
appointment of Prince George as Governor of Crete. She 
very soon relaxed her pressure upon the Sultan, as she 
realised that, in time, it would become apparent that 
Prince George's appointment would be the only possible 
solution to the Cretan question and would be carried 
t h r o u g h ^ a s  indeed it was in November I898.
There were, however, important members of the British 
Cabinet who still believed that Britain should reach an 
agreement with some country in order to secure support for 
her policy in China. Throughout the early months of I898, 
Chemiberlain and Balfour carried on, unofficially, negotia­
tions with Hatzfeldt and Rckardstein with the object of 
bringing about an An^lo-German a g r e e m e n t . P r o m  the
(1) W. L. langer, op.oit., Vol. II, pp. 469-70.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 16 Peb., I898; P.O.78/4922,
Tel. No. 53.
(3) Salisbury was at this time convalescing on the Continent, 
but he was informed of all that took place.
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memoranda which Chamberlain made, recounting his conver­
sations with the Germans, it is clear that his chief aim 
was to secure German aid in order to check any Russian 
advance beyond Manchuria; in order to induce the Germans 
to accept the proposed agreement,Chamberlain personally 
was ready to offer a defensive alliance against Russia.
But the Germans intimated that they would he willing to 
enter into an alliance with Britain only if the alliance 
were accepted by Parliament. It was doubtful whether 
Parliament v/ould accept an Anglo-German alliance at that 
time - the Kruger telegram was still not forgotten. 
Hatzfeldt, therefore, suggested on 25 April that the 
difficulty might be overcome if the Mediterranean Agree­
ments of 1887 were renewed, as a closer connexion between 
England on the one hand and Austria-Hungary and Italy on 
the other would of necessity lead to closer Anglo-German 
relations.- Chamberlain showed little interest in the idea 
and reiterated that his wish was for an alliance with 
Germany.
Whem Salisbury returned he told Hatzfeldt that he 
thought there ''might be much to be said" for a general
(1) Garvin, Life of Chsmberlain, III, pp. 259 ff.
(2) Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, 26 April, I898; G^. XIV 
No. 3793.
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alliance with Germany, hut that he was hound to remind 
him that :
"With respect to one subject, the maintenance of 
the Ottoman Empire, this country was not in a 
condition to enter upon any further engagements.
He (Hatzfeldt) had himself seen sufficient to 
convince him that, in respect to that question, 
the public opinion of this country was very 
. deeply divided." (1)
Hatzfeldt replied that he did not think that either Italy
or Austria-Hungary (with whose interests Germany in this
matter was principally concerned) desired any further
engagements from Britain with respect to the Ottoman
Empire than "an undertaking to prevent its fragments, when
it fell to pieces, falling into Russian hands". Salisbury
did not contest the soundness of such a policy, but he
observed that :
"a negative condition, so vague, could hardly 
be the foundation of an agreement." (2)
The Ottoman Empire had ceased to be a burning issue.
î/hereas in 188? Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy had had
vital common interests in the Ottoman Empire to defend
against Russian encroachment, in I898 this was no longer
the case. In I898 Britain was much more concerned with
opposing Russian aggression in China. Of the Powers of
(1) Salisbury to lascelles, 11 May, I898; P.0 .64/1436, 
No. 109a, Seer.
(2) Ibid, and G^P. XIV (1) pp. 230-31: footnote.
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the Triple Alliance, Germany was the only country with 
interests in China and, although it was in Germany's 
interest to see that Russia did not obtain too much terri­
tory in China, it was even more in her interest to see 
Russia occupied in the Far East, as then Russian pressure 
on Germany's frontier was greatly reduced.
In 1898 there was no longer the same relationship' 
between the British and German ambassadors at Constantinople 
as there had been in the early years of the 1890s. When 
1/ihite and Radowitz represented their Governments at Con­
stantinople, the German Government had little interest in 
Turkey beyond a desire to see that Russian influence did 
not completely dominate the scene; therefore, it was in 
the interest of Germany to make common cause with Britain, 
Austria-Hungary and Italy on all questions in which these 
Powers were opposed to Russia and F r a n c e . B u t  in I898 
Germany herself was seeking to increase her economic and 
political influence in Turkey. In the course of working 
towards this end she inevitably found herself in collision 
with Britain, who still had some important interests left 
in Turkey.
In November 1897 considerable agitation was caused 
among British representatives at Constantinople when it
(1) Of. pp.
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appeared that the Germans were unofficially urging that 
the Presidency of the Council of Ottoman Public Debt 
should no longer be confined to the British and French 
representatives, but that a German representative should 
be given the opportunity to become President.Yi/hen the 
Council was first instituted it was arranged that the 
Presidency should be held alternately by Britain and France, 
because these countries held the preponderating amount of • 
the debt - (about 30^ in Britain and about 40^ in France, 
while Germany only held about 3^). It was, however, pro­
vided that if any material alteration should take place at 
any time in the relative amounts of the holdings the 
arrangement should be reconsidered. The German represen­
tative, Dr. Lindau now stated that the German holding was 
as large as the British and a report drawn up by the French 
delegate, with some other object in view, confirmed his 
statement. Dr. Lindau was instructed by his Government 
"to insist" on a reconsideration of the arrangement, 
although he himself professed to depreciate any change.
The Italian representative was friendly to Britain but, in 
view of the fact that the Italian Government 'might be pressed 
by the Germans to instruct him to support their proposal,
Mr. Gaillard, the British delegate, urged that the British
(1) Currie to Salisbury, 12 Nov., 1897; F.O.78/4809, Priv.
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Government should ask the Italian Government not to give 
the German proposal any encouragement. Gaillard main­
tained that there was no proof that the relative propor­
tions of the holdings of the debt had changed to the extent 
which the Germans declared they had changed. He wrote to 
Salisbury a long letter and memorandum on the German 
proposal and described it as:
"one more attempt of the Germans to push out 
English influence and substitute their ovm." (2)
The question as to who would be President of the Council
had a political significance as the President had political
influence at Constantinople. The new attitude of Salisbury
to the diplomatic struggle at Constantinople was to a
certain extent shown by his comment on Gaillard*s memorandum:
"Vihat a bore the man is!"
As it happened, the German delegate agreed to
take no action as long as Gaillard was President and, since
it would be unwise to initiate a discussion when the
Frenchman was President (in view of the preponderance of
French interests) the issue was s h e l v e d . B u t  another
(1) Ibid.
(2) Gaillard to Salisbury, 10 Nov. 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 98, Nos. 83 and 84.
(3) It was reopened again in I90I, when it was decided to 
wait three years until the Bonds were again deposited 
for a new sheet of coupons.
O'Conor to Lansdowne, 29 Jan., 1901; F.O.78/5120.
No. 39.
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straggle between the British and the Germans quickly 
followed on the subject of railway concessions. The 
Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, the only British railway 
company still operating in Asiatic Turkey, was trying to 
obtain permission to extend their line to Tchai, where 
they would join the German railway line to Konia. They 
had succeeded in getting a contract drawn up which had 
received the assent of the Grand Vizier and other important 
Turkish Ministers, when it became apparent that the German 
Anatolian Railway Company v/ould vigorously oppose the 
granting of the c o n c e s s i o n . I n  order to prevent the 
extension of the British line, the German Company sought 
permission to extend their line to Diner. At the same 
time the Deutsche Bank and the Anatolian Railway Company 
made a loan of £1200,000 to the Sultan, one of the condi­
tions of the loan being that the Company should be given
(2 ) -
the required concession.' ' The Sultan was greatly in 
need of a loan and so he sent instructions to his Council 
of Ministers, which was prepared to report favourably to 
the Aidin Company, "to drop the matter".'^' Currie had
(1) Currie to Sanderson, 6 Jan., I898; P.O.78/4911. Priv; 
inclusing a report (surreptitiously obtained) of a meet­
ing of the directors of the German Anatolian Railway 
Company.
(2) Currie to Sanderson, 10 Jan., I898; P.0 .78/4922.
Tel. (no number).
(3) Ibid.
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already envisaged the possibility of the Germans putting 
"the screw on the Sultan" and had asked Salisbury to speak 
to the Turkish ambassador in London in favour of the Aidin 
Company.'  ^ Salisbury promised to try to do his best with 
the ambassador, although he revealed his pessimistic 
attitude by adding "but I expect very little result". 
Currie, however, sent a very strong message of protest to 
the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Palace. 
After a long discussion, the Turkish Council of Ministers 
decided to refuse to grant the extension to Diner to the 
G e r m a n s . C u r r i e  did not cease to press the claims of 
the Aidin C o m p a n y ; ^ b u t ,  on 31 March, the Sultan issued 
an irad/ proclaiming that extension should be granted 
neither to the German nor the British railway companies. 
Currie had been only partially successful in his efforts 
to press the claims of the Aidin Company, but the fact 
that he had succeeded in stopping the German attempt to
(1) Currie to Sanderson, 6 Jan., I898; F.O.78/4911, Priv.
(2) Currie to Sanderson, 10 Jan., I898; F.O.78/4922
(no number). Minute by Salisbury.
(3) Currie to Salisbury, 12 Jan., I898; F.O.78/4922.
Tel. No. 9.
(4) Currie to Salisbury, 13 Jan., I898; Ibid, Tel.No. 10.
(5) Currie to Salisbury, 3 March I898; F.O.78/4913, No.123.
(6) Currie to Salisbury, 31 March I898; P.O.78/4914,
No. 201.
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crush the company altogether showed that British influence
was still not negligible at Constantinople.
The Germans, however, had still to play their trump
card, in the struggle for influence at Constantinople.
They played it on 17 October when the German Emperor arrived
in person to pay his respects to the Sultan as head of the
Ottoman Empire. In the course of a visit which lasted six
days William II was feted at the Turkish capital. No
trouble or expense was spared by the Sultan in his effort
to entertain his Imperial guest. The visit was taken as
a compliment by the Mussulman population who felt that
honour was being done to their Caliph, to their religion
and to their country by the visit of so great a potentate.
The full significance of William II's visit was well
evaluated by Sir N. O'Conor (the new British ambassador
to Constantinople) in his annual report for Turkey of 1907:
"The Sultan was under the odium and cloud of 
the Armenian massacres. The European Powers 
showed their displeasure. They barely tolerated 
the Greek war and interfered to prevent Turkey 
reaping the benefit of her military successes 
and Greece from suffering the punishment of her 
aggressive policy. They shortly afterwards 
approved of the autonomy of Crete. The /German/ 
Emperor dfd not see his way to gainsaying the 
decisions of Europe, But he came to Constanti­
nople with the Empress, spent a week at Yildiz,
(1) O'Conor to Salisbury, 22 Oct., I898; F.O.78/4919, 
No. 55OA.
292.
showed himself as the personal friend of the 
SifLtan and, as far as lay in his power, 
whitewashed the Sultan before Europe." (1)
The effusive attitude v/hich William II adopted towards the
Sultan and the Turks was typified by a speech which he
made at Damascus in November:
"Let H.I.M. the Sultan Abdul Earaid Khan II 
rest assured, as well as the 300 millions of 
Moslems v/ho, scattered as they are all over 
the world, are united by the closest bonds 
with the Turkish Sovereign in his character 
as Caliph, that the German Emperor will be 
their friend forever." (2)
The Germans naturally expected some reward for this excessive
display of friendship and the ambassadors of the other
Powers at Constantinople were at pains to decide whether
the Germans sought it in the political or commercial sphere.
No political understanding of any kind was arrived at, but
the Emperor dwelt upon the importance of improving the
Turkish army and probably assured the Sultan of Germany's
support in this direction. The commercial, results of the
Emperor's visit were bound to be numerous. Many concessions
were put forward as being the object of German ambition.
There v/as the concession for the construction of quays and
depots at Haidar Pasha, the terminus of the Ismid railway;
(1) Annual Report for Turkey, 1907, B.D. V, No. 43.
(2) O'Conor to Salisbury, 24 Nov., 1898; P.O.78/4920,
No. 622, transmitting a report from the British Consul 
at Damascus.
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there was the concession for the prolongation of the German 
railway from Angora to Bagdad and the concession for a port 
on the coast of S y r i a . O ' C o n o r  believed that nothing 
more had been done in the matter of the concession to the 
Anatolian railway which would run counter to the interests 
of the Smyrna-Aidin railway.
The Sultan had to be extremely careful at this time 
not to offend unduly any of the Great Powers; for, although 
his prestige had been raised both in the eyes of Europe and 
of his own subjects by the successful conduct of the war 
against Greece, much of that prestige had been lost through­
out the time of the long negotiations which resulted in 
the peace of September 1897. Then, in November I898,
Prince George of Greece was finally appointed commissioner 
of Crete with a mandate from Britain, Prance, Russia and 
Italy to organize a proper administration in the island. 
Everyone knew that Prince George's appointment was only 
the first step to the union of Crete with Greece. The 
Sultan, through bad administration, had lost another pro­
vince and the effect of this was not lost either on his 
subjects or on his ministers. The last effort of the 
Sultan to put a bold front forward was made in November
(1) O'Conor to Salisbury, 26 Oct., I898; P.O.78/4919, 
No. 556.
(2) W.L. Langer, op.cit., vol. I, p. 378.
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1898 when he suddenly interfered with the Porte's decision
to withdraw the Turkish troops from Crete and instructed
his Ministers to draw up a new "mazhatta" in the opposite
s e n s e . O n  this occasion two Turkish Ministers refused
to sign the "mazhatta" - the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the
Minister of Justice, H.H. Abdurrahman Pasha. The Sheikh-
ul-Islam explained to the Council his reasons for not
signing the "mazbatta" and added that:
"if the Sultan persisted in his system of 
Government, there was a great danger to the 
Empire ... The present system of Government 
v/as not in accordance with the Koran. The 
holy law enjoined upon them to live in concord 
with their Christian fellow subjects: for
some time the opposite had been the case." (2)
The Sheikh-ul-Islam was the leader of the religious party
in Turkey: in any struggle against the Sultan he would
have that party with him. His remonstrance against abuses
in every part of the Turkish administration was, therefore,
of great significance. Even more significant was the fact
that the Sheikh and the Minister of Justice continued in
office after their open criticisms of the Sultan's rule.
In former years any minister who had dared to use such
language would-have been instantly dismissed. The fact
(1) O'Conor to Salisbury, 23 Nov., I898; F.O.78/4920. 
Ho. 614 Seer.
(2) Ibid.
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that the Sultan did not dismiss the Sheikh and Abdurrahman 
Pasha indicates that he felt a weakening in his position. 
The reform policy which Britain had advocated in 
Turkey for so many years was now openly proclaimed by two 
of the most powerful Ministers of the Sultan. Abdul Hamid, 
realising that his surrender to Russian influences had 
discredited him in the minds of an increasing number of 
his subjects who were adherents of a more liberal policy 
and that even the German ’’alliance" was no longer as 
popular as it had once been, felt compelled to show a more 
favourable disposition towards Britain, The attempt of 
the Sultan to bring about more friendly relations between 
Turkey and Britain was greatly facilitated by the appoint­
ment of Sir H. O'Conor as British ambassador to Constanti­
nople in October I898, Sir Philip Currie had, from 1895 
onwards, been obliged to maintain towards the Sultan an 
"attitude of coldness and reserve", for no other attitude 
v/as compatible with the feeling of repugnance at the 
Sultan's conduct towards the Armenians which was widespread 
in B r i t a i n , C u r r i e ' s  conduct of diplomacy at Constan­
tinople had also been characterised by a certain want of
(1) Currie to Barrington, 20 July, 1897; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 137, No. 24.
Barrington to Currie, 27 July, 1897; Ibid, Vol. 138» 
No. ,42-
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"suaviter in modo" which, arose from the fact that his 
earlier experience had been that of an official at the 
British Foreign Office and not that of a diplomatist.
But O'Conor came to Constantinople after having served 
as ambassador at St, Petersburg and he came with the inten­
tion of using all his charm and "savoir faire" in order to 
restore something of the cordiality which had once existed 
between the Sultan and the British embassy. O'Conor v/as 
aided in his task by the growing conviction among the Turks 
that the power of Britain was on the increase. Events in 
had greatly impressed them and the Sultan felt that' 
it was no longer safe to outrage British public opinion.
The first sign of the change of front in Turkey 
appeared when a series of articles in the local newspapers 
v/as published advocating a return to better relations with 
Britain. For many years previously the Turkish press had 
either studiously avoided all reference to British affairs 
or had treated them in a spirit of marked hostility. But 
now such papers as the Tarik commented with satisfaction 
on the tone of the British press.
(1) Barrington's Memorandum of a conversation with Mr. S. 
Vvhitman, London Correspondent to the New York Herald, 
who had just returned after spending three months in 
Constantinople, 1896; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 96, No. 21. .
(2) O'Conor to Salisbury, 29 March, 1899, F.0 .78/4992,
No. 151.
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"Papers (formerly influenced by Gladstone 
and men with views like his) now publish 
matter showing that they fully appreciate 
the importance and value of Turkish friend­
ship. These contain frequent mention of 
the name of the new British ambassador at 
Constantinople, Sir N. 0*Conor. This dip­
lomatist is a statesman of correct views, 
who has of old appreciated the moral and 
material power of Turkey." (1)
The acting British consul at Brzeroum reported that a
general feeling of friendship towards. Britain was returning
together with the conviction that the disturbances and
massacres of 1895-6 had been a mistake which had done much
to injure the prosperity of the country. He thought that
orders had been sent by the Sultan to the provinces for a
more just treatment of the Christian population and that
this was a consequence of the desire to please Britain.
It now suited the Sultan to forget the events of 1895-6
and their effect upon British public opinion. He began
his bid for British friendship by asking 0 ’Conor for a
list of the pending cases in which the British Embassy was
interested and which were awaiting solution at the Porte.
0*Conor tactfully presented the Sultan with a list which.
(1) Ibid, inclosing a translation of the Tarik, 17 March 1899.
(2) 0*Conor to Salisbury, 17 April, 1899; P.O.78/4993,
No. 185, inclosing a despatch from the British consul 
at Erzeroum.
(3) O'Oonor to Salisbury, 13 April, 1899; P.O.78/4992,
No. 179.
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"he could clear off without loss of dignity in his own 
eyes."
About this time O'Conor thought it likely that the 
Sultan might make direct overtures to Britain and the 
ambassador requested Mr. de Bunsen, who was on leave in 
Britain, to sound Salisbury as to the line to be taken if 
this should happen. 0*Conor himself thought that British 
public opinion would "have nothing to say to Abdul Hamid", 
but, on account of her Mussulman subjects, Britain could 
not afford "entirely to pooh pooh offers of this kind".^^) 
Salisbury's advice to O'Oonor was given in a brief and 
curt minute: "Distrust them" - that is, the Sultan's 
overtures.
At the same time as the Sultan was trying to place 
his relations with Britain on a more friendly basis, the 
Russians were attempting to come to some kind of arrangement 
with Germany on affairs in the Near East. The increased 
influence which Germany enjoyed in Turkey after the Graeco-
Turkish war had from the beginning aroused Russian opposi-
(2 )tion.' ^ The financial credit which the Sultan gained as 
a result of the indemnity to be paid by Greece enabled him
(1) O'Conor to de Bunsen, 2 Jb'eb. 1899; Salisbury Papers, 
Vol. 137, No. 58.
(2) Cf. p^
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to spend money in Germany on munitions of war. As early
as November 1897 this provoked a warning from Russia to
the Porte regarding Turkey's continued indebtedness to
Russia in respect to the indemnity of the Russo-Turkish
war of the '70s. Russia claimed that an outstanding charge
of £1,000,000 for the maintenance of prisoners of war
remained to be s e t t l e d . C u r r i e  heard that the Sultan
had directed his ambassador at St. Petersburg to explain
to the Tsar that:
"There was a strong anti-Russian feeling among 
his Ministers and that he might find it 
impossible to persist in his present attitude 
of political friendship with Russia if the 
latter continued to press for the indemnity 
at this inconvenient moment ..." (2)
Y/hen the Germans succeeded, in Spring 1899, in gaining
the concession for the construction of a port at Haidar
Pasha and began also to press for a concession for the
construction of a railway from the Sea of Marmora to the
Persian Gulf, the Russian Minister, Muraviev, openly
expressed to the German ambassador at St. Petersburg his
fears that Germany's economic interests in Turkey might
one day lead her to defend them and turn against Russia.
(1) . Currie to Salisbury, 18 Nov., 1897; 0.78/4809. No.757.
(2) Currie to Salisbury, 25 Nov., 1897; Ibid. No. 777.
(3) Radolin to Hobenlobe, 5Ap., 1899; XIV (11)
No. 3982.
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Count Osten-Sacken, the clever Russian ambassador at Berlin
went even further and attempted to bring about an agreement
between his country and Germany regarding their respective
interests in Turkey. He told Billow that;
"The time of alliances was passing; existing 
alliances were either in the process of des­
troying themselves or of being transformed 
into acts of pure formality, or indeed they 
had had from the beginning a more platonic 
than practical character. We live," he 
declared, "in times of arrangements. Germany 
and Russia ought to conclude an arrangement 
relating to Asia Minor." (1)
After allowing a suitable interval to elapse, Osten-Sacken
returned to the subject and stated specifically that the
point of vital interest to Russia was the Straits. If
Germany would set at rest Russian fears regarding the
Straits (i.e. guarantee them to Russia on the disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire), Russia would leave Germany a free
(2 )hand in Asia Minor.' ' The Germans did not receive Osten- 
Sacken' s proposal with enthusiasm. They thought that v/hat 
Russia offered bore no relation to v/hat she asked from 
Germany in r e t u r n . I t  was quite clear that Germany 
could press ahead with her economic enterprises in Asia
(1) Memorandum by Bulow, I8 Ap., 1899» Ibid,1 H o . 4.Q17«
(2) Memorandum by Bulow, 26 Ap., 1899; Ibid, No. 4018.
(3) Memorandum by Bulow, 4 July, 1839; Ibid, No. 4025-
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Minor with or without Russian approval: all Germany
really needed was the Sultan's approval and V/illiam II 
had taken care to ensure that this v/ould he given. A 
German commitment to Russia respecting the Straits would 
he in contradiction to Germany's commitments under the 
terms of the Triple Alliance. Russia would have to offer 
a more tangible inducement to Germany in order to persuade 
her to run the risk of losing.the friendship of the 
Austrians and I t a l i a n s . I f ,  however, Russia and France 
would declare themselves ready to enter with Germany into 
a reciprocal guarantee of the maintenance of the territorial 
status quo of the three Pov/ers, Germany would be ready to 
conclude an agreement.^ O s t e n - S a c k e n  had to admit that 
this would not yet be possible for France: although the
rational element in the French character had renounced 
Alsace-Lorraine, the sentimental element in their character 
would not permit the formulation of this rationalism.
The Russians had for the time being to be content with the 
assurance that Germany had only economic interests in 
Turkey and would not seek to secure a predominant political 
influence. In April 1900, however, the Russians concluded
(1) Eatzfeldt to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1 May, 1899; 
Ibid, No. 4019.
(2) Memorandum by Bulow, 5 May, 1899; Ibid, No. 4020.
(3) Ibid.
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an agreement with Turkey which prevented the building of 
railways in the Black Sea districts of Asia Minor without 
their consent.
The interests of Russia and Germany in Turkey were in 
fact opposed. Although Russia might wish, for the present, 
to maintain the status quo, she did not wish to see Turkey 
strengthened; on the contrary, she worked fbr the slow 
decomposition of the Ottoman Empire. Germany, on the 
other hand, v/as investing large sums of money in the Ottoman 
Empire and industrial capital demanded the stability of 
the political situation in the country in which it was 
placed. Germany worked with the object of preserving the 
Ottoman Empire for as long a time as it would be possible 
to preserve it.^^^ In August I898 the Berlin Foreign 
Office went so far as to consider the possibility of 
assisting Turkey to fortify Constantinople on the side 
menaced by Russia.'^' Marschall gave a true forecast of 
the future when he observed that, if Germany continued to 
expand economically in the Near East, he foresaw the moment:
(1) G^P.XVII, Nos. 5211, footnote, 5217, 5218, 5221.
(2) Marschall to Hohenlohe, 6 June, 1899; G.P. XIV (11), 
No. 3988.
(3) Richthofen to Bulow, 9 Aug., I898; G^. XII (11),
No. 3343. The idea was given up because it was thought 
too dangerous.
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•'When the famous remark that the whole Near East 
is not worth the hones of a Pomeranian grenadier 
will he an interesting historical reminiscence, 
hut will no longer correspond to reality." (1)
By the turn of the century it was becoming increasingly
apparent to the Turks and even to the Sultan that Russia
would like to see the process of disintegration continue
in Turkey. But the Sultan had at heart only one interest -
self-interest - not the interest of his country. It is
probable that there was some truth in the rumour which
circulated at this time that Abdul Hamid had concluded a
secret agreement with Russia which guaranteed his personal.
safety, whatever might h a p p e n . B u t ,  although the
Sultan was reassured on this point, he still felt the need
to make some attempt to halt the process of disintegration
of his Empire and to subscribe to the wishes of a great
number of his subjects by enlisting the aid of Britain.
Throughout the last years of the old century and the early
years of the new, the Sultan continued to make tentative
approaches to Britain.
On the occasion of the Queen's birthday, in May 1900,
the reception at the British Embassy at Constantinople was
attended by "a quite unusual number of Ottoman Ministers
(1) Helfferich, Georg von Siemens, III, 90; quoted by 
A.J.P. Taylor in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848' 
1914, (Oxford, 1954) p. 3o3.
(2) O'Oonor to Lansdov/ne, 6 Oct., 1902; P.O.78/5193.
No. 432 Confid.
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and officials". In view of the fact that special Imperial
permission was necessary in the case of every prominent
Turk who desired to visit an Embassy, the prevalence of
the Turkish element at the British Embassy "excited general
comment and was observed to be in contrast with the usual
practice on such occasions.
On 3 August the Sultan spoke to O'Oonor in a very
friendly manner of the identity of interests which existed
between Turkey and Britain.
"Common interests were the foundation of policy 
and he would always endeavour, as he had done . 
in the past, to maintain the friendly relations
between the tv/o countries." (2)
The Sultan remarked that, however great one country was,
it was always possible that, at some time or another, it
might be in need of assistance. He had a numerous and fine
army and could put in the field a million men and, had need
been, he could have sent one or even two army corps to
S. Africa or elsewhere:
"There were certain points which it would be 
necessary for England to guarantee and that 
he v/ould, if I liked, put them down on paper 
and send them to me." (3)
(1) O'Oonor to Lansdowne, 25 May, 1900; P.O.78/5059. No.186.
(2) O'Oonor to Lansdowne, 3 Aug., 1900; P.O.78/5060,
No. 271 Conf.
(3) Ibid.
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O'Oonor answered in a general polite way, but did not 
encourage the Sultan because he was certain that, if any 
agreement were concluded, all the burden would be on the 
side of Britain.
In spite of the Sultan's fine words, certain pending 
questions between Britain and Turkey were still unsettled 
by 1901. These included the payment of indemnities of 
losses suffered by Britain at the time of the Armenian 
troubles, the payment by the Sultan for the purchase of à 
cruiser from Armstrongs, a concession for the Haifa- 
Bamascus railway and a settlement regarding the Salonica 
post o f f i c e . I t  was to O'Oonor's credit that he took a 
firm stand in demanding the settlement of these questions. 
Eventually resort had to be made to a movement of the 
British fleet to put pressure upon the Sultan. The 
movement of the fleet, the stern language held in London 
to the Turkish ambassador^and the diplomatic pressure 
exerted by O'Oonor at Constantinople all combined to make 
the Sultan give way and order a settlement of the questions
(1) O'Oonor to Lansdowne, 3 May 1901; P.0 .78/5126. 
Tel. No. 34.
(2) Lansdowne to O'Oonor, 23 May, 1901; P.O.78/5125, 
Tel. No. 56.
(3) Sanderson to O'Oonor, 25 May and 26 May, 1901;
P.0.78/5125, Priv.
Sanderson to Lansdowne, 27 May, 1901; P.O.277/31.
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which was satisfactory to B r i t a i n . T h e  prestige of the 
British embassy at Constantinople was increased by this 
success, which represented a triumph for 0’Conor who pre­
vailed upon the Sultan without losing his friendship.
In December 1902 the Sultan asked O'Oonor's advice 
"as a friend rather than as an Ambassador" regarding the 
steps which Turkey should take to deal with unrest in 
Macedonia. Abdul Hamid waxed sentimental and recounted 
how his father had been fortunate enough to have Ambassadors 
accredited to him who were sincere friends. The Sultan 
mentioned Lord Stratford and said that he remembered, as a 
child, his coming frequently to the Palace, laughing and 
joking with his father:
"and many a time had he lifted him, a mere boy, 
in his arms and carressed him."
Abdul Hamid lamented that he had not had the luck of his
father: there had been no other ambassador whom he could
regard in the light of an intimate f r i e n d ; a l t h o u g h ,
it must be admitted that the Sultan was doing his best
with O'Oonor!
In 1901 certain influential persons in Britain and
Germany were once more doing their best to bring their two
(1) O'Oonor to Lansdowne, 5 June, 1901; P.O.78/5126. No. 64.
(2) O'Oonor to Lansdowne, 19 Dec., 1902; P.O.78/5194.
No. 533 Confid.
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countries together - even to the extent of an alignment.
The conduct of the unofficial negotiations was facilitated 
by the fact that Lansdowne had succeeded Salisbury as 
Foreign Secretary, although Salisbury remained Prime Minister. 
Lansdowne was not nearly so convinced as Salisbury of the 
safety of Britain standing as she did, unattached to either 
of the tv/o great Continental groups of Powers. He was 
ready to receive with sympathetic attention any overtures 
from Germany. In spring 1901 the leading figure on the 
German side was Eckardstein, the first Secretary of the 
German Embassy in London. His great ambition was to con­
clude an Anglo-German alliance and, at this time, he was 
given scope for his activities, as the German Ambassador, 
Hatzfeldt, was ill. Acting on the principle that the end 
would justify the means, Eckardstein distorted the facts 
of the situation both in Germany and in Britain, so that 
the negotiations were c o n f u s e d . B u t  when Hatzfeldt was 
well enough to resume his duties as ambassador and, on 
23 May, had an important conversation with Lansdowne, the 
issue was clarified. Hatzfeldt suggested that an alliance 
should be concluded between the British Empire on the one
(1) Memorandum by Salisbury, 29 May, 1901; B.B.II, No. 86. 
Memorandum by Lansdowne, 11 Nov., 1901; Ibid, No. 92,
Very seer.
(2) W.L. Langer, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 728-732.
308. 2
hand and the Triple Alliance on the o t h e r . W h i l e  
Hatzfeldt thought that agreement should be reached on this 
general principle before concrete terms were discussed, 
lansdowne was anxious to discuss details. He had been 
promised a memorandum by E c k a r d s t e i n . T h e  memorandum 
never materialised. This fact, together with the extreme 
reluctance of Salisbury to contemplate Britain's adherence 
to the Triple Alliance and the general confusion caused in 
Berlin and in London by Eckardstein's misreporting of the 
views of the Ministers concerned resulted in the dropping 
of the negotiations until November.
In the period a crisis developed between Britain and 
Germany over Kuweit on the Persian Gulf. Britain had 
important interests in the Persian Gulf which she had 
tried to safeguard in 1899 by concluding a secret agreement 
with the Sheikh of Kuweit who undertook not to grant con­
cessions to third parties or to cede any part of his terri­
tory without the consent of the British Government.
The Sheikh of Kuweit was in fact an independent luler,
(1) Memorandum'by Lansdowne, 24 May, 1901, B.B.II. No. 82 
Enclosure.
Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, 23 May, 1901; 
G.P. XVII No. 5010. Tel.
(2) Lansdowne to Eckardstein, 24 May, 1901; B.B. II, No. 84.
(3) Secret Agreement of 23 Jan., 1899; B.D. X (11), 
pp. 194-5.
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although, in theory, his territories were on the outer 
fringe of the Ottoman Empire. In August 1901 Turkish troops 
were sent to Kuweit and the Sultan tried to strengthen his 
hold on those territories. Britain at once protested and 
prevented the disembarkation of the Turkish troops.
The action of Britain aroused great alarm at Berlin, for 
the Germans felt the need to secure the terminus of the 
Bagdad railway at Kuweit and they greatly feared a protec- 
torate over Kuweit by B r i t a i n . T h e  Germans accordingly 
used strong language to Britain, hcttcrnich (the new German 
ambassador in London) declared that a British protectorate 
would be regarded as "an unfriendly act to Germany in con­
sequence of her interest in Kuweit as the terminus of the 
Bagdad r a i l w a y . Britain had in fact no intention of 
declaring a protectorate for she realised that it would 
raise "International questions which had better remain 
quiescent".(4) m  that Britain required was that Turkey 
should understand that Britain would not allow her to
( 1 ) ' IÎ.3.K. Gorripan, British, French and German Interests 
in /slatle Turkey, IGLl-l^Y^r 'Unpublished"thesis of 
university oi’ London, 'j.kVi. , 1954-, pp. 232-234.
(2) ■ Richthofen to .iarschall, 6 larch, 1901; O-.P. XVII,
No. 5289.
(3) imemorandum by Oanderson, 29 Aug., 1901; Id■■>.78/9173. 
Bulow to Eckardstein, 29 Aug., 1901; G.n. XVII,
No. 5292.
(4) Minute of Lansdowne, undated on India Office to foreign 
Office; 1.0.78/517 3.
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strengthen her hold over Kuweit to the detriment of 
Britain's position in the Persian G u l f . W h e n  this fact 
was accepted at Berlin, Germany's fears died away and the 
Crisis p a s s e d . B u t  Holstein drew the important moral 
that if questions such as Kuweit could come to a head 
between Britain and Germany, there could be no more talk 
of an alliance, but, at best, of two antagonists.^^)
In the meantime, however, Lansdowne had given his 
serious attention to the German proposal of the Spring 
regarding an Anglo—German alliance. The Foreign Secretary 
thought that it was "out of the question" that Britain 
should entertain the German overture.in the form in which 
it was presented by Hatzfeldt; but he would not refuse all 
further discussion of the question, for the objections to 
Britain joining the Triple Alliance did not seem to him to 
apply to a much more limited understanding with Germany as 
to Britain's policy in regard to certain matters of interest 
to both Powers. Lansdowne thought that it would be valuable 
to conclude an understanding on the lines of the Anglo-
(1) Lansdowne to O'Oonor, 3 Sept., 1901; F.0 .277/31.
(2) Bulow to Marschall, 4 Oct., 1901; G.P. XVII,
No. 5311. Tel.
(3) Holstein to Metternich, 4 Sept., 1901; Ibid, No. 5296, 
Priv. Tel.
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Italian Agreement of 188?.^^) Britain and Germany might 
agree tjiat they had a common interest in the maintenance 
of the status quo on the shores of the Mediterranean, the 
Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Seas and in the mainte­
nance of the freedom for the commerce and navigation of all 
nations in the Persian Gulf and the prevention of any 
territorial acquisitions by other Powers v/hich might inter­
fere with that object. The two Powers might agree to co­
operate in the furtherance of this policy, the nature of 
the co-operation to be determined whenever the occasion 
for it might arise.
It would obviously be to the advantage of Britain that 
the status quo should not be disturbed at Constantinople, 
in Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria, in Tripoli and Morocco 
and in Egypt and that Russia and Germany should be excluded 
from establishing themselves strategically on the shores of 
the Persian Gulf. In a sense, lansdowne was attempting to 
revert to the relations which prevailed between Britain and 
the Powers of the Triple Alliance in 188?. But there was 
one important difference: in 188? Britain had been con­
nected with the Triple Alliance through her close relation-, 
ship with Austria-Hungary and Italy and her connection with
(1) Memorandum by Lansdowne, 11 Nov.., 1901; B.B. II,
No. 92, very seer.
(2) Memorandum by Lansdowne, 12 Dec., 1901; B.B. II, No. 93.
312.
Germany v/as only indirect. In 1901 lansdowne wanted the 
relationship with Germany to be.direct. He was disappointed 
in his hopes, for Metternich very quickly made it plain 
that Germany wanted a full-blown alliance or nothing. He 
said quite bluntly;
"It was a case of the whole or none."^^)
In 1 9 0 2 , however, it seemed that there might be a 
prospect of Britain once more approaching the Triple 
Alliance through Austria-Hungary and Italy. The attempt 
made by Russia, in September, to send through the Straits 
into the Black Sea, four torpedo boats, which had been con­
structed at Cronstadt,(^) resulted in a re-opening of 
discussions on the Straits question between the Cabinets 
of London, Vienna, Rome and Berlin. It was then revealed 
that there had been a genuine misunderstanding at the 
Continental capitals regarding the importance which Britain 
attached to the Straits. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador 
in London, Leym, revealed that Goluchowski had inferred 
from the statements which Salisbury had made in Spring 
1 8 9 6  that it was unlikely that Britain would take an active
(1) Lansdowne to Lascelles, 19 Leo., 1901; Ibid, No. 94.
(2 ) O'Oonor to Lansdov/ne, 2 Sept., 1902; P.O.78/5248.
No. 3 8 9  Conf.
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interest in the Straits q u e s t i o n . L a n s d o w n e  pointed 
out to the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires that 
Salisbury:
"Had never said anything which could properly ^ 
be interpreted as an announcement that /Britain/" 
had ceased to take an interest in the question 
of the Straits. On the contrary ... he had 
guarded himself against such an admission, and 
that on every occasion when vessels of war had 
been allowed to pass the Straits had placed on 
record a protest on behalf of the British 
Government and reserved the right to resort 
to such consequent measures as might seem to 
them appropriate." (2)
4 . .~=
Lansdowne wished Austro-Hungary and Italy to act simul­
taneously with Britain in representing to the Porte that 
the admission of the four Russian torpedo vessels through 
the Straits would be contrary to the Treaty obligations of 
Turkey and that, if they were allowed to pass, those 
countries would reserve the right to claim corresponding 
p r i v i l e g e s . T h e  Foreign Secretary hoped that this common 
action would be the precursor to a discussion à trois of 
the Straits question.
On 20 November Plunkett (the British ambassador in
(1) Lansdowne to Plunkett, 17 Nov., 1902; Ibid, No. 137, 
Conf.
(2) Lansdowne to Plunkett, 9 Nov., 1902; Ibid, No. 133.
(3) Lansdowne to Rodd, 18 Nov^, 1902; Ibid, Tel. No. 49.
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Vienna) reported Goluchowski as saying that he hoped that 
he might before long hear from Lansdowne in regard to the 
renewal of the "accord à trois". Goluchowski believed 
that a fresh arrangement on the lines of the former would 
be most desirable.
But as the days went by it was gradually revealed that 
Austria-Hungary was not prepared to play the role which 
Lansdowne expected of her even in the specific matter of 
the four Russian torpedo boats. By the third week in 
December Goluchowski had still not sent instructions to his 
ambassador in Constantinople to make representations to the 
Porte. Vdien Milbanke discussed the subject unofficially 
with Count Lltzow of the Vienna Foreign Office the latter 
expressed the opinion that Galice would not be instructed 
to make any but the vaguest and most general representations 
at Constantinople. Liitzow explained that, in view of the 
approaching visit to Vienna of Count Lamsdorff (the Russian 
Foreign Secretary) and the excellent relations which 
existed between Austria and Russia, which were of so great 
importance in regard to the Macedonian question, the 
Austrians were loth to do anything which might be taken 
badly at St. Petersburg and the question of the Straits was
(1) Plunkett to Lansdowne, 20 Nov., 1902; Ibid, No. 279 
Conf.
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naturally one on which the Russians were particularly 
sensitive.
lansdowne commented on Milbanke's report: "this is 
very unsatisfactory." The Foreign Secretary's hopes of 
reviving the"accord à trois^were to be disappointed. 
Goluchowski was to steadfastly maintain the view that 
Britain should be in the first line and Austria-Hungary 
only in the second line with regard to any action to be 
taken respecting the Straits. In fact both lansdowne.and 
Goluchowski had to a certain extent bluffed in their pro­
nouncements of November 1902. Although it was true that 
Britain was still interested in the Straits, it had by this 
time become accepted that Britain could not do anything 
materially to prevent Russia occupying Constantinople and 
obtaining free access from the Black Sea through the Darda­
nelles. Indeed, after Fashoda and after the strengthening 
of Britain's positions in Egypt, it was decided that the 
circumstance of Russia obtaining free access through the 
Straits "would not fundamentally alter the present strategic 
position in the Mediterranean."^^)
(1) Milbanke to lansdowne, 18 Dec., 1902; F.0 .277/1. 
Private.
(2) Memorandum by Hardinge respecting the Passage of Russian 
War Vessels through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,
16 Nov., 1 9 0 6 . Includes Extract from Defence Committee 
Paper IB, 13 Feb., 1903; & D .  IV, p. 5 8 .
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As far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, the real 
parting of the ways took place in 1897 when the Austro- 
Russian Agreement was concluded. Although after this time 
certain Russian actions aroused irritation at Vienna and on 
occasion Austro-Russian relations were strained, Goluchowski 
philosophically decided that neither party to an under­
standing, however intimate, could he expected entirely to 
surrender his independence of views on certain points and 
continued to believe that the best hope for Austria-Hungary's 
future security lay in the Agreement with Russia.
Certainly, in 1902, the area from which most danger to 
peace was to be feared was Macedonia where considerable 
unrest was manifested. In the concerted effort of Austria- 
Hungary and Russia to press the Sultan to undertake remedial 
measures for the situation in Macedonia lay the best hope 
for peace.
The improved relations between Britain and Turkey at 
the beginning of the twentieth century came too late to 
make any material difference in the situation. The Sultan 
was still afraid of Russia who, after all, was his nearest 
neighbour, and he was still much influenced by Germany who 
was the greatest military Power. The future of Turkey was
(1) Rumbold to Salisbury, 13 May, I 8 9 8 ; P.O.7/1273, Ho.157.
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uncertain. In January 1902 O'Oonor wrote privately to 
lansdov/ne expressing the opinion that anarchy might supervene 
in the near future; hut he concluded with the remark that, 
in spite of the partial military outbreaks then taking 
place, he was inclined to take an optimistic view of the 
situation: there could hardly have been an ambassador at
Constantinople for the last fifty years who had not, at 
some time, thought a disruption inevitable, yet it had not 
come.(^)
In 1902 it seemed rash to attempt to forecast the 
future. The only certainty was that the old grouping of 
Powers at Constantinople was no more. The tentative move­
ment of Britain and Prance towards a better relationship 
between their two countries had become more definite.
Gambon was nov/ the Prench ambassador in London. Only two
more years were to pass before the Anglo-Prench Agreements
(2)regarding Egypt and Morocco were concluded.' ' Already, in 
1902, the way was open for a reorientation of British policy.
(1) O'Conor to Lansdowne, 14 Jan., 1902; P.O.277/27.
(2) Texts in B.D. II, pp. 374-398.
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CONCLUSION
In 1890 Salisbury regarded Constantinople and the 
Straits as the "keys to the Eastern question", which still 
occupied a vitally important position in Britain's foreign 
policy. The diplomatic moves of the other European Powers 
at Constantinople were closely watched and any movement of 
Russian ships through the Straits was noted. The events which 
took place in Asiatic Turkey, the Balkan countries and the 
Turkish territories of Africa were a matter of concern to 
Britain who often took decisive action in order to safeguard 
her own interests. It is not true to say that, in the early 
years of the 1890s, the Near East was superseded in impor­
tance by the Far East and the colonial territories.
Salisbury considered the problem of Constantinople and 
the Straits from two different but inter-related points of 
view. He recognized that the keeping of Constantinople out 
of Russian hands had been made a vital article of the British 
political creed for many generations and British prestige 
had become tied up with it. If Constantinople were to fall 
under Russian influence, the blow would be tremendous: the
party which had that item on their record would share the 
fate of Lord North's party. Until 1897 Salisbury consistently
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worked with the object of delaying Russia's advance towards 
Constantinople and of checking Russia's attempts to achieve a 
diplomatic supremacy in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.
His most important action was to enlist the aid of 
Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary. The latter Power was even 
more vitally interested than Britain in maintaining the status 
quo at Constantinople and in the Straits. Salisbury recog­
nized that not only did Austria-Hungary and Britain share 
this common interest, but their interests clashed nowhere: 
Austria-Hungary was Britain's only real friend in Europe.
When, during fend after 1896, Salisbury's doubts about 
Britain's ability to defend the Straits and to maintain a 
strong diplomatic position at Constantinople increased, he 
continued publicly to adhere to his former policy, because, 
although it was no longer so important in itself to Britain, 
it was important as a means towards another end - the 
retention of the friendship of Austria-Hungary and the 
prevention of the formation of the Dreikaiserbund.
The doubts of the Directors of Naval and Military 
Intelligence concerning Britain's ability to defend the 
Straits were of a much earlier origin than Salisbury's.
In 1891 they warned Salisbury that it would be too dangerous 
to employ any portion of the British Mediterranean fleet at
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the extreme eastern end of the Mediterranean, because the ships 
would not only be at the end of somewhat precarious communica- 
tions but, detaching them^<would hand over for a time the
f ' y
maritime preponderance in the western Mediterranean to the 
French. The immediate reaction of Salisbury to this state­
ment was the caustic comment that, since "the main object" 
of British policy in the Mediterranean was declared to be 
entirely out of reach, it was questionable whether Britain 
should keep a fleet in the Mediterranean at all: if the
fleet were retained in Portsmouth Harbour, it would at least 
be safe from any possible attack and a very considerable 
relief would be given to the Budget of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer! Salisbury never properly understood naval matters. 
His daughter records that he once bitterly enquired:
"What is the use of a fleet if it is never to be 
taken out of silver paper for fear of the paint 
getting scratched?" (1)
He quickly allowed the information of the Directors of Naval
and Military Intelligence to recede into the background of
his mind, for there were diplomatic considerations also to be
taken into account: Salisbury was certain that any hostile
(1) G. Cecil, Biographical Studies of Lord Salisbury
(printed for private circulation, London, l94S), p.35.
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move made by Russia against Constantinople and the Straits 
would at once arouse the opposition of the other European 
Powers and as long as Britain maintained her close relation­
ship with Austria-Hungary and the other Powers of the Triple 
Alliance, their assistance could be utilised to hold the 
French in check.
The Cabinet's refusal to allow the fleet to go through 
the Straits in November 1895 came as a shock to Salisbury 
and constituted a psychological turning point. Although 
he strove throughout 1896 and the early months of 1897 
to carry on his policy as before, the diplomatic setbacks 
which he met with in those years served to increase his 
despondency. Britain could not maintain an active interest 
in Constantinople, the Straits, and the surrounding terri­
tories if she had no means of enforcing her demands on the 
Sultan.
Even at the beginning of the period, British diplomacy 
was not in itself sufficient to carry great weight at 
Constantinople. The measure of success attained bore a 
direct relationship to the measure of support accorded by 
Germany and her friends of the Triple Alliance. But, as 
Germany's economic interests in Turkey increased, so she
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■became correspondingly less willing to endanger them by 
giving political support to Britain. She was reluctant to 
forfeit the Sultan's good-will by associating herself with 
Britain in pressing demands for reform upon the Sultan. 
Indeed, she was suspicious of Britain's repeated attempts 
to coerce the Sultan into accepting reforms; she asked 
herself whether Britain really wished to maintain the status 
quo or whether Britain was not secretly working for the 
downfall of the Ottoman Empire. These suspicions came to a 
head in 1895 when the Germans became convinced that Salisbury 
wished to partition Turkey.
In fact, Salisbury, believing that the only hope for 
the Ottoman Empire lay in reform, was, by the energetic exe­
cution of the reform policy, doing his utmost to ensure the 
Empire's continued existence. Salisbury never wavered in 
his loyalty to Austria-Hungary. Even wHen, after the worst 
excesses of violence against the Armenians, Salisbury asked 
for the co-operation of the Tsar to depose the Sultan, he 
made it clear that there could be no concessions to Russia 
in the Straits; Britain could not abandon Austria-Hungary 
after she had stood by her for so long.
The Germans had, however, already sowed the seeds of 
their own suspicions in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian
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Foreign Secretary, Goluchowski. He craved for reassurance 
as to Britain's intentions in the Near East and sought to 
substitute for the vague agreements of 1887 a more definite 
agreement by which Britain would be committed to fight for 
the defence of Constantinople and the Straits. Unlike his 
predecessor, Kalnoky, he did not understand that Britain, 
governed by Parliamentary institutions, could not pledge 
herself in advance to go to war and Salisbury's refusal to 
enter into new engagements confirmed his suspicions that 
Britain was no longer to be trusted. In spring 1897 
Goluchowski sought security in an agreement with Russia to 
maintain the status quo in the Near East.
Although the Cretan troubles brought about a temporary 
resurrection of the Dreikaiserbund, the tradition of co­
operation between Britain and the Powers of the Triple 
Alliance in the Near East was sufficiently strong to survive 
and, in 1901, Lansdowne came near to re-creating the old 
grouping of Powers in order to counter Russian activities 
in the Straits. He failed ultimately because the confidence 
of the three Continental Powers in British Policy was no 
longer strong enough to form a basis for collaboration; 
they insisted on a definite commitment by Britain to support 
the Triple Alliance. Lansdowne felt no more able than
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Salisbury had done to enter into written engagements 
involving an obligation to go to war. Britain turned away 
from the Triple Alliance and the movement was accelerated as 
Egypt came more and more to displace Constantinople as the 
focua of Britain's interest in the Near East.
After Fashoda and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904,
Britain's position in Egypt was assured. She had Alexandria
\
as a naval base and could strengthen her naval power in 
the Mediterranean so that she could say in 1903 that the
opening of the Straits would not fundamentally alter the 
strategic position. Moreover, the diplomatic support of the 
Powers of the Triple Alliance was no longer necessary to 
Britain in the Egyptian question. There were no further 
obligations to Austria-Hungary in the Near East 
to be considered: the Dual Monarchy had chosen to
look fo its agreement with Russia as a source of security. 
The way was open for a reorientation of British policy.
325.
APPENDIX I
British Diplomatic Representation at Constantinople,
1890 - 1902
Sir William White, Ambassador, 1 January 1887-27 December 1891.
Sir Edmund Fane, Charge^ d'Affaires, 25 June 1891-20 January,
1892.
Sir Clare Ford, Ambassador, 12 January 1892-25 December 1893.
Sir Edmund V. d. Fane, Minister, 21 January 1892-26 February
1893.
Sir Arthur Nicolson, Charg/ d'Affaires, 6 June 1893-10 February
_ 1894.
Sir Philip Wodehouse, Ambassador, 1 January 1894-30 June 1898.
Sir Michael Herbert, Charge^ d'Affaires, 29 October 1896-8
September 1896.
Mr. M.W.E. de Bunsen, Charg/ d'Affaires, 27 May 1896-21 Septem­
ber 1898.
Sir Nicholas Rodrick O'Conor, Ambassador, 1 July 1898-1 Septem­
ber 1900.
Mr. de Bunsen, Charge''d'Affaires, 13 September 1900-29 August
1902.
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APPENDIX II
Lord Salisbury's Memorandum of 4 June 1892
Most Confia. Printed for Cabinet, 8 June 1892.
Salisbury Papers, confidential
prints.
A joint report of the Director of Military Intelligence and 
the Director of Naval Intelligence has just been placed in my 
hands by the direction of the Lords of the Admiralty, who 
concur in it. It has reference to the possibility of a descent 
of Russia upon Constantinople and upon the attitude which 
should be observed by this country in case of such an event.
I do not think it to be urgent, because, as far as it is 
possible to judge, a Russian descent is not imminent at 
present. They are not prepared for a general war, their fleet 
is not complete, their military armament is imperfect and 
their finance is in disorder.
I do not therefore advert to it as a matter requiring 
the immediate attention of H.M's Government. But it is of 
the gravest possible moment and the early attention of whoever 
is responsible for the conduct of public affairs cannot be 
withheld from it without public danger for very long.
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For the upshot of this Report is that the Foreign Office 
on the one side and the Defence Department on the other have 
been proceeding on Lines as far divergent as it is possible for 
lines of policy to diverge and it is evident that, if this 
difference is maintained until the moment for action arrives, 
nothing but the most serious disaster can be the result.
The protection of Constantinople from Russian Conquest 
has been the turning point of the policy of this country for 
at least forty years and to a certain extent for forty years 
before that. It has been constantly assumed, both in England 
and abroad, that this protection of Constantinople was the 
special interest of Great Britain. It is our principle, if 
not our only, interest in the Mediterranean Sea; for, if 
Russia were mistress of Constantinople and of the influence 
which Constantinople possesses in the Levant, the route to 
India through the Suez Canal would be so much exposed as 
not to be available except in times of the profoundest 
peace.
I need not dwell upon the effect which the Russian 
possession of Constantinople would have upon the Oriental mind 
and upon our position in India, which is so largely dependent 
upon prestige. But the matter of present importance is its 
effect upon the Mediterranean and I cannot see, if
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Constantinople were no longer defensible, that any other 
interest in the Mediterranean is left to defend. The value 
of Malta, our only possession inside that sea, would at all 
events be diminished to an infinite degree.
It now appears from this Report that, in the opinion of 
General Chapman and Captain Bridge, it is not only not pos­
sible for us to protect Constantinople, but that any effort 
to do so is not permissible. Even supposing the fortifications 
in the Dardanelles could be silenced, even supposing the 
Sultan asked for our presence in the Bosphorus to defend him 
against Russian attack, it would yet be, in the judgement of 
these two officers, a step of the gravest peril to employ 
any portion of the British Mediterranean fleet in protecting 
him. The peril would arise, not from any danger we might 
incur in meeting the Russian forces, not from the strength of 
any fortifications the fleet would have to pass, but from the 
fact that this is the extreme end of the Mediterranean and 
that, so long as the French fleet exists at Toulon, the 
function of the English fleet must be to remain in such a 
position as to prevent the French fleet at Toulon from 
escaping into the Atlantic and the English Channel, where it 
would be a grave peril to this country. They conclude, 
therefore, that unless we had the concurrence of the French,
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which is of course an absurd hypothesis or, unless we had at 
first destroyed the French fleet at Toulon, which at all 
events must be a very distant contir^ncy, it is not legitimate 
for us to employ our fleet at the Eastern end of the Mediter­
ranean. The presence of the French fleet in the harbour of 
Toulon, without any declaration of hostile intention or any 
hostile act, has the power of entirely immobilizing and there­
fore neutralizing any force that we possess or could bring 
under existing circumstances into the Mediterranean.
Two very grave questions arise from this tragic declara­
tion which it must be the task of H.M.'s Government, before 
any long period has elapsed, definitely to answer.
In the first place, it is a question whether any advan­
tage arises from keeping a fleet in the Mediterranean at all. 
The main object of our policy is declared to be entirely out 
of reach and it is laid down that even a movement to attain 
it would be full of danger. There is nothing else in the 
Mediterranean which is worth the maintenance of so large 
and costly a force. If its main duty is to protect the 
Atlantic and the Channel, it had better go there. If it is
retained in Portsmouth Harbour, it will, at least, be safe 
from any possible attack on the part of the fleet at Toulon 
and a very considerable relief will be given to the Budget of
330.
the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Secondly, the other consideration is that our foreign 
policy requires to he speedily and avowedly revised. At present 
it is supposed that the fall of Constantinople would he a 
great defeat for England. That defeat appears to he not a 
matter of speculation, hut of absolute certainty, according 
to the opinion of these two distinguished officers, because 
we may not stir a finger to prevent it. It would surely be 
more in the interests of our own reputation to let it be 
known as quickly as possible that we do not pretend to defend 
Constantinople and that the protection of it from Russian 
attack is not, in our eyes worthy of the sacrifices of the 
risks which such an effort would involve. At present, if the 
two officers in question are correct in their views, our 
policy is a policy of false pretences. If persisted in, it 
will involve discomfiture to all who trust in us and infinite 
discredit to ourselves.
I would merely say, in conclusion, that this momentous 
question is not one which either the Admiralty or the War 
Office can decide on their own responsibility. The Cabinet 
which undertakes to decide it (and the decision cannot be 
long delayed) must have at its command the opinion of all that 
England or India can furnish of naval or military strategic
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knowledge. We have been going on for long, evidently 
enormously overrating the utility of our fleet for any purpose 
except that of bare coast defence at home. It is very impor­
tant that the real facts, however disagreeable they may be, 
should be ascertained and presented in the clearest light to 
those who are responsible for the policy of the Empire.
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APPENDIX III
Lord Salisbury's Conversations with the Tsar at 
Balmoral, 27 and 29 September, 1896
Cabinet Memorandum by Lord Salisbury 27 and 29 September 
1896. Salisbury Private Papers, P.O. (Private Corres­
pondence) Vol.89, Cabinet Memoranda, No.20. Very 
Secret.
"I saw the Emperor of Russia tonight between 7 and 8.30. 
He was, of course, purely Russian in his views, but, subject 
to that qualification, his language was conciliâtoiy, straight­
forward, and honest. He made me begin the conversation; 
and throughout he initiated little.
There was one central point on which he felt veiy 
strongly: there were a number of subsidiary points on which
he spoke quite clearly, but without any strong feeling. I 
will take the latter first.
He was distinctly in favour of maintaining at present 
the territorial status quo in Turkey. On this point he 
received my views approvingly, but did not pledge himself 
as to the immediate steps to be taken. He agreed that it 
was dangerous for any Power to attempt to coerce Turkey by 
occupying any portion of her territory, because to do so 
would awaken a jealousy among the Powers so keen that it 
might lead to war; but, on the other hand, he agreed that it
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was dangerous to leave matters as they are, for many causes, 
and chiefly financial pressure, might speedily bring the 
Ottoman Empire to anarchy, and then the isolated action of 
some Power or other - especially Austria - became probable 
and would in all likelihood lead to European war. Therefore, 
something must be done. Our procedure could not, for the 
reasons stated, be levelled against the territory of the 
Empire, therefore, it must be directed against the Sultan 
himself. He recognized that the deposition of the Sultan 
might be a necessary step, and that it was only through the 
agency of a Sultan that better government for the Turkish 
Empire could be gained. He doubted who the next heir would 
be. I replied that he must be selected according to the rule 
prevalent in the House of Ottoman, but that whoever he might 
be, when he took the Sultanate he would know that his 
predecessor had been deprived of it by the voice of the 
Powers and he would know that if he shocked the feeling of 
Europe, or disregarded the voice of the Powers, a similar 
fate might await himself. Premising, therefore, my distrust 
of paper reforms, and Constitutions created for the purpose, I 
expressed the belief that the best guarantee of good govern­
ment we could obtain would not be in formal Constitutions and 
Organic Laws which might be instituted by the presence of the
I
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Ambassadors, but without a guarantee for their observance would 
have no practical effect whatever. Such a guarantee could 
only be sought in the Sultan's fears, I thought the mere 
knowledge of his predecessor's fate would make the successor 
pay due regard to the advice of the Powers, and that no other 
security was needed or would be of much use. He listened to 
these observations - demurred to none of them, and assented 
to most of them from time to time with varying emphasis.
I ended by saying that, as he agreed in the main to these 
views, I should make a formal proposal to his Foreign Minister, 
as soon as he had one, to the effect of my proposal last 
week to Austria, of which I informed him, viz, that the 
ambassadors should be directed to consult as to the changes 
that were necessary in order to prevent a recurrence of the 
pecent cruelties, that whatever the Six Powers were all agreed 
upon the Sultan should be compelled to accept. I further 
suggested that our Ambassadors should be instructed that a 
change of Sultan was probably a desirable expedient. His 
attitude and language throughout this part of the conversation 
were assenting, but without warmth .... As to Egypt, he told 
me that was the matter about which the French were most keen."
^Salisbury did not see his way to a very early evacuation.]
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"Later on I referred to Nicholas' proposal in 1851 to 
Sir G.H. Seymour, when he wished to consider the heritage 
of the Sick Man, and proposed we should have Egypt in the 
distribution. He said he had no objection to our having 
Egypt. I added that the Emperor Nicholas had proposed that 
France should have Syria; he seemed to think that too 
little ..." j^India and Persia].
In regard to Armenia, he ridiculed the proposals of some 
philanthropists in England who wished that Russia should 
occupy Armenia. It would be a very costly undertaking, bring­
ing no return to Russia, and it would not benefit the 
Armenians as a whole; for, although those who were in the 
occupied territory might benefit, those outside, who were 
scattered throughout the Turkish Empire would not benefit, but 
would be exposed to the vengeance of the Moslems.
I introduced the subject of the extreme East and 
assured him that England had no desire to hinder the commercial 
and industrial development of Russia in that quarter, because 
all that favoured industry created trade, and it was on trade 
we lived. He accepted these assurances with great apparent 
satisfaction. He said he should try to carry his railway 
through Manchuria, but they had yet no definite project as to 
its outlet. He was confident that there would be no cause
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of friction between Russia and England in that quarter.
Then he advanced his own view, on which he dwelt at 
considerable length, and was thoroughly in earnest. It was 
that the Straits should be under Russian control. I suggested 
that he might without difficulty procure that they should be 
opened to all nations; but that arrangement he emphatically 
said that Russian opinion would reject. The Straits were the 
door to the room in which he lived, end he insisted he 
must have the key of that door. I said that this view implied 
that the Sultan had disappeared, for while he was there, it 
was only he that could have the control of the Straits. To 
some extent, he replied that was true; he was forecasting 
the future. In dealing with the immediate present, he said 
he was in favour of the status quo. But, he added, he could 
conceive the Sultan remaining, even though Russia had command 
of the Straits. Russia did not want Constantinople or any 
of the Turkish territory on either side. She only wanted the 
door, and the power of fortifying it.
I asked how he thought Roumanie would like that 
arrangement. He said that difficulty had never occurred to 
him, but it was not a matter of great importance. I asked how 
he thought Italy and France would like the introduction of a 
new Naval Power into the Mediterranean. He seemed surprised
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at the idea that either should object. I pointed out that 
Italy, with her long line of maritime coast, had a deep
interest in the question whether she would have to defend it
against one Power or against two. France was mistress of the 
Mediterranean so far as the States bordering on any one of 
the three Continents was concerned and the introduction of 
Russia to the Mediterranean would be challenge to that 
supremacy. But France, he said, will hot think we mean to go
to war with her. I replied, not now; but men and circumstan­
ces change and they have to guard against an unknown future.
I told him that Waddington had been very earnest in assuring 
me on that point; the policy of France was unchanged from 
what it was at the time of the Crimean War. He expressed 
great surprise at this statement, but told me he had taken 
no steps to ascertain the feelings of France. I hoped that 
he would ascertain from Hanotaux (whom I praised highly) 
how France would take this change. He promised to ask Hanotaux 
and to let Dufferin know the result.
He insisted much on his own objection to war, and that 
in asking for the key of the door, he had no desire to 
establish a Maritime Power in the Mediterranean. He had a 
fleet in the Black Sea. It consisted of his best and most 
modern vessels. Directly the Straits were open he should send
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those vessels to the Pacific and leave them there.
These were the maritime objections. England's objection, 
I said, was of the same order, so far as her interests were 
concerned. But I did not pretend that our interest in the 
matter was of so urgent a character as that of either of these 
Powers. Our direct interest in the Mediterranean was at 
present confined to Malta and Egypt. But there was a more 
serious objection which was not mainly maritime and that was 
the one that came from Austria. I expressed in strong 
language my sense of the importance to Europe of the exis­
tence of Austria, and my feeling that after having pursued 
this policy by her side for so many years, there would be 
something of "bassesse" in our conduct if we left her in the 
lurch. As I understood, Austria's impression was that the 
master of the Straits would have full control over the present 
Turkish dominions lying between Bulgaria and the Aegean Sea, 
and Austria could not allow herself to be surrounded by 
Russia. To protect herself by taking Salonica and the 
territory which lay behind it, would expose her to another 
and an internal danger - the upsetting of the balance between 
the Slavonic and the non-Slavonic elements of her Empire.
The mention of Austria produced a series of remarks on 
her condition from the Emperor which showed considerable
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antipathy - though he expressed the deepest respect for the 
actual Emperor. He was sore that Austria should have obtained 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the last war without losing a man or 
spending a shilling, making Russia take the chestnuts out of 
the fire. He expressed a strong view as to her future. He 
thought that she was only held together by respect for the 
present Emperor ... But he repudiated with some emphasis the 
idea that he should attempt to hasten or assist the process 
of her ^Austria's] disintegration by force of arms ....
I expressed the opinion, which he shared, that there 
seemed no cause of opposition between Russia and England 
except this question of the Straits. I thought that the 
interest of England in the matter was not so large as that of 
the others, and was purely maritime. I admitted that the 
theory that Turkish rule at Constantinople was a bulwark to 
our Indian Empire could not be maintained. But I did not 
see how we could abandon the allies by whom we had stood so 
long. The task of Russian and Austrian statesmen should be 
to see whether there was no contrivance by which, not only 
compensation, but security, could be given to Austria in 
the case of any such change taking place on the disappearance 
of the Turkish Empire. I thought that if Austria, France and 
Italy were (in that event) in favour of Russia having control
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of the Straits, England would not maintain her objection 
alone, but would seek for some arrangement by which it could be 
met.
Incidentally, he expressed himself in terms by no means 
friendly to the Emperor of Germany. He said that the Emperor 
was a very nervous man; he (the Emperor of Russia) was 
a quiet man, and he could not stand nervous men. He could 
not endure a long conversation with the Emperor William, as 
he never knew what he would do or say. I understood him to 
say that the Emperor William's manners were bad; that he 
would poke him in the ribs, and slap him on the back like a 
schoolboy ••••
I mentioned incidently, while praising the talents of 
Prince Lobanow, that I thought he had a "guignon" against 
England. The Emperor denied this energetically and said that 
he had talked a great deal to Lobanow oh the subject and was 
convinced that it was not true.
He told me the Emperor of Germany was willing to fall 
in to his views about the Straits, but he had not ventured to 
speak about them to the Emperor of Austria.
The upshot of the conversation I take to be that if we 
give him the Straits he will help us, and will consider 
favourably proposals for compensation to us. If we do not
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give him the Straits, he will only help us formally in regard 
to present difficulties.
29 September
I saw the Emperor again this evening. The Emperor sent for 
me to tell me that he had thought for two days over our 
conversation and that while recognizing the enormous diffi­
culty of doing any good while Abdul Hamid was on the Throne, 
he thought that the deposition of the Sultan was at this stage 
too great a risk to run. It was impossible to say how the 
Moslems would take the proceeding, ^hey had often had 
artificial successions to the Throne created by the murder 
of the Sultan and they had submitted peaceably to his succes­
sor; but they have never had a vacancy created by the action 
of the Christian Powers. He thought it was quite possible 
that they would look on the new Sultan as a creature of the 
Christians and would refuse to obey him - perhaps murder him. 
In that case the intolerable burden of pacifying and governing 
the Turkish Empire would be thrown upon the Powers. I 
recognized that nothing could be done in that direction 
unless the Six Powers were agreed; and I recognized that his 
apprehensions were not without foundation; but I feared that 
if we let the matter slide a graver crisis, the utter
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disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, would he upon us before 
long. I understood him, however, to renew his assent to the 
proposal I had made to Austria, which I have mentioned above. 
But I should not be surprised if his advisers and the French 
Government were to succeed in talking him into inaction. He 
promised to let me know through Lord Dufferin what Hanotaux 
thought of the steps to be taken to meet the present difficul­
ties.
Referring to what he said about Russian control of the 
Straits, I gave my opinion that it was not impossible that 
the claim should be admitted if made after the Turkish Empire 
had disappeared; because the other Powers would all have 
demands to satisfy, and it might be made^part of a general 
arrangement. But I said that the idea, at which he had 
hinted, that this control of the Straits should be given to 
Russia while the Sultan was still at Constantinople, would be 
exceedingly unacceptable to the other Powers and would be 
strongly resisted. It would not be a situation nette. The 
Sultan with his Treaty rights and his religious influence 
would still be there; but he would really only be a mask for 
Russia. He assented, and said he quite understood my 
objection, and would prefer the other arrangement himself. He
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had only proposed the coarse to which I objected because he 
wanted to emphasize what he had said before, that Russia 
wanted no addition to her territory, not the smallest; she 
had enough to occupy her whole energies for a century; but 
he wanted access to his dominions.
In discussing these future matters, I said that I was 
giving him my candid opinion on the questions he raised; but 
that I had colleagues, and Her Majesty's Government had 
allies, and past traditions, and therefore he must not take
any expression of opinion as a pledge. To that he quite
assented.
I mentioned to him at the end of our conversation that 
I apprehended one possible danger, against which we ought 
to be prepared. It is said that the next commotion in 
Constantinople is like to be directed, among others, 
against the æbjects of the Six Powers and, still more,
against the personnel of the Embassies. I said it would be
quite/possible that, if such a thing took place, we could
A
sit still and tolerate it. In this view he emphatically 
agreed. It would be necessary that we should agree upon some 
mode of defending ourselves. I suggested that each Power 
should, in that case, have the liberty of sending up not more 
than three ships of war. He did not contest this view; I
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think he partially approved it. But he did not at all 
fancy the prospect and soon afterwards closed the interview.
Sent to:
Prince of Wales,
Lord Lansdowne,
Duke of Devonshire,
Mr. Chamberlain,
Mr. Goschen,
Lord G. Hamilton,
Mr. Balfour saw it at Hatfield.
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